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Abstract 
 The aims of this thesis were twofold: the first was to develop a reliable 
and valid measure of the control of mental imagery, second was to explore the links 
between imagery, creativity and schizotypy.  The Image Control and Recognition Task 
(ICRT) was developed because a reliable and objective measure of mental imagery 
control was lacking in the field.  Two trend analyses (n = 29 and 31) found the tool to 
effectively measure individual differences in imagery control and the ability to reinterpret 
mental images.   
 A series of related studies using over 300 participants investigated the 
construct validity and reliability of the ICRT and found that it provided an accurate 
measure of both mental imagery control and image recognition, and revealed these to be 
related, yet distinct dimensions of mental imagery.  The tool may be used to indicate 
abilities on a number of imagery control abilities which appear to be related to enhanced 
creative performance, such as evocation, rotation, maintenance and transformation.   
 An investigation with 96 psychology students looked into 
interrelationships between performance-based imagery control (ICRT), self-reported 
mental imagery abilities (vividness and control) and four dimensions of schizotypy 
(unusual experiences, cognitive disorganisation, introvertive anhedonia and impulsive 
nonconformity).  A multiple regression found that mental imagery control, unusual 
  
experiences and cognitive disorganisation scores together predicted 28% of variance in 
creativity scores.   
 The final study, which recruited 40 visual artists and 56 psychology 
students, investigated relationships between mental imagery control, incommodious 
schizotypal traits, and creative performance as measured by battery of creativity tasks and 
a self-report measure of creative achievement.  Significant differences were revealed 
between the artist and non-artist groups in their creativity scores, but no significant 
differences were found between these groups on any index of schizotypy.  Independent 
groups t tests showed that the visual artists had significantly more controlled mental 
imagery and enhanced recognition abilities when compared to the non-artist group.  
Multiple linear regression found that mental imagery control and unusual experiences 
scores, which included associated ratings of distress, distraction, and frequency, both 
explained variance in levels of creative achievement, suggesting that, together, magical 
ideation, unusual imaginal and perceptual experiences, and fantasy proneness, as well as 
the ability to control, manipulate, recombine, reinterpret and „play with‟ mental images is 
implicated in achieving „real-world‟ success in creative domains.  Imagery control 
predicted 8% of the variance in the ability to conceive of conceptually unusual, and 
strikingly original alien creatures when assessed in experimental settings.  The ability to 
control mental imagery shared predictive power with impulsive nonconformity in 
generating alternative uses for household objects explaining 10% of the variance. 
  
 It appears that mental imagery abilities are implicated in creativity as the 
abilities required to control mental imagery were strongly related to higher performance 
on measures of divergent thinking, creative strengths, conceptual expansion, and creative 
achievement.  The results support assertions that all constructs are multidimensional and 
related in differential ways, and tentatively point to the possibility that the associations 
between unusual experiences, mental imagery and enhanced creative achievement may 
be explained in terms of controlled and uncontrolled imagery, for indices of unusual 
experiences may indirectly represent levels of schizotypal imagery. 
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CHAPTER 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREATIVITY & MENTAL 
IMAGERY 
This chapter will review the literature surrounding the reported relationship between 
creativity and mental imagery.  A selection of some of the historical accounts describing 
the link between creative production and mental imagery will be presented, followed by 
cognitive theories of both creative thought and mental imagery.  A discussion of the 
operationalisation of these constructs and the literature focussing on measuring creativity 
and mental imagery in laboratory settings follows this.  Inconsistencies in the literature 
surrounding mental imagery and creativity research will be outlined.  
 
1.1 History of the Relationship between Mental Imagery and Creativity 
There are numerous accounts of both eminent and non-eminent creative individuals 
exploring and manipulating the inner worlds of their mental imageries and utilising these 
abilities while engaged in creative pursuits (LeBoutillier, 1999; LeBoutillier & Marks, 
2003; Perez-Fabello & Campos, 2007; Finke & Slayton, 1988; Finke, Pinker & Farah, 
1989; Finke, 1990).  Vivid and controlled mental imagery, dream-imagery, thought 
experiments and sometimes hallucinations, have been cited by scientists, poets, writers, 
artists and architects as methods of „playing‟ with and reconceptualising ideas, theories 
and abstractions (Mavromatis, 1987; Weisberg, 1993; Ochse, 1990; Barrantes-Vidal, 
  14 
2004).  Some anecdotal reports of creative professionals utilising their mental imagery 
follow. 
 
1.1.1 Anecdotal evidence of the relationship between mental imagery and creativity 
Historically renowned scientists, poets, writers, sculptors, and visual artists have provided 
anecdotal evidence that controlled and vivid mental imagery, in the form of thought 
experiments, lucid dreams, hallucinations, and structured manipulations of images, 
played a significant part in their endeavours (Palmiero, Cardi & Belardinelli, 2011; 
Gooding, 2004; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003; LeBoutillier, 1999; Miller, 1996).  These 
individuals appear to engage in this type of thinking effortlessly, and this facilitative 
influence of enhanced mental imagery has been reported extensively by persons in a 
wide-range of creative professions (Barrantes-Vidal, 2004).  The multifarious properties 
of mental images and the ability to easily control and manipulate them, have been noted 
by artists and scientists alike.   
 
Shepard (1988) reports a “composite caricature of individuals who have reported 
extraordinary instances of visual-spatial creative imagery” (p. 49), and the anecdotal 
evidence supports the claim that many creators can imagine and manipulate complex and 
vivid forms in mental imagery with ease (LeBoutillier, 1999).  Surrealist artist Salvador 
Dali took advantage of detailed, bizarre and elaborate „hypnagogic‟ imagery, the often 
unusual imagery experienced in the period just as one is drifting into sleep (Mavromatis, 
  15 
1987).  Dali claimed he would fall asleep with his head propped on top of a wooden 
spoon so that once he entered into a hypnagogic state the muscles in his neck would relax 
causing his head to „loll‟ thus waking him.  The artist would take advantage of the often 
elaborate imagery which arose during these states, allegedly furiously painting these 
images upon waking (Weisberg, 1993; Mavromatis, 1987).   
 
The poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge said he wrote the epic „Kubla Khan‟, also known as 
„A Vision in a Dream: A Fragment‟ (1797, cited in Shepard, 1978), in an opium-induced 
state, describing vivid images and fantasies which he says ultimately contributed to the 
elaborate imagery encountered in this poem.  The novelists Joan Didion and Judith Guest 
stated that the pictures and images often arose in their minds before any narrative or 
specificity of character did.  These anecdotal accounts highlight the utility of vivid and 
controlled mental imagery in creative and scientifically innovative pursuits.  These 
abilities appear to allow free thought and abstract ideas.  It should be noted that a small 
body of evidence exists to suggest that some creative individuals may have embellished 
certain details pertaining to their creative processes, and the reports lying behind this high 
acclaim may distort reality.  For example, rough drafts of „Kubla Khan‟ were found after 
publication, though the claim by Coleridge had been that the imagery for the piece 
presented itself to him as he wrote (Vernon, 1970).  Findings such as these contribute to 
„the myth of genius‟, a term coined to reflect the supposition that eminent creative 
individuals may at times have exaggerated the routes and means by which their works of 
  16 
„creative genius‟ came to fruition (Weisberg, 1993).  That some exceptional and 
mysterious thought processes result in the creative products mentioned previously is 
referred to as the „genius‟ view (Weisberg, 1993), and being a genius has traditionally 
been viewed as being something of value (Guilford, 1967), in turn leading to status and 
prominence within society.  The genius view may well be supported if the processes 
engendering such high creativity are exaggerated or romanticised, as the embellishments 
of many creative techniques leading to productivity which have been unmasked 
demonstrate (Ochse, 1990).  Critiques of the anecdotal reports of historically creative 
people are cited by Ochse, who points out that both scientific and artistic eminence are 
treated as though they have the same underlying processes, and demonstrate the same 
kinds of creativity, despite their inherently different characteristics.  That is, inventions or 
equations created by scientists and mathematicians are referred to in the same context as 
paintings and poems.  Especially relevant to the following chapter are the suggestions 
that a certain „type‟ of creative personality may commonly be endorsed, including that of 
the „eccentric‟ or „mad genius‟. 
 
As well as eminent visual artists and writers using elements of their mental imagery in 
different ways, many scientists have demonstrated an inclination to engage in similar 
techniques.  In his seminal article on the mental image and its function, Shepard (1978) 
cites illustrious scientists relevant to this debate, two examples being Michael Faraday 
and James Clerk Maxwell.  When contemplating the laws of electrical and magnetic 
  17 
fields, Faraday claimed that visual images contributed to his theories, stating that the 
force fields “rose up before him” (Koestler, 1964; Tyndall, 1868, both cited in Shepard, 
1978, p. 126).  It is claimed that Maxwell in fact made this a habit, that every problem 
had its own “mental picture” (1957, p. 76, cited in Shepard, 1978).  Maxwell developed 
Faraday‟s work by mentally representing each of his mathematical formulae in this way, 
the longer and more elaborate images often leading to the answer.  Reiber (1995) also 
looked at the techniques of scientists when problem solving.  Engineer and inventor 
Nikola Tesla visualised problems and experiments in imagery so precisely that he would 
not put them to paper until they were finalised in his mind, saying “invariably the device 
works as I conceive it should and the experiment comes out exactly as I had planned it” 
(Tesla, 1919, cited in Towe & Randall-May, 1999, p. 499).  The inventor Thomas Edison 
also utilised hypnagogic states to facilitate creativity and would fall asleep with a steel 
ball in his hand over a metal tray.  The ball would drop onto the tray once his grip on it 
relaxed, alerting him to the hypnagogic phase of sleep (Weisberg, 1993), a phase in 
which he would semi-consciously work on problems by guiding the emotive and 
cognitive focus in imagery.  In 1865 the chemist Friedrich August von Kekulé was 
supposedly dosing in a hypnagogic state, after previously considering the problem of how 
to understand the structure of benzene.  In a dream, he encountered images of „snake-
like‟ atoms, and saw one of the snakes curve and bite its own tail, while whirling about in 
front of him (Weisberg, 1993; Holmes, Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008).  The image 
encountered by Kekulé was so significant to him that he instantly awoke; he had „seen‟ 
the answer he had been looking for and knew that the structure of benzene was a ring of 
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six carbon atoms.  Another example comes from Albert Einstein‟s well-known quote “I 
rarely think in words”, which hints at the use of imagery in his work.  Creative 
individuals often allude to a certain „special‟, indescribable quality to their internal 
images and thoughts (Miller, 1996).  An interesting account regarding Einstein‟s imagery 
is provided by Shepard, (1978) and is related to his procedure for conceptualising 
mathematical formulae.  Einstein stated that while developing his theories and equations 
he visualised “certain signs and more or less clear images which can be voluntarily 
reproduced and combined” (Claxton, 2006, p. 351).  Many examples from Einstein‟s 
accounts which implicate the use of mental imagery exist, however, the above anecdote 
encapsulates particularly clearly the importance that mental imagery played in the 
formulation of his ideas and theories, and Einstein reportedly spent much of his time 
engaging in vivid thought experiments.  For example, when tackling such complex 
matters as the Special Theory of Relativity, he imagined riding on a light wave, and 
considered what it would be like for passengers and onlookers to observe lightening 
striking a train in two places at the same time.  Thought experiments such as this, which 
he claims often lead to his solutions (Shepard, 1978; LeBoutillier, 1999).  In a letter to 
Jacques Hadamard in 1945 regarding visual thinking in human thought and reasoning, 
Einstein stated that “Combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive 
thought” (Mednick, 1962, p. 351, cited in Claxton, 2006).  Indeed, he also stated that his 
particular skills lay in “visualising… effects, consequences, and possibilities” (Shepard, 
1978, p. 126).  Collectively these anecdotes suggest that the visual imagery utilised by 
these individuals is primarily of two types.  The first typifies the use of controlled, 
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deliberate and precise visualisation, in which images can be voluntarily manipulated, and 
the second relates to more spontaneous and uncontrolled imagery, which may arise in 
moments of insight, and which appear to be, at least partly, out of the experient‟s 
immediate control.   
 
Studying eminent creative and innovative individuals has revealed some common 
techniques utilised by them during the creative process (Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley, & 
Corr, 2006a; Simonton, 2003; Sternberg, 2005, 2006; Barron, 1966), and, as was just 
outlined, one of these is the use of mental imagery, with its fundamentality to the efficacy 
and even discovery of creative ideas and theories (Glazek, 2012; Palmiero, Nakatani, 
Raver, Olivetti, Belardinelli, & van Leeuwen, 2010; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2009; Perez-
Fabello & Campos, 2007).  Many of these cases are linked to unconscious altered states, 
introspection, dream-like or hypnagogic imagery and moments of insight, all of which 
may invoke different types of mental imagery.  It appears that the ability to apprehend 
and control visual images in these ways is useful in these professions, professions which 
are generally considered inherently creative by nature, and which no doubt involve 
comprehending new ideas, theories, solutions, and essentially the transferral of imagined 
concepts and visualisations into forms accessible to others.  What is less clear is how to 
study this relationship, and the reasons for this are considered in the following sections. 
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1.2 Operationalising Creativity and Mental Imagery 
Both of the constructs under review in this chapter have been extensively studied and 
attempts to operationalise both are ongoing (Burton, 2003; Ganis, Thompson & Kosslyn, 
2004; Batey, 2012; Silvia, Kaufman & Pretz, 2009; Runco, 2009; Ward, 2007; Silvia, 
Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011; Kim, 2011; Claxton, 2006; Sternberg, 2005).  
This section will review theories of creativity and mental imagery and attempts at 
definition. 
 
1.2.1 Defining creativity and attempts at operationalisation 
Early investigators saw creative problem solving as a context for studying creativity and 
focused on several stages which utilised unconscious processing of ideas for creative 
success (Poincaré, 1826 and Hadamard, 1945, both cited in Welling, 2007; Wallas, 
1926).  In his creative problem solving model, which was adapted from Poincaré‟s 
theory, Wallas described these stages.  „Preparation‟ refers to the utilisation of prior 
knowledge and practice in problem solving where some expertise is beneficial and is 
thought to be the crucial first stage of creative production.  During „incubation‟, the 
unconscious mind works freely in a way that perhaps it cannot do whilst consciously 
focussing on a problem and that this time away from the task can ultimately lead to 
creativity (Runco, 2004; Boden, 2004).  Periods of incubation, where conscious attention 
to the problem is temporarily halted and the unconscious mind is free to “associate and 
restructure” ideas (Aldous, 2007, p. 177), may, according to Wallas, precede a phase of 
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„intimation‟ where the creator feels the solution will soon be reached.  The penultimate 
stage is „illumination‟ which may be experienced as a sudden insight or the solution 
suddenly entering consciousness, as was briefly described in section 1.1.1.  Hadamard 
(1945) called this the Aha moment in his classical model of creative problem solving, 
which also incorporated these phases.  Perhaps the most famous example of illumination 
is the (perhaps apocryphal) tale of Archemides and his bathtub.  When he got into the 
bath, Archemides‟ body misplaced the water and caused it to overflow.  This lead to a 
sudden realisation of the solution to the problem of calculating the volume of an 
irregularly shaped object, in this case a crown, and he leapt out of the bath (Schooler & 
Melcher, 1995).  The „verification‟ phase which involves conscious, controlled problem-
solving then takes place.  Here the solution is checked for efficacy and necessary 
alterations or elaborations.  A return to an earlier phase may ensure should unworkable 
solutions arise.  As we have seen, a great number of creative individuals have certainly 
described their creative solutions and insights as coming to fruition in this way.   
 
In Guilford‟s 1950 Presidential address to the American Psychological Association, 
claimed that there was considerable agreement regarding the existence of these four 
“important steps” in the creative process (Lubart, 2000-2001, p. 295).  These steps were 
based on the introspective reports of von Helmholtz (1896, cited in Simonton, 2003), and 
on Poincaré‟s (1908, cited in Ghiselin, 1985) observations that unconscious ideas are 
combined and then brought to the conscious mind.  In his address, Guilford called for 
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more research into other creative-relevant abilities such as fluency and flexibility of 
ideas, reorganisation of ideas and evaluation skills (Lubart, 2000-2001).  This call has 
been answered and these facets of creativity, along with other abilities contributing to this 
multifaceted construct, such as divergent thinking and insight problem solving, have 
since been investigated (Simonton, 2000; Naderi, Abdullah, Aizan, Sharir, & Kumar, 
2010; Kaufman, Pumaccahua, & Holt, 2013; Gansler et al., 2011; Gilhooly, Fioratou, 
Anthony, & Wynn, 2007;  Joy, 2008; Batey & Furnham, 2006; Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley, 
& Corr, 2006a; Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis, & Corr, 2006b; Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 
2008; Gelade, 2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Boden, 2004; Dietrich, 2004).   
 
Barron (1965) defined creativity as multidimensional and related to its product, the 
person or the processes lying behind it, with novelty, unusualness and aptness crucial for 
receiving a label of „creative‟ (Neihart, 1998; Runco, 2014).  Especially relevant here is 
Barron‟s definition of the creative process as being one which involves intention, form, 
inspiration, and temporal and emotional phases, as it appears to acknowledge the 
importance of imagery in this process.  Boden (1996) distinguishes between two types of 
creativity, with „psychological‟ (P) creativity pertaining to novelty to the individual, and 
„historical‟ (H) creativity encapsulating a new way of thinking about a theory or 
phenomenon which changes the way it is regarded from then on.  Her model encapsulates 
three creative mental processes which are used to navigate “conceptual space” (Boden, 
1999, p. 352).  These are combinatorial, exploratory, and transformational creativity, the 
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former involving the unconstrained combination of familiar ideas in unfamiliar ways, the 
latter two processes allowing these newly combined ideas to be explored and adapted 
(Boden, 2004).  By investigating examples of Boden‟s „P‟ creativity, also termed „little 
c‟, (referring to products that are creative to the individual, which is in contrast to „Big-C 
creativity, which relates to eminent creativity, see Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) it is 
possible to look at creative abilities of non-eminent individuals in experimental settings.  
This facilitates a better understanding of creative people in general, and of the processes 
underlying creativity.   
 
Despite such a breadth of research there still appears to be no single agreed definition of 
creativity, possibly due to its many manifestations and the respective influences of 
cultural settings over time.  As recently as 2012 it was stated by Batey that an 
unequivocal definition and clear operationalisation of creativity as a psychological 
construct are still not reached.  Stoneham and Coughtrey (2009) stated that the processes 
underlying creativity and the resultant products “remain subjective in definition and 
elusive to objective measurement” (p. 827).  The necessity of two components is 
consistently implicated however, those of originality and usefulness (Mumford, 2003).  
For this reason, tools which measure divergent thinking abilities are often used to assess 
creative ability as they require the generation of unique and appropriate responses which 
are scored along on both of these indices.  The originality score is usually calculated 
statistically taking into account the whole sample‟s set of responses and is a measure of 
  24 
how infrequent each answer is in relation to other answers provided for the same 
problem.  The index of usefulness is usually based on whether the solutions, or as is more 
common in these tasks, the inventions (Finke et al., 1992) are appropriate for that 
particular task‟s constraints and impossible ideas are disregarded.  A number of well-
researched divergent thinking tasks are available, and this thesis will utilise such tasks, a 
more thorough description of the tools which are used to tap divergent and creative 
thinking is presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  However a brief introduction to tasks 
of this nature follows. 
 
The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1974) are one of the most 
commonly used measures of creative ability and will be described fully in Chapter 5.  
This battery assesses figural and verbal creative abilities where responses are scored 
along the following dimensions: fluency, originality, abstractness of titles, elaboration, 
resistance to premature closure, and creative strengths (Torrance, 1974; Torrance 2008, 
cited in Acar & Runco, 2012).  The subscales in this battery can be used to look more 
closely at specific creativity-relevant skills (Kim, 2011). Claridge and Blakey (2009) 
observe that a large number of researchers tend to equate creativity solely with divergent 
thinking, however, they describe eight categories of creativity measurement: divergent 
thinking (DT) tests; attitudes and interest inventories; personality inventories; 
biographical inventories; ratings by peers; judgements of products; ratings of eminence, 
and self-report creative activities.  These serve as ―an indication of how creativity has 
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been and may be assessed‖ (p. 58) and reflect again the multifaceted nature of the 
construct.  Kaufman, Plucker, and Baer (2008) state there to be five categories of creative 
measurement, namely creative products, creative cognition, creative traits, creative 
behaviour, and creative accomplishments.  Divergent thought is an important component 
of the creative process, though importantly Runco states (1991) it cannot be equated with 
creativity but rather can predict creative potential. 
 
When one thinks of what constitutes „creativity‟, a variety of things may spring to mind 
such as art, poetry, sculpture, scientific innovation, dance, and literature, and it is clear 
that there are indeed many ways to measure it, as was just described.  In addition to 
traditional ideas of what creativity actually is, non-eminent individuals, even those who 
do not consider themselves to be creative, have the potential to exhibit creative thought in 
various ways, for example, in the generation of alternative uses for common household 
objects such as a paperclip, a newspaper or a brick (Guilford, 1967), by producing varied 
solutions to open-ended problems, through generating remote consequences of 
hypotheses (Barrantes-Vidal, 2004), or writing „associative poems‟ (Joy, 2008).  
Alternate uses for everyday items are then scored for fluency (the number of meaningful 
uses), flexibility (production of varied responses from conceptual categories), originality 
(the far from obvious ideas), and elaboration (the number of additional detail 
embellishing the initial response).  Additionally, creative artefacts may be scored for 
creativity by trained judges.  One particular approach which will be outlined and 
  26 
described at length throughout the thesis is that of creative cognition (Smith, Ward, & 
Finke, 1995) which requires individuals to combine random shapes into meaningful 
patterns or objects in their visual imagery.  Taken together, the aforementioned review 
suggests that some progress has been made, at least in the approaches to assessing 
creativity, as these new approaches appear to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the 
creativity construct and more researchers appear cognisant of the importance of 
developing useful and accurate methods of studying it. 
 
1.2.2 Defining mental imagery and attempts at operationalisation 
Individual differences in mental imagery is something which have been investigated ever 
since Greek philosophers wondered as to its nature and purpose, noticing its importance 
in thinking and the similarities between visual imagery and visual perception (White, 
Sheehan, & Ashton, 1977).  The metaphor of an internal artist “painting pictures in the 
soul” was used by Plato (Philebus 39c, cited in Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004).  
Another early area of interest was the ability to control and manipulate mental imagery, 
with pioneering experimental psychologist Gustav Fechner observing distinct individual 
differences in imagery controllability and writing about “imagination images” in 
Elemente der Psychophysik (1860, cited in White, Sheehan, & Ashton, 1977).  He stated 
that while some individuals were able to bring to mind detailed images of objects which 
were „percept-like‟, others were only able to imagine “momentary glimpses” of these 
images (Fechner, 1800, cited in Kosslyn & Jolicouer, 1980).   
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Early theorists put forward many ideas as to the function of mental imagery.  In her 
chapter entitled „A Very Private World‟, (in Sheehan, 1972), Rosemary Gordon claimed 
that imagery may function in order to aid selection and organisation of sensory stimuli 
thus eliciting appropriate instinctual responses.  She claimed it may enable the 
classification of these stimuli and may facilitate the relation of past to present experience, 
and that it was the basis of abstract and symbolic thought.  Gordon discussed 
characteristics of visual imagery as being phenomenological experiences which varied 
from person to person.  It was suggested by Gordon and others (for example, Richardson, 
1969) that different modes of imaging might result in “intolerance, misunderstanding, 
and lack of communication” (p. 70) at the outset when studying imagery.  Gordon 
asserted that one problem inherent in the way some researchers treat mental imagery is 
that many limit the term to refer only to visual experience, and not other modalities like 
gustatory imagery (imagining tastes) and auditory imagery.  Gordon adopted a definition 
of imagery of perceiving forms, colours, sounds, smells or movement while no such 
external stimuli are present.  An important distinction that she made was between the 
words „image‟ and „imagination‟, which are clearly etymologically linked.  She noticed 
that many theorists treat the terms as interchangeable, however made the claim that one 
cannot utilise imagination without using visual images.  It is also conceivable that one 
can have an image without having an „imagination‟, in the common sense of the word.   
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White, Sheehan, and Ashton (1977) maintained that adequate definitions of imagery were 
not formulated at the time of writing their paper, and stated that definitions ranged 
“widely from Richardson‟s (1969) emphasis on quasi-perceptual experience to Neisser‟s 
(1972) explanation of imagery in terms of planned construction” (p. 45).  Imagery is 
viewed by Paivio (1990) as synonymous with visualisation, consisting of mental 
representations which have spatial, non-abritrary (picture-like) qualities and resembles 
actual objects or events, and as something which is „continuous‟.  Paivio calls this an „all-
in-oneness‟ quality (Paivio, 1990).  Mental imagery has since been defined as occurring 
when perceptual information from memory is accessed, leading to the experience of 
“seeing with the mind‟s eye” and as involving a collection of abilities (Kosslyn, Ganis, & 
Thompson, 2001, p. 195).   
 
Roe (1951) found that different types of mental imagery were utilised in different 
scientific arenas, with psychologists and theoretical physicists preferring verbal imagery 
(imagining speech) and symbolisation, while biologists and experimental physicists 
engaged in more visual imaging processes such as the manipulation of their mental 
images.  In 1880, Francis Galton published a research paper which he concluded by 
saying that scientists were largely deficient in their mental imaging abilities (cited in 
Brewer & Schommer-Aikins, 2006).  Brewer and Schommer-Aikins (2006) carried out a 
replication of Galton‟s original study and found this claim to be false, according to the 
responses from their participants at least.  All of the scientists in their investigation 
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reported using mental imagery strategies whilst completing a visual memory task, 
Galton‟s (1880) Breakfast Table Questionnaire (to be described below), and found that 
scientists‟ imagining abilities were no different to the undergraduates who took part.  
Despite Galton‟s findings being refuted by the authors of this investigation, and others (to 
be outlined in Chapter 4), his contribution to the scientific investigation of visual imagery 
remains a meaningful one. 
 
Quantitative assessment of visual imagery was born when Galton devised his Breakfast 
Table Questionnaire in (1880, cited in Richardson, 1999), which required recall of details 
relating to a previously perceived image, a breakfast table containing food items being 
one example.  Questions were asked about elements of the mental image such as 
illumination, colour, extent of the field of view, distance and command of images, with 
participants also being free to describe their mental experiences in their own words, and 
psychometric tools utilising similar protocols continue to be developed (D‟Ercole, 
Castelli, Giannini, & Sbrilli, 2010).   
 
Investigations in this field tend to employ one of the great number of tools which purport 
to measure mental imagery ability of various types, for example, imagery control, 
imagery vividness, and rotation of objects in imagery.  A thorough review of these tools 
and this research is presented in CHAPTER 3, section 3.1.1., and so a selection of the 
most widely-used imagery measures are briefly outlined below. 
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The first tool to receive prominent usage was Betts‟ (1909) Questionnaire upon Mental 
Imagery (QMI), evaluating seven different sensory modalities (visual, kinaesthetic, 
tactile, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, and organic), and assessing the vividness of evoked 
images of scenes.  This instrument was adapted and shortened by Sheehan (1967), and 
was subsequently known as the Betts‟ QMI (Richardson, 1969).  Gordon‟s (1949) Test of 
Visual Imagery Control (TVIC) is another early measure of imagery ability and requires 
participants to follow oral instructions regarding their ability to manipulate visual images 
(White, Sheehan, & Ashton, 1977).  Richardson (1969) adapted the format of this tool by 
introducing an „unsure‟ option and by advocating a pen and paper task.  It was claimed to 
be internally consistent, to enjoy adequate test-retest reliability, and to correlate with 
other pencil and paper imagery tools (White, Sheehan, & Ashton, 1977).  However, more 
recently evidence has been found which demonstrates that response sets are a problematic 
outcome when using this tool (LeBoutillier & Marks, 2001-2002).  The TVIC (Gordon, 
1949) and Bett‟s QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale (Richardson, 1969) also appear to tap 
different aspects of mental imagery, the TVIC attempting to measure how controlled 
one‟s mental imagery is, the QMI assessing vividness (Khilstrom et al., 1991; Kaufmann, 
Plucker, & Baer, 2008).  Di Vesta, Ingersoll, and Sunshine (1971) purport that Betts‟ 
QMI and Gordon‟s TVIC may represent diverse facets of the same process, namely, 
„image evocation‟ (White, Sheehan & Ashton, 1977), and this notion of multiple imagery 
abilities is one that will be returned to throughout the thesis.  Another self-report tool is 
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the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973), which includes 
the five visual items from Betts‟ Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (Richardson, 1969) 
and requires participants to introspect and rate whether they consider their internal 
images of people and places to be „perfectly clear and vivid‟, if they have „no image at 
all‟, or if their image lies somewhere between these points.  It is completed under two 
conditions, once with the eyes open and once with them closed, though the rationale for 
this feature of the VVIQ is unclear, and Dowling (1973) revealed no difference between 
the two versions.  Previous research on the VVIQ has indicated that it is a valid and 
reliable measure of vividness of mental imagery (McKelvie, 1995), McKelvie reporting 
split-half reliability of .88, and test-retest reliability at .74.  However, this measure is not 
without its critics, content validity issues being most prominent, with alternate form and 
test-retest proving problematic (McKelvie, 1995), and the context in which the tool is 
completed influencing results.  For example, different vividness ratings are revealed 
when participants visualise their mothers compared to their fathers (the „unvividness 
paradox‟, Ahsen, 1990).  Socially desirable responding has also been an issue with this 
tool, and indeed with many other self-report measures of imagery (Allbutt, Ling, & 
Shafiullah, 2005-2006; Allbutt, Ling, Heffernan, & Shafiullah, 2008; LeBoutillier & Marks, 
2000-2001).  Marks (1983) did however find that VVIQ scores correlated with response 
times on a visual memory recognition task, which asked for specific details about a 
memorised picture, which arguably requires similar cognitive processes to that of the 
VVIQ and asks participants to evoke an image from memory and rate details about its 
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qualities.  Evidence supporting the use of self-report imagery tools is mixed, but there are 
other ways to assess mental imagery abilities which are more objective. 
 
Mental rotation tasks have been found to be effective tools for assessing spatial ability, 
that is, the ability to rotate shapes and images in one‟s imagination (Zacks, 2008), and 
this type of task is more objective than some self-report measures.  According to Zacks‟ 
(2008) meta-analysis, stimulus sets for mental rotation tend to include the following: 2- 
or 3D shapes as originally used by Shepard and Metzler (1971), alphanumeric characters, 
drawings or photographs of objects, hands, or bodies, abstract 2D line figures and 3D 
cubes.  According to descriptions of the „cracking‟ of the genetic code and the revelation 
of the double helix structure of DNA detailed in James Watson‟s (1968, cited in Shepard, 
1978) The Double Helix, it can be deduced that mental rotation was utilised while 
considering this Nobel-Prize winning discovery.  As was discussed in section 1.1.1, 
anecdotal accounts of the benefits of imagery ability are cited by many eminently 
creative individuals.  However, failure to acknowledge differing aspects of mental 
imagery may complicate its‟ investigation.   
 
Kosslyn suggested that the collection of abilities which contribute to mental imagery 
mean it may be most beneficial to study these aspects separately (1980, 1994).  These 
abilities include the level of detail, clarity, proportion and relative size of images (Dean & 
Morris, 2003).  Participant ratings of image evocation, detail, clarity, maintenance, 
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proportion, vividness, ease of rotation, proportion during rotation, and vividness during 
rotation are strongly inter-correlated due to the fact that some of the properties and 
processes involved in these aspects of the task are prerequisites of others, where facets of 
imagery such as mental rotation are found to be „rate-limiting‟ factors in tests measuring 
spatial ability, meaning that mental abilities other than those which the test proposes to 
measure may influence performance on that test.  Kosslyn (1980) conceives of visual 
imagery as comprising of three broad processes; image generation (formation), where 
„stored information‟ is used to create an image, image maintenance (inspection), where 
qualities of the images are inspected, and image transformation (rotation), where mental 
images are manipulated and their appearance altered (Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, & Wallach, 
1984; Kosslyn et al., 2004).  Kosslyn (1980) suggests that this collection of differentiated 
constructive processes work to form a mental image, and that these processes work with 
the visual buffer to give rise to the phenomenological experiences of the image.  Limited 
resolution and spatial extent are the main surface properties of the visual buffer (Kosslyn 
et al., 1984), and it may be that these limitations are reflected in the clarity of respective 
elements of the visual image.  Evidence has been found that has shown it is possible to 
accurately introspect on these processes and to scrutinise internal images, answering 
questions on the properties of these imagined forms and patterns (D‟Ercole, 2010; Mast 
& Kosslyn, 2002; Denis, 2008; Bischel & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1997; Kosslyn, 1973, cited 
in Dean & Morris, 2003).  One can inspect „structural‟ elements of mental images and 
can manipulate them in order to make these observations (Shepard, 1978; Kosslyn & 
Jolicoeur, 1980).   This has implications for imagery tasks requiring the holding of visual 
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information in memory as it is theoretically related to the control of mental images.  Dean 
and Morris (2003) suggest that problems with some „introspective‟ measures of mental 
imagery, to be discussed in Chapter 3, may be due in part to the implication of long-term 
memory in these tasks.  Such tools often require the evocation of images from long-term 
memory, such as a familiar face or place, and it is suggested that the cognitive processes 
required simply may not be used when imagining recently perceived or new items which 
are located in visual short-term memory (Baddeley, 1986, 2000).  This is especially 
relevant here because, as we shall see in section 1.3.2, there exists a disparity between 
mental imagery abilities as measured by introspective, self-report questionnaires and 
scores on performance-based measures.  Logie‟s (1995) claims are also relevant.  Logie 
suggested that visual stimuli are “placed in the visual or spatial short-term stores via 
long-term memory representations of visual form or spatial information” (p. 248), 
suggesting an overlap between these two types of input to STM in terms of the 
underlying cognitive processes. As shall be discussed in section 1.3.2, differences in the 
nature, quality and experience of mental imagery, in methods of investigation, as well as 
some researchers not considering (or not being aware of) these differences, may have 
hindered the operationalisation of the construct.  
 
The view that imagery is a unitary construct is now considered by many theorists to be a 
false one (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn et al., 2004), and indeed much empirical evidence has 
been published to support the claim that it is multidimensional and involves a collection 
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of abilities (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2002.  
Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, and Motes (2006) suppose that imagery involves a collection 
of abilities and have purported that visual imagery is comprised of at least two distinct 
subsystems, object imagery, and spatial imagery, which are involved in encoding and 
processing.  Blajenkova and her colleagues‟ investigations followed work by researchers 
who also suggested the existence of related yet distinct types of imagery (Farah, 
Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1998 and Levine, Warach, & Farah, 1985, both cited in 
Blajenkova et al., 2006; Kosslyn, 1994).  Object imagery involves seeing properties such 
as the form, size, colour, shape and other aspects of literal appearances of objects in 
imagery, such as „brightness‟.  Spatial imagery on the other hand refers to the ability to 
apprehend spatial relations in image such as its individual parts, the location of objects 
and their movement, in addition to the quality of abstract representations and 
transformations between imagined objects (Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shepard, 2005).  
Kozhevnikov, Hegarty and Meyer (2002) found that the self-reported imagery styles of 
scientists and engineers were different when compared to visual artists, the former 
tending to image using spatial imagery, the latter utilising object imagery more often, 
which, incidentally, is yet more evidence that Galton‟s early observations were 
inaccurate.  Blajenkova and her colleagues have since replicated these findings in a later 
study (Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006).   This suggests that, as well as 
eminent creative individuals using mental imagery and visualisation techniques when 
problem solving, people providing creative solutions in everyday situations tend to 
employ these techniques too (LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003; Finke et al., 1988, 1989; 
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Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999).  Reiber (1995) gives the example of directing someone 
who is lost to their desired location, stating that visualisation tricks are extemporaneously 
employed when ones gestures and outlines the route while considering it in their mental 
imagery.  More relevant here is the imagery exhibited by creative professionals, and also 
the imaginal process utilised and adopted by individuals when their creativity is tested 
experimentally.  Non-eminent individuals tested for creative ability often claim to use 
controlled mental imagery and synthesis while performing creative tasks in the laboratory 
(Daniels-McGhee & Davies, 1994; Durndell & Wetherick, 1976).  When engaging in 
exercises which require them to combine imagined shapes in order to create a 
recognisable image, participants are able to internally change the shape combinations, 
and recombine them in different ways before settling on a final combination, and this 
observation will be returned to in section 1.3, but first a review of how relationships 
between creativity and imagery are typically studied is presented, followed by a 
discussion of issues may have impeded progress in investigating the seemingly deepening 
complex relationship between creativity and imagery. 
 
1.2.3 The lack of relationships between different tools measuring mental imagery 
In addition to problems with the psychometric properties of many self-report imagery 
questionnaires discussed in section 1.2.2, it has been found that indices of imagery ability 
measured through introspective means, such as the VVIQ (Marks, 1973), regularly fail to 
correlate with scores on spatial imagery tasks previously described (Dean & Morris, 
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2003; McKelvie, 1995).  In a study investigating mental imagery vividness and 
„unvividness‟, Richardson (1988) states that one has “epistemological priority with 
regard to their mental imagery” (p. 119), reflecting the belief that the qualities of mental 
imagery are only really accessible to the experient.  This paper cites numerous studies 
which also show that self-report mental imagery questionnaires do not bear any 
consistent relationship with spatial thinking tests, (for example, Ernest, 1977; Danaher & 
Thoresen, 1972; Richardson, 1978; Starker, 1974, cited in Richardson, 1988; Durndell & 
Wetherick, 1976).  Dean and Morris (2003) also state that “the functional role of imagery 
in spatial ability tests is unrelated to the vividness of imagery” (p. 247).  Slee also pointed 
out in 1988 that when measured in isolation imagery vividness was an unsatisfactory 
indicator of mental imagery ability, yet it continues to be widely used as such.  There 
seemingly exist problems with the measurement of mental imagery, such as the 
contradictory findings revealed in studies utilising the same tools, and the lack of 
relationships between tools purportedly measuring the same constructs.  These will be 
further outlined in Chapter 3 as this has implications for investigations seeking to 
understand the relationships of types of mental imagery to creativity.   
 
The problems of operationalisation of mental imagery may seem unavoidable due to its 
introspective and subjective nature, and indeed, this has presented clear obstacles to its 
investigation.  It is possible that imagery control and vividness represent different facets 
of the same process (Kihlstrom, Glisky, Peterson, Harvey & Rose, 1991), namely image 
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evocation, though they are often used as interchangeable terms.  A psychometric analysis 
of mental imagery vividness and imagery control tools concluded that the majority of 
measures included in Kihlstrom et al.‟s study confused the dimensions of vividness and 
control, did not define either attribute satisfactorily and did not measure individual 
differences in imagery ability (Kihlstrom et al., 1991), though as will be outlined below, 
recent studies have begun to rectify these methodological issues. 
 
1.3 Measuring the Relationships between Creativity and Mental Imagery  
The evidence described so far, from both inside and outside of the laboratory, points to a 
complex and nuanced relationship between creativity and mental imagery.  Researchers 
in this field have developed a number of methods of investigating mental imagery in 
relation to creativity, including employing measures of divergent thinking, self-report 
measures and creative imagery tasks, and these are outlined below. 
 
1.3.1 Investigating creative imagery 
An increasingly common approach to the investigation of mental imagery and its links to 
creativity in laboratory conditions is the image generation approach (Finke, Ward, & 
Smith, 1992, Finke, 1996; Finke & Slayton, 1988).  This looks at the emergence of 
creativity through visualisation and mental synthesis of (usually) geometric and 
alphanumerical shapes and lines or 3D objects such as brackets, wheels or bowls.  Finke 
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and his colleagues (1992) popularised the creative cognition approach to creativity, 
demonstrating that particular mental processes and conceptual structures often guide 
creative pursuits.  Creative cognition is defined as the ability to create original, novel and 
useful products in the absence of concurrent stimuli, that is, the shapes are imagined 
rather than being present in front of them.  The mental synthesis task (Finke, Pinker & 
Farah, 1989) and its subsequent variants were developed by Finke and Slayton (1988; 
Finke, 1990) and requires participants to combine and manipulate common geometric 
forms to create something new, sometimes according to pre-defined object categories.  
These images can then be rated for creativity, correspondence (how much the image 
produced looks like what the respondent intended it to look like), and appropriateness 
(whether any of the shapes have been altered or changed).  Finke, Ward and Smith‟s 
(1992) Geneplore model consists of discrete „generative‟ and „exploratory‟ phases, two 
distinct processes making up creative cognition, and demonstrates how participants are 
able to produce unique, elaborate and previously unanticipated inventions and creations 
through „mental synthesis‟ (combining forms in imagery), and „restructuring‟ (separating 
and then recombining shapes in imagery), in a cyclical „combinational play‟ of mental 
images (Finke & Slayton, 1988).  Creative products generated through these 
methodologies can also be scored on the basis of a number of additional dimensions 
relevant to creativity and its measurement, namely originality/novelty, where points are 
awarded on a scale from 1 being „very poor originality‟ to 5 „very high originality‟, with 
the same scale being used for the practicality/usefulness ratings.  In studies employing 
mental synthesis protocols, participants are sometimes asked to combine the shapes, and 
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only afterwards to allocate their image to a category, ascribing some use and a title.  
Interestingly, these responses are often rated as more creative than those requiring 
participants to design something fitting into a predefined category, such as „furniture‟, or 
„weapon‟.  Ward, Smith and Finke, (1999) state that these „emergent patterns‟ in mental 
images may be central to the imagery-creativity link for creative ideas are more likely to 
arise from skilled combination and recombination of images in novel ways.  Morrison 
and Wallace (2001) also cite several imaging abilities important for creativity, such as 
spatial visualisation, image vividness, and „absorption‟, which refers to the engagement 
of perceptual, enactive, imaginative, and ideational resources in creative productivity.  Of 
course, to accurately research these abilities requires accurate tools, and, as has been 
discussed, the controversies in measuring the respective constructs are multifarious. 
 
Despite difficulties with definitions and operationalisation of both constructs, individual 
differences in mental imagery abilities and the implications that these cognitive facets 
have for creativity have been researched using traditional statistical procedures.  
LeBoutillier (1999) and others (Campos & Gonzalez, 1995; Gonzalez, Campos, & Perez, 
1997; Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Ward, 1994; Antonietti, Bologna, & Lupi, 1997; 
Morrison & Wallace, 2001; Palmiero, Cardi, & Belardinelli, 2011) have conducted 
extensive investigation into the relationship between self-reported mental imagery and 
creative performance.  LeBoutillier (1999) and LeBoutillier and Marks (2003) found 
relationships between self-reported mental imagery and creativity as measured by 
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divergent thinking tasks such as the Alternative Uses Tasks (AUT; Guilford, 1967), 
however, the effect sizes were small (0.05 and 0.15).  The AUT, a measure of verbal 
fluency, requires the generation of as many uses as possible for common household 
objects such as a brick or a paperclip, and tasks such as these are often used in creativity 
research, along with creative synthesis tasks of the type which have been described 
above, where stimuli must be combined to create new ideas, sometimes according to pre-
defined categories (Finke & Slayton, 1988; Finke, Pinker & Farah, 1989).  The 
controllability of mental imagery was responsible for a larger association than was the 
vividness measure, suggesting that while vividness is important for generating alternative 
uses for household objects, the controlling and manipulation of these mental images was 
more beneficial to the creative process.  Mast and Kosslyn (2002) revealed that 
participants who could easily rotate mental images were more likely to correctly 
reinterpret their rotated image as something new and previously unseen, and this has clear 
implications for utilisation of mental imagery in creative engagement, as novelty is 
considered by many to be a requisite of true creativity (Sternberg, 1999; Boden, 1996; 
Finke & Slayton, 1998).  The ability to rotate items in imagery, Mast and Kosslyn claim, 
may have been a rate-limiting step in the task, in that mental image rotation largely 
determined whether the participants were able to make new „discoveries‟ from their 
imagery.   
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In conclusion, thorough inspection of the literature on the relationship between creativity 
and mental imagery has highlighted problems relating to the operationalisation of both 
constructs, further clouding the nature of this relationship and chances of elucidation.  
These issues are scrutinised in Chapter 3 (Introduction section 3.1), and findings 
published in the past decade which support a collection of imagery abilities are also 
outlined.  As has been seen, vague definitions and connotations in imagery task items, the 
raft of psychometric problems and issues with terminology incorporated in questionnaires 
measuring both imagery and creativity tasks and the treating of separate imagery 
constructs as though they measure the spectrum of imagery abilities, despite evidence of 
a multifaceted construct utilising disparate cortical areas (see Chapter 3, Introduction 
section 3.1), appear to have interfered with the untangling of these relationships. 
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CHAPTER 2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CREATIVITY AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
In this chapter, a review of the literature surrounding the relationships between creativity 
and psychopathology is presented.  Attempts by theorists to define the constructs will be 
outlined, and the subsequent discussions relate to creative products, measured through 
creative visualisation tasks, creative writing and drawing tasks, and to the thinking styles 
characteristic of those people typically successful in creative domains.  The chapter ends 
with a new argument outlining ways in which the three multidimensional constructs of 
creativity, imagery, and schizotypy may overlap in terms of cognitive processing.  This is 
followed by an outline of the intended approach to studying these intricate relationships. 
 
2.1 Creativity and Psychopathology 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, it is apparent that there is no conclusive definition of 
creativity as a construct (Batey, 2012; Fink, Benedek, Grabner, Staudt, & Neubauer, 2007).  
It is, however, conceived by many to be multidimensional and measureable in a number 
of ways (Claridge & Blakey, 2009).  Creativity may be measured as an aspect of 
personality, as a trait, or may be based on achievement in creative domains (Barrantes-
Vidal, 2004).  Barron (1993) states that the creative process involves intention, form, 
inspiration, and temporal and emotional phases, but of particular interest is his conception 
of „controllable oddness‟ as being a resource for creativity because he suggests that the 
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idiosyncratic thoughts of creative persons arise from the ability to control and „take hold 
of‟ bizarre ideation and experiences, while Martindale‟s (1999) theory of „cognitive 
disinhibition syndrome‟ supposes that broad associations and defocused attention may 
lead to creative performance through oscillation along a cognitive continuum between 
analogical, free-associative thought at one end, and logical, reality-oriented thinking at 
the other.  As is to be discussed below, these differential types of cognition, „top-down 
diffusion‟, controlled attentional processing and lack of inhibition may be creatively 
beneficial only in some circumstances.   
 
When considering ways to study the relationship between creativity and psychopathology 
there have been several approaches; biographical and survey studies into eminent creative 
individuals, family studies (Appels, Sitskoorn, Vollema, & Kahn, 2004; Nuechterlein et 
al., 2002), studying the creativity of psychiatric patients (Keefe & Magro, 1980; Santosa 
et al., 2007), looking at the correlations between creativity and liability to 
psychopathology (Schuldberg, 2000-2001; Richards, Kinney, Lunde, Benet & Merzel, 
1988), and the psychometric assessment of individuals in creative pursuits (Burch et al., 
2006a; Tsakanikos & Claridge, 2004).  In terms of its relation to creativity, 
psychopathology was defined by Schuldberg (2000-2001) as behaviours relating to 
positive or negative schizotypal cognitive symptoms, and negative schizotypal affective 
symptoms, such as hypomania, depression, and impulsivity.  Some have reported an 
inverted U-shaped model representing the relationship between creativity and 
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psychopathology (Akiskal & Akiskal, 1988), while a recent historiometric study revealed 
differential patterns for scientists compared to artists (Simonton, 2014), with more 
extreme psychopathology showing a detrimental effect for the scientists only.  What this 
means is that those with low levels of psychopathological-type thought may only rarely 
use this to their creative advantage and that, as these symptoms and characteristics 
increase, so does the capacity for creative output.  However, should this psychopathology 
become too severe then creativity suffers and individuals may be unable to make use of 
these characteristics.  Nelson and Rawlings (2010) also reported a quadratic pattern 
(inverted U-shape) whereby creativity increased along with moderate schizotypy.  
However, as the severity of psychopathology worsened, a detrimental effect on creativity 
was observed.  The notion of the ‗mad genius‘, a concept to be outlined later in this 
chapter, is not supported by these accounts as the research appears to suggest that the 
creativity-psychopathology debate is far more convoluted. 
 
Barron‟s (1993) two-factor approach to creativity looked at „ego strength‟, which, when 
measured by the Barron Ego Strength Scale (BESS, 1953, in Barron, 1993), attempts to 
differentiate between the presence or absence of psychopathology.  Those high on this 
scale report feelings of self-adequacy and Barron found that, when combined with 
deviant or psychopathological traits, ego strength was a mediating factor that determined 
output in two very different ways.  This combination either leads to damaging symptoms 
or healthy creative output in individuals.  Fodor (1995) also found that those high in ego 
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strength but who were also prone to psychosis were able to produce highly creative 
responses in creativity tasks, further strengthening the supposition of a clear-cut 
psychopathology-creativity link. 
 
Baer (2011) provides an overview of some of the conclusions that have been drawn 
regarding the relationships between creativity and mental illness.  These “vary greatly 
across domains” (Kaufman & Baer, 2002, p. 311), and Baer espouses the domain-specific 
view of creativity.  This view states that, with the possible exception of some early 
innovative thinkers, for whom it was more common to possess a plethora of 
specialisations, for example, Leonardo da Vinci who explored science, mathematics, 
engineering, anatomy, and who was also a painter, sculptor, architect, botanist, musician 
and writer (Pevsner, 2002), most contemporary creators rarely excel in more than one 
domain.  Baer (2011) outlines one example of genetic research which looked at the 
relationship and reported a genetic link between creativity and psychosis (Kéri, 2009).  
Kéri‟s study looked at the possibility of shared „genes for psychosis and creativity‟ and 
used as the sole measure for creativity a subscale of the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking (TTCT, 1974), the „Just Suppose‟ task, which requires consideration of the 
outcome to a series of unlikely situations.  There are controversies around using the 
TTCT in this way (to be reviewed in Chapter 6), and it is likely Kéri was unaware of 
these.  Essentially, the issues arise when one treats the TTCT as a tool to measure 
„general creativity‟, rather than providing an indication of ability in a number of areas.  
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Baer states that “By claiming to be domain-general measures of creativity, the TTCT 
promote... loose thinking and problematic conclusions” (p. 311).   There is much to be 
disentangled, but before undertaking this, a review of the history of the relationships 
between creativity and psychopathology is presented. 
 
2.2 History of Creativity and Psychopathology 
2.2.1 Creativity and mental illness - an ancient association 
The often mysterious nature of creativity, and the characteristics and circumstances 
which are related to its production, have been of interest to psychologists for many years 
(Barron, 1966; Wallace & Gruber, 1989; Vernon, 1970; Ochse, 1990; Finke, Ward, & 
Smith, 1992; Andreasen, 1987, 2008; Amabile, 1983; Fisher et al. 2004; Simonton, 2000; 
Folley & Park, 2005; Joy, 2008).  The ancient Greeks were interested in what makes a 
person creative, Plato viewing it as the result of divine intervention (Albert & Runco, 
1999; Ludwig, 1995).  Aristotle supposed that more natural processes were at work, with 
innovation instead being important for survival (Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976).  Of 
particular significance here, however, was Aristotle‟s impression, which was to be shared 
by many others following him, that “there was never a genius without a tincture of 
madness” (422-384 BC, Pridmore, 2004). In „Problemata xxx‟, he asks “why is it that all 
those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are clearly 
melancholics…?” (Klibansky et al., 1979, p. 18, cited in Akiskal & Akiskal, 2007).  Also 
apparently noticing this connection, Dryden stated of fellow poets in 1681 that “Great 
  48 
wits are sure to madness near allied...And thin partitions do their bounds divide”, with 
Lord Byron noting in 1834 that “we of the craft are all crazy” (Nettle, 2001, p.10).  The 
view of the roots of genius changed during the Renaissance as it was thought more likely 
to be influenced by genetic factors, not God (Dacey, 1999, cited in Glaveanu, 2010).  The 
Romantic era allowed great strides in art and imagination, while reason and the scientific 
method led to great advances during the Age of Enlightenment (Weiner, 2000, cited in 
Glaueanu, 2010).  An interesting point here is one made by Becker (2000-2001) which is 
that during the Romantic era, those considered „mad‟ were said to be ostracised from 
society, whilst the obvious creative eminence that many of these individuals subsequently 
meant that both them and their supposed „madness‟ were viewed in more favourable 
lights during the Age of Reason which followed.   
 
This seemingly natural curiosity into the creative genius, more specifically, the inkling 
that something related to „madness‟ is occurring, has indeed occupied some of the 
greatest minds, with many esteemed thinkers being seemingly cognisant of the 
relationship.  That disorders within the schizo-affective spectrum are linked to a 
disproportionate number of creative writers, scientists, and visual artists is well 
documented (O‟Reilly, Dunbar, & Bentall, 2001; Baas, De Creu, & Nijstad, 2008; 
Becker, 2001; Nettle, 2001, 2006; Andreasen, 1987, 208; Morrison & Wallace, 2001; 
Richards, 2000-2001; Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley, & Corr, 2006a).  Depression is observed 
in a disproportionate number of creative individuals (Jamison, 1993; Nettle, 2001) with 
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up to 54% of 291 creative men studied by Post (1994) possessing traits resembling 
personality disorder, and 69% having a psychiatric diagnosis.  One problem in 
interpreting anecdotal reports is the possibility of role expectation, with researchers 
postulating that over time it has, in some cultures, come to be assumed and accepted that 
creative people are necessarily ostensibly essentially „mad‟.  It has been suggested that 
some may even conform to these types of behaviours due to this expectation (Becker, 
2000-2001; Glaveanu, 2010).  Glaveanu points out that the view of creators as 
outstanding and insightful, revered for their individuality and creative genius has resulted 
in an account of creativity that is “elitist and essentialist” (Glaveanu, 2010, p. 81) which 
detaches creators from reality and ultimately paints them in a „pathological‟ light.  
Glaveanu (2010) cites Montuori and Perser (1995) who state that “the fate of the genius 
is often represented as that of a person who is misunderstood, eccentric and even anti-
social” (p. 76).  From this sociological viewpoint it is suggested that mental suffering has 
become a constitutive element of creative inspiration.  It may even be expected.  This 
may have influenced the biographical accounts of eminent creators.  The relationship is 
indeed far from clear-cut, as the often debilitating nature of „full-blown‟ mental disorder 
understandably hinders productivity and motivation for many (Brod, 1997).  Becker 
points to problems with some early research in the area which relied upon the self-
endorsement of psychiatric symptoms by the creative individuals themselves, rather than 
medical records, or „certified‟ diagnoses (for example, Jamison, 1993).  Studies such as 
those relying on self-report measures are problematic as they further complicate 
interpretation of creativity-psychopathology research. 
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2.2.2 Shared traits of creative individuals 
Investigations into creativity have focused on a number of dimensions of personality 
while trying to uncover what assists or shapes the creative individual (Miller & Tal, 
2007; Simonton, 1999a; Barron, 1993; Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008; Shepard, 1978), and 
these are relevant due to the differential results that are found.  One of these traits 
includes intelligence.  It has been argued that creativity and intelligence have a high 
correlation up until IQ level 120, after which the two appear to become independent 
(Eysenck, 1995).  A curvilinear relationship between knowledge and creativity has also 
been purported, which states that to achieve eminence in creative fields requires enough 
knowledge to advance that field, however, should one acquire too much knowledge it 
may cause entrenchment in current trends in the field thus resulting in difficulty „seeing 
things in a different light‟ (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Stenberg & Lubart, 1995, cited in 
Kim, 2011).  Others have asserted that neuroticism is another shared trait of creative 
individuals, a trait which itself is related to psychoticism (Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis, & 
Corr, 2006b), psychoticism being particularly pertinent to this thesis.  Extroversion and 
openness to experience are also common amongst both eminent and non-eminent creative 
individuals (Miller & Tal, 2007; Silvia, 2008).  Interestingly, Götz and Götz (1979) 
provided early evidence for domain specificity of creativity when they showed 
differences between artistic and scientific creativity, with neuroticism being positively 
related to the former but negatively related to the latter.  Tolerance of ambiguity is 
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another trait which has been posited to be possessed by creative persons (Kirton, 1976), 
that is, creators are happy to try things for which the outcome is unknown.  This allows 
for the reconceptualisation and reformulation of ideas and theories in the face of, for 
example, new or conflicting evidence, or some such barrier, as is often required.  Finke, 
Ward and Smith (1992) refer to this process as „combinatory play‟, or mental synthesis, 
in their theory of creative cognition, as was seen in Chapter 1, and this type of thinking 
was famously utilised by Einstein (Claxton, 2006), and is likely to entail both controlled 
mental imagery, and a certain „comfortableness‟ with uncertainty.  This comfortableness 
is important as it is possible to conceptualise a scenario where, whilst engaged in some 
creative activity or pursuit, there may be a period in which solutions or creative output of 
other types may seem far off to the creator, and so being able to tolerate this state of „not 
knowing‟ would be beneficial because the alternative action may be to abandon the task 
altogether, thus failing to find creative solutions which may have arisen otherwise.   
 
Barron (1966) points out the many levels by which creativity may be expressed, from 
everyday creativity, to “flights of genius, and the many gradations in between” (p.183).  
Analysis of the lives of well-known creators through the psychobiographical method, 
studying documents such as memoirs, diaries, letters, doctor‟s notes and interviews, have 
offered further suggestions for distinguishing qualities and similarities of creative 
individuals (Kottler, 2005; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009, Barrantes-Vidal, 2004).  In 1931, 
Lange-Eichbaum scrutinised biographies of and interviews with well-regarded „geniuses‟ 
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and noted the following: “...it cannot simply be a chance matter that among geniuses the 
healthy constitute only a small minority” (cited in Kyaga et al., 2011, p. 351).  The 
concomitance of psychopathology and exceptional giftedness within an individual helps 
to facilitate creative genius, according to Lange-Eichbaum.  Also cited by Kyaga et al. 
(2011) is Juda‟s (1949) study which revealed elevated incidences of psychopathology 
(„psychic abnormality‟) in a sample of 294 highly gifted artists and scientists born 
between 1650 and 1900.  These early investigations hint at a relationship between 
creativity and states of psychological health.  However, a limitation to this approach is 
that the interpretations and subsequent categorisations which may include „bipolar‟, 
„unipolar‟, „schizophrenic‟, „schizotypal‟, and „schizoaffective‟, were obviously made 
retrospectively, and it is of course difficult to assess the efficacy of authors‟ diagnostic 
judgements (though inter-rater reliabilities of these diagnoses are increasingly being 
reported).  These classifications may result from the previously mentioned tendency to 
attribute characteristics which may be described as „mad‟ to creative individuals because 
to some extent it is expected of them to behave this way (Rothenberg, 1990).  
Additionally, these are largely correlational studies and so interpretations of the findings 
should be made keeping this in mind.   
 
Another area of investigation in creativity research is whether similarities in cognitive 
styles appear across different creative disciplines, for example, whether prolific visual 
artists have distinctly differing creative styles compared with scientists (Nettle & Clegg, 
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2005).  Nettle makes the claim that different types of cognitive process lead to different 
types of creativity so, for example, convergent thinking and thought processes typical of 
autistic individuals are more frequently related to mathematics, with divergent thinking, 
affective and schizophrenic-type thought being more commonly reported by poets and 
artists, a claim also made by Barrantes-Vidal (2004).   
 
Simonton (2014) found evidence for a distinction in levels of psychopathology between 
individuals specialising in different types of creativity.  His investigation found that, of 
the 204 eminent creators included, the artists and writers had a significantly higher 
prevalence of psychopathology than the scientists, composers and ‗thinkers‘ (for 
example, philosophers).  Further, the results showed that the curve representing the 
relationship between eminence and psychopathology was positive monotonic, indicating 
that higher eminence was positively associated with higher psychopathology, while a 
nonmonotonic, single-peaked function emerged for scientists, composers and thinkers, 
revealing ‗optimum amounts of psychopathology‘ in the curves for the former two types 
of creative.  This is a striking finding, and highlights the differences in both the 
prevalence and even the benefits of psychopathology between artists and writers on the 
one hand, and scientists on the other.  For scientists, much lower levels of 
psychopathology were associated with high eminence, and as psychopathology increased 
past the level of what Simonton labelled ‗moderate‘, scientific success fell sharply.  By 
contrast, as was hinted at just now, for writers and artists, more ‗madness‘ appears to be 
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associated with more eminence.  An interesting observation by Simonton was that 
―scientists are the only group in which those with severe psychopathology are worse off 
than those with none at all‖ (p. 57).   
 
This section has highlighted some psychological and personality traits which are relevant 
to the study of creativity in order to further illustrate the complexities with conducting 
research in this area.  While this thesis does not concern personality per se, it is important 
to note that there are many constructs which have been found to be associated with 
creativity. One must acknowledge these because they may contribute to the convoluted 
interpretations which pervade the literature.  Focus now turns to the purported 
relationship between creativity and the schizoaffective spectrum. 
 
2.3 Creativity and the Schizoaffective Spectrum  
2.3.1 The cognitions of the creative 
There are many famous creative individuals of whom it has been claimed that they had 
mental health problems. A handful of examples listed by Nettle (2001) are presented 
below. 
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Table 1.1   
Famous creative individuals with „psychotic‟ traits  
Creative group Name 
Poets Baudelarie, Lord Byron, Coleridge, T. S. Eliot, Keats, 
Sylvia Plath, Robert Lowell, Ezra Pound, Shelley, 
Dylan Thomas, Tennyson, Walt Whitman 
 
Writers J. M. Barrie, Joseph Conrad, Noel Coward, Charles 
Dickens, Fyodor Dostoevsky, William Faulkner, F. 
Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, Victor Hugo, 
Henry James, James Joyce, Franz Kafka, Immanuel 
Kant, Marcel Proust, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Robert 
Louis Stevenson, Leo Tolstoy, Evelyn Waugh, Tennesse 
Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf 
 
Composers/Musicians Schumann, Beethoven, Berlioz, Bruckner, Chopin, 
Dowland, Elgar, Handel, Hjolst, Mahler, Rachmaninov, 
Rossini, Tchaikovsky, Wagner 
 
Visual Artists Borromini, Cézane, di Chirico, Gaugin, Goya, Van 
Gough, Kandinsky, Michelangelo, Modigliani, Munch, 
Picasso, Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko 
Note. Taken from Nettle, 2001. 
 
An impressive list of impressive minds is presented in 
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Table 1.1, and there are other well-known names that are not listed here.  An interesting 
finding by Schaller (1997) indicated that creative eminence may actually lead to a higher 
prevalence of psychopathology amongst these groups, alcoholism and substance abuse 
being especially implicated.  There is another possibility which is that researchers may 
interpret behaviours otherwise viewed as ordinary as somehow extraordinary, thus 
committing a classic example of confirmation bias (Nettle, 2001).  However, as Nettle 
was also careful to point out, when interpreting lists such as these it is important to note a 
number of things.  Firstly, they suggest a relationship between psychopathological 
thought and creative recognition more so than creative capacity or ability; these 
individuals have been specifically selected for these so called „eminence studies‟ because 
of their enhanced creativity rather than a general capacity for creative production.  
Second is a point which has already been stated: there are millions of people who 
experience the often entirely disabling and all-consuming realities of mental disorder who 
never achieve creative „greatness‟.  Nettle expresses it well: “To pluck the flower of art 
from the nettle of psychosis takes unusual intelligence and discipline, and most people 
high in psychoticism do not possess this” (2001, p. 149).  Psychoticism (often known 
simply as „P‟) is an inherited personality trait which gives someone a vulnerability to 
psychosis (Eysenck, 1993; Nettle, 2001).  This is said to exist on a continuum, so the 
further up the psychoticism scale one goes the more likely they are to develop a form of 
psychosis, though this is not guaranteed as triggers and environmental factors are also 
involved.  It is also worth noting the sizeable number of individuals listed in Table 1.1 
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and elsewhere who underline their tumultuous lives by committing suicide at the end of 
them, a finding reported disproportionately amongst poets and writers (Kottler, 2005). 
 
Bipolar disorder is frequently reported in a disproportionate number of creative 
individuals (Andreasen, 2008; Kottler, 2005), and the thinking styles resembling 
symptoms of schizophrenia have also been associated with unique and creative output 
(Nettle, 2005; Claridge, Pryor, & Watkins, 1990; Kinney et al., 2000-2001).  
Schizophrenia is less frequently linked to literary creativity than the affective disorders 
(Post, 1994), though more literature in support of a relationship has appeared more 
recently by Sass (2000-2001) and Glazer (2009).  An astute observation is made by Sass 
about the differences between schizophrenic and bipolar thought and the respective 
effects these have on creators.  Sass claims that symptoms of schizophrenia may include 
detachment, nonconformity, and a sense of alienation, all of which go against the 
philosophy of the Romantics, which is reflected in the paucity of „schizophrenic-type‟ 
symptoms and behaviours observed during that time.  As mentioned above, there exist 
many observations of „affective-type‟ symptoms and behaviours during the Romantic 
period.  Schizophrenic thought, however, has been said to resemble some 20
th
 century 
thought which, as put by Glazer “demanded an identical removal of the individual from 
the constraints of social norms” (2009, p. 757), a behaviour which essentially defines the 
impulsive nonconformity subscale (Claridge & Beech, 1995). Sass (1992) observes that 
these distinct historical differences between the Romantic and Post-Modern eras, as well 
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as being correlated with distinct psychopathologies of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, 
respectively, they have also influenced changes in accepted notions of what is regarded as 
„creative‟.   
 
Forrest (1976) claimed that a certain metaphorical language is frequently and purposely 
used by people with schizophrenia and that this is analogous to the creative processes of 
many artists.  Forrest also stated that these cognitive processes were likely shared by 
creative people and those with schizophrenia.  Nettle (2001) illustrates the parallels 
between delusional thought and creativity, especially literary creativity.  He conveys a 
delusion described to him by a person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  The tale 
involved conspiracy, deceit, was relayed with intricate detail, and included its own made-
up, yet highly sophisticated scientific theories.  According to Nettle, the delusion 
appeared as good as any „whodunit‟, and similarities of this nature are palpable (Nettle, 
2001; Kottler, 2005), and elegantly reinforce the associations between the constructs.  
Nobel Laureate and mathematician John Nash is one example of a renowned creative 
individual diagnosed with schizophrenia, (the book, and later film, „A Beautiful Mind‟ 
portray his story).  The parallels between the dimensional constructs of both creativity 
and psychosis, that is, that they both exist on respective continua, are also noted by 
Glazer (2009), however it is suggested that concentrating on the oversimplified question 
of whether schizophrenia or affective disorders are linked to creativity, that is, the 
„either/or‟ type distinction that is often made, it would be more beneficial to look at the 
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dimensional nature of these constructs and to study them with this in mind.  Claridge and 
Blakey (2009) cite evidence to suggest that creativity may be related to both affective 
disorders and schizotypy due to them being different manifestations of a common 
underlying process (unitary theory).  It is easy to see how bizarre ideation and associative 
„leaps‟, typical of schizotypal thought, in the absence of a psychiatric diagnosis, could aid 
various types of creativity, be they storytelling, elaborate poetry or prose, complex 
narratives and plays, or intricate theories and works of art.  However, as will be discussed 
in more detail in the next section, it is more difficult to imagine this in someone with 
schizophrenia, with the cognitive constraints that often go hand-in-hand with such a 
diagnosis.   
 
Nettle (2001) provides evidence to support the notion that healthy individuals in creative 
professions have an overlapping profile with individuals with schizophrenia in terms of 
their underlying cognitive processing.  These individuals sample a wider range of stimuli 
than those who do not have schizophrenia, and can cope with and integrate several 
signals being fed to them, with material entering consciousness which they were 
supposed to ignore being used for creative solutions.  When investigating a sample of 
artists and architects Nettle found that both groups had increased scores on the 
schizophrenia subscale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2, 
1989).  What was suggested was that these individuals perhaps possessed the same 
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capacity to take leaps of the mind in order to reach different and out-of-the-ordinary 
outcomes. 
 
Prentky (2000-2001) went some way to try to understand the link between creativity and 
mental illness, providing two explanations as to why there are such disproportionate 
numbers of creative individuals with symptoms of psychiatric disorders.  Firstly, the 
positive symptoms (such as aberrant perceptions and beliefs, paranormal experiences) 
and the negative symptoms (social withdrawal and an inability to experience pleasure) do 
not have the same „life cycle‟.  That is to say, positive symptoms such as hallucinations 
and delusions are shorter lived than negative ones such as flat affect and „anhedonia‟, 
which is a deficit of positive feelings (Nettle, 2001).  The fact that affective symptoms 
are more enduring has implications for creativity because a low mood can result in low 
motivation.  Secondly, the base rates for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder vary 
significantly from country to country, meaning data from studies conducted in different 
countries may not be comparable.  Prentky (2000-2001) states that symptoms related to 
depression and „schizotypy‟, subclinical traits which resemble these disorders (to be 
defined fully in section 2.4), are more common in non-clinical populations when 
compared to symptoms relating to schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  Barrantes-Vidal 
(2004) suggests the paradox that is found whereby psychoses are related to creativity (but 
not milder neuroses), despite the severity of symptoms, could result from the dimensional 
nature of mental illness, a view which supposes that all mental disorders are connected 
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with „normality‟ (Claridge, 1998; Poulton et al., 2000; Johns & van Os, 2001).  This 
dimensional view sees psychoses as “extreme pathological variants of otherwise normal 
personality dispositions” (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976, cited in Barrantes-Vidal, 2004, p. 
60), and states that the difference between psychoticism, the temperamental basis of 
psychosis, and clinical psychosis itself lies in the quantitative difference between these 
dimensional traits.  These traits are said to be stable and “possibly adaptive” (Barrantes-
Vidal, 2004, p. 61). 
 
Prentky (1979) claimed that creativity and psychopathology were alike in terms of 
similar, shared cognitive processes, and evidence from neuropsychology and cognitive 
psychology has been found for this since that time (Claridge & Blakey, 2009).  These 
shared processes include the intuitive acceptance of large amounts of information along 
with more detailed analysis of a limited body of information.  Prentky‟s discussion of the 
type of thought process common to pathology and creativity allowed the development of 
experimental operations for testing such research questions with some degree of 
specificity.  Hasenfus and Magro (1976) noticed the similarities between measures of 
creativity and those used to measure a so-called „schizophrenic performance deficit‟ and 
thus postulated a correspondence between the empirical constructs of schizophrenia and 
creativity.  They argued that the “operational definitions of creativity are often virtually 
identical to the operational definitions of schizophrenia” (p. 347), and highlight that 
„ideational fluency‟, that is, increased flow of ideas, and „overinclusive‟ thought, the 
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tendency to make unusual links and connections, were both facets of the same cognitive 
propensity.  Earlier studies looking at this issue also found that the equivalence could 
result from both processes being involved in the sampling of a wide range of stimuli 
(Dykes & McGhie, 1976), an ability to express imagery freely (MacKinnon, 1961, cited 
in Keefe & Magro, 1980), and being adept at engaging in pictorial thinking, which is the 
“sampling of multiple cues and combining them into statistically rare combinations” 
(Bogen, 1969, cited in Keefe & Magro, 1980, p. 396).  Keefe and Magro (1980) studied 
the creative performance in 10 paranoid schizophrenia patients, 10 non-paranoid patients, 
10 non-psychotic psychiatric controls, and 10 „normal‟ patients.  Non-paranoid patients 
were significantly more creative than paranoid patients and psychotic controls, and 
generated a significantly higher percentage of „highly creative‟ responses on the 
Alternative Uses Task and other creative thinking tasks.  Keefe and Magro suggested that 
more unusual thought processes, impulses and imagery were demonstrated by the 
participants with schizophrenia, along with a willingness to express these, and that this 
pattern was reflected amongst the more creative people in the sample. 
 
The associations between psychopathology and creativity, though well-researched remain 
somewhat unclear, though general agreement of this relationship exists and empirical 
evidence continues to be found in support of this.  However, there are a number of other 
relevant factors which must be acknowledged when reviewing and presenting this age-
old relationship between creativity and psychopathology.  
  63 
 
2.3.2 Are the creativity-psychopathology relationships causal? 
There is certainly empirical literature which seems to suggest links and interrelationships 
between elements of psychopathological and creative thought.  However, to state that 
where there is psychopathology there is creativity would be entirely false, as the 
relationships described in previous sections are not always present (Acar & Sen, 2013).  
The claim that mental illness somehow facilitates creativity may also appear to some as 
counterintuitive.   If one is lost in a deep depression, low and lacking motivation, or is in 
a period where symptoms of schizophrenia are particularly severe, complete with 
disorganised thought, impulsive behaviour and lack of enjoyment in life, then how can 
one take the steps necessary to produce exceptional works or formulate passages of 
brilliance?  Poet Sylvia Plath put it well: “When you are insane you are busy being insane 
– all the time…  When I was crazy that was all I was” (cited in Barrantes-Vidal, 2004, 
p.64).  The supposition that nonclinical thought processes are useful in creativity is 
concretised by the finding that those who are diagnosed with psychosis or depression are 
rarely creative during these periods, instead exhibiting optimum creativity during their 
periods of „wellness‟ (Barrantes-Vidal, 2004; Ramey & Weisberg, 2004).  There are too 
of course a great number of eminent creative individuals who never exhibit any form of 
psychopathology at all (Burch et al., 2006a), not to mention the sizeable number of 
people who have, or have at some time been affected by psychopathological complaints 
who demonstrate no creative abilities, or indeed inclinations, at any time in their lives 
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(Nettle, 2001).   Perhaps these creative artefacts come to fruition during „well periods‟ 
because these minds are able to somehow „take hold of‟ or control this inherently chaotic 
thought.  Barron‟s (1993) notion of „controllable oddness‟ again springs to mind, a 
personal quality which he posits may be important in understanding the creative person 
and their creative processes.  These periods are in stark contrast to the bouts of depression 
which must accompany the manic phases of bipolar affective disorder, which usually 
amount to no creative production whatsoever, with many instead describing periods of 
frustration and sadness at this sudden lack of flair.   This lends further support to the 
contention that it is not the disorders themselves that are responsible for these robust 
links, but the cognitive styles and processes underlying them. 
 
An elegant and less rigid model than has been seen accounting for the relationship comes 
from Glazer (2009), in her attempt to rephrase „the madness-creativity debate‟, which 
incorporates the huge body of empirical literature in the area.   This model views the 
creativity construct as existing along two continua; one between everyday and eminent 
creativity (Axis A), the other from science domain to art domain creativity (Axis B).  
This persuasive model does indeed rephrase the debate, for it addresses the differences in 
creative production, be they everyday or eminent, and it recognises the differences 
between creative domains.  Taking into account a vast body of literature, the model 
postulates that the closer a person is to the eminent creativity end of Axis A, the more 
likely it is that they may possess psychopathological traits, and states that 
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psychopathological traits interact with Axis B influencing the discipline that person is 
likely to work in.  The model is persuasive because it also acknowledges cultural and 
environmental influences on this combination of factors and is supported by a body of 
empirical evidence (Simonton, 2014; Sass, 2002; Simonton, 2000; Claridge & Blakey, 
2009; Fitzgerald, 2004, cited in Glazer, 2009).  
 
2.3.3 Traits and characteristics of the relatives of psychiatric patients 
Many researchers have noted the similarities in thinking style between psychotic and 
creative individuals, however, as has been noted, psychotic patients themselves are rarely 
exceptionally creative.  Mounting evidence suggests that studying the relatives of persons 
with mental disorders can tell us something more about this complicated and intricate 
relationship (Richards et al., 1988).  These relatives exhibit higher creativity when 
measured in laboratory settings, and are overrepresented in professions which would be 
considered to be creative in their nature.  What the literature seems to suggest is that 
particular cognitive styles coupled with a lack of psychiatric diagnosis is what sets these 
particular individuals apart from others.  This research is reviewed below. 
 
The notion that the relatives of persons diagnosed with schizophrenia have creative 
hobbies and vocations is not new, with a number of studies reporting this (e.g. Karlsson, 
1970).  Heston (1966) found that when he studied the creativity of children whose 
mothers had schizophrenia they possessed more “artistic and imaginative talents” than 
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the rest of his control group in a sample of children being raised in foster care (cited in 
Nettle, 2001, p. 391).  McNeil (1971, cited in Kyaga et al., 2011) studied the psychiatric 
profiles and creative achievement rates in adopted Danish participants.  The sample was 
split into „high‟, „medium‟, and „low‟ categories of creative achievement and the results 
showed not only that rates of mental illness to be highest in the high creativity group, but 
also that the biological parents of these individuals reported disproportionately high 
incidences of mental illness too.  Karlsson (1984) later conducted a large study which 
concluded that the first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia showed 
heightened „creative intelligence‟.  He found that the relatives of psychotic patients were 
thirty percent more likely than general the population to be listed in Icelandic Who‟s 
Who?, and were fifty percent more likely to have authored and published a book.  More 
than double the expected number were involved in professions relating to the arts or 
scholarship. 
 
Andreasen (1987) studied 30 creative writers and their first-degree relatives.  The writers 
had increased rates of mental illness, and she too found evidence of increased creativity 
and prevalence of affective disorder in the relatives of these writers compared to the 
control group.  Jamison (1993) found an increase in the self-reported prevalence of 
affective disorders, suicide, and institutionalisation in poets and their first degree 
relatives.  Ludwig (1995) conducted an investigation into female writers and their 
families and found that personal and maternal psychopathology significantly predicted 
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creative performance and demonstrated that a disproportionate amount of 
psychopathology and creativity could be found in the family trees of these individuals.  
Post (1994) studied 294 recognised people of notable creativity and of the novelists and 
playwrights in the sample a significant proportion had a history of familial 
psychopathology.  Similarly, Nettle (2001) and others have suggested that both 
psychiatric disorder and creative thinking styles run in families.  For example, Fanous, 
Gardner, Walsh, and Kendler (2001) found that it was possible to use positive and 
negative symptoms of schizophrenic patients to predict schizotypal symptoms in the 
relatives of these patients.  These findings lend support to the proposition that it is not 
simply the thought or affective disorder itself that is beneficial to creativity but rather the 
phenomenology of these spectrum disorders.  Kinney et al., (2000-2001) found that 
children who had been adopted who also had parents with schizophrenia were rated as 
significantly more creative than controls (as adults) by independent-researchers blind to 
the aims.  Those exhibiting schizotypal symptoms and personalities were rated even 
higher for creativity.  These individuals are free from diagnosis and were therefore 
theoretically more psychologically healthy, yet what is suggested is that they share 
similar modes of thinking with their psychiatrically unhealthy relatives, i.e. the tendency 
for unconventional and idiosyncratic thought, unusual experiences in imagery and 
perception.  As a result of this they exhibit more unusual and unique behaviours, 
thoughts, conclusions, abstractions, and so on (Green & Williams, 1999; Batey & 
Furnham, 2008).  Richards‟ (2000-2001) study found that bipolar disorder patients scored 
slightly higher on measures of creativity, but also found that their unaffected relatives 
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scored higher still.  It was suggested that these relatives may reap the compensatory 
benefits of this inherited disposition („psychosis proneness‟) when engaging in creative 
tasks, possibly due to the lack of debilitating symptoms they experience. 
 
In their nested case-control study of more than 300,000 Swedish individuals, Kyaga, 
Lichtenstein, Boman, Hultman, and Langstrom (2011) used a substantial collection of 
National registers and censuses to look at relationships between creativity and mental 
disorder.  Scrutinised were creative and non-creative occupations, which were further 
subdivided into visual and non-visual artistic groups, and familial patterns of both 
psychiatric diagnosis and creative achievement.  The distinction between visual and non-
visual artists was to allow for investigation of domain-specific differences in creativity, 
while the inclusion of maternal and paternal half-siblings meant that environmental 
factors which theoretically determine creativity could also be investigated.  For the 
„schizophrenia subgroup‟ in their study, it was found to be more likely that these 
individuals held artistic occupations, particularly visual artistic occupations.  This latter 
observation hints towards the interrelationships between creativity, schizoaffective 
thought and visual imagery.  This study also found that it was significantly more likely 
for the parents and siblings of people with schizophrenia to work in creative jobs across 
all domains.  The children of parents with schizophrenia were also more likely to work in 
visual artistic domains.  Though the present thesis focuses on schizotypal thought and 
behaviour, the vast literature implicating an increase of bipolar disorder in creative 
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groups, as well as the overlapping phenomenology of schizotypy and some affective 
disorders means that consideration of bipolar subgroups is relevant and cannot be 
overlooked.  As may be expected given this abundance of literature, bipolar individuals 
in Kyaga et al.‟s study were significantly overrepresented in professions independently 
considered to be creative, with an increased likelihood being found for visual artistic 
occupations, as was found for the schizophrenia subgroup, however, there was also an 
elevated chance of these latter individuals working in non-visually artistic professions.  
This last observation is interesting as it again points to a differential style between 
creative individuals both in terms of their psychological and cognitive „make-up‟ and the 
creative professions that may distinguish them.  Evidence has already been cited which 
suggests that enhanced visual imagery abilities are useful when creating (Chapter 1), yet 
here it can be seen that it is the schizophrenia subgroup who exhibited an increased 
likelihood of creativity in only one domain, that is, visually artistic occupations, and it is 
precisely this distinction that the current thesis is getting at.  The experiences of those 
with schizophrenia, as has been outlined, often include perceptions that are aberrant, 
unusual, and even at odds with reality.  It is possible that the processes underlying these 
disorders are what are important for novel creation, a frequently stated notion which is 
receiving increasing support, and this would go some way towards explaining the 
frequent reports of increased creativity in schizotypal individuals and the „well‟ relatives 
of those with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  This is further buttressed by the 
interesting finding reported by Kyaga et al. (2011) which showed that “the likelihood of 
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creative occupations... decreased with increasing familial distance to these individuals” 
(p. 377). 
 
Studies have recently been published which report associations linking genetic 
polymorphisms and creativity (Kéri, 2009).  The polymorphisms which were found to 
impact on creativity are also related to psychosis risk and altered cognitive functioning 
(Keri, Kiss, & Kelemen, 2009; McIntosh et al., 2008), and these studies provide further 
support towards an advantage of certain psychotic-type thought processes, otherwise 
known as the balancing selection hypothesis, which advocates a view of an adaptive 
advantage of the susceptibility to mental disorder.   
 
This section has presented evidence that cognitive processes underlying psychiatric 
disorders may explain the frequently reported associations between creativity and 
psychopathology.  Research that implicates aspects of the nonpathological, 
multidimensional construct of schizotypy in creativity has been published, a review of 
which is presented next.  
 
2.4 Schizotypal traits and their relationship to creativity 
Schizotypy, the collection of subclinical personality traits that bear a resemblance to 
schizophrenia, but which are not full-blown instances of the disorder, has been linked to 
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creativity in numerous studies (Burch et al., 2006a; Karimi, Windmann, Gunturkun, & 
Abraham, 2006; and, O‟Reilly, Dunbar, & Bentall, 2001).   
 
Traits resembling schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are said to appear towards the lesser 
extremes of their respective continua, are known as schizotypy and thymotypy, and these 
characteristics are present amongst the general population in the absence of clinical 
psychopathology (Claridge & Beech, 1997).  As was noted by Nettle (2001), “This view 
of the benign functions of schizotypy has a long history, espoused by the influential 
Victorian psychiatrist Henry Maudsley in 1871” (p. 135).  Broken down further, 
schizotypy consists of subclinical personality traits which themselves appear along 
separate continua.  Schizotypy may enhance human imagination, verbal skills, creativity, 
especially when combined with high intelligence (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003).  
However, excessive and pathological development of such cognitive processes may lead 
to extreme distractability, overinclusive perception, overestimation of the meaningfulness 
of naturally-occurring coincidences, delusional ideation, and highly–disordered thought 
and language, all of which represent core symptoms of schizophrenia (Leonhard & 
Brugger, 1998; Mohr & Leonards, 2005; Mohr, Graves, Gianotti, Pizzagalli, & Brugger, 
2001; Mason et al., 1995).  When considering the discussion in the following section, that 
of „schizotypal creatives‟, it would be interesting to think about what sets these 
individuals apart. Perhaps they did not posses these excesses or could control them in 
some way.  It has in fact been found that, despite these impairments, those with 
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schizophrenia out-perform normal controls on a selection of tasks involving use of 
context information (Mellet et al., 2006) and syllogistic reasoning (Owen et al., 2006), 
indicating that the cognitive profiles of schizoaffective disorders include both strengths 
and deficits. The continuum of positive schizotypy represents a susceptibility to divergent 
thought and odd experience, and Mason et al. (1995) suggest it may be useful not to filter 
these stimuli out too effectively as these associative leaps can facilitate creative insight or 
help to find non-obvious solutions when solving problems.  Theoretically the problem is 
one relating to balance: too much divergent thought leads to cognitive disorganisation, 
eccentric behaviour, delusion and hallucination, however a little may prove advantageous 
when engaging in creative pursuits. 
 
Like many of the constructs described thus far in this thesis, there are a number of models 
to describe the construct of schizotypy.  The quasi-dimensional model sees schizotypy as 
simply a milder form of schizophrenia (Meehl, 1962; Rado, 1953, cited in Goulding, 
2004) and says that someone who is high on one or more schizotypy factors will probably 
show signs of psychological ill-health.  The quasi-dimensional model is a disease model 
whereby schizotypy is related to psychological ill-health (Goulding, 2004).  The quasi-
dimensional model has been challenged by McCreery and Claridge (2002) who showed 
that high scores on the aberrant perceptions and beliefs factor of schizotypy can be seen 
as something positive, and not obviously associated with ill-health, as has been shown in 
the abundance of literature presented.  There is also the personality model proposed by 
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Eysenck (1960) which supposes that psychotic people populate the extreme upper end of 
what he calls a normality-psychosis continuum.  The fully-dimensional model has 
received the most empirical support and is seen as an extension of the previous two 
models.  This model represents schizotypy as a collection of continuously distributed 
traits; the sources of healthy variation and also the predisposition to psychosis.  It 
incorporates the quasi-dimensional model because an additional continuum on a different 
level from the personality traits exists.  The disease continuum, which is found in the 
quasi-dimensional model, is included in this second continuum, and covers a spectrum of 
schizophreniform disorders (Goulding, 2004).  These range from „schizotypal personality 
disorder‟ (Raine, 1991) at the one end of the scale, to schizophrenic psychosis at the 
other.  This model enables researchers to view schizotypy as sometimes associated with 
health and sometimes with ill-health as it is entirely possible that people with high scores 
on one or more schizotypy factors are as healthy as people with low schizotypy scores.  
The fully-dimensional model is fundamentally neutral in that it is not concerned with 
psychological ill health in any particular realm. 
 
Factor analyses of schizotypy measures have revealed three or four factors (Neuvo et al., 
2012; McCreery & Claridge, 2002).  The first relates to aberrant perceptions and beliefs, 
and paranormal experiences and beliefs, and this factor resembles the positive symptoms 
of schizophrenia such as hallucinations and delusions.  Second are the subclinical forms 
of cognitive failures such as attentional difficulties and increased social anxiety.  Next is 
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introvertive anhedonia, describing subclinical forms of the negative symptoms found in 
psychosis such as social withdrawal and „flat-affect‟, which is an inability to experience 
pleasure.  A fourth debated factor has also been found which relates to asocial behaviour 
(McCreery & Claridge, 2002).  What is debated is whether it can be said to be a „true‟ 
schizotypy factor or not because it is not relevant to schizophrenia, per se (Day & Peters, 
1999).  The most common tool for measuring schizotypy is the Oxford-Liverpool 
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE, Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995).  
The four schizotypy subscales are unusual experiences, relating to magical ideations, 
overinclusive and bizarre thought processes (positive schizotypy); cognitive 
disorganisation (disorganised schizotypy), exhibited as attention and concentration 
difficulties, mood swings and social anxiety; impulsive nonconformity, showing 
disinhibited and reckless personality traits, and odd behaviours and speech and 
introvertive anhedonia, being a lack of social enjoyment, an aversion to intimacy and an 
emphasis on solitude (negative schizotypy).   
 
Researchers have uncovered shared variance between schizotypy scales and the Big Five 
personality traits.  The associations between personality and schizotypy appear to depend 
on the measure used to measure schizotypy (Boyle, Matthews, & Zaklofske, 2008).  
Openness to experience is one factor that appears to share variance with dimensions of 
schizotypy.  Boyle et al. (2008) claim that the positive associations that have been found 
between schizotypy and openness are often revealed when university undergraduate 
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students are sampled, while negative associations between schizotypy and openness have 
been reported to exist in clinical populations (Ross, Lutz, & Bailley, 2002).   
 
Miller and Tal (2007) administered the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ, Raine, 1991) and their results revealed 
significant correlations between positive schizotypy (magical ideation, ideas of reference, 
odd speech, and odd behaviour) and openness (r = .29), conscientiousness (r = -.26), 
agreeableness (r = -.30) and neuroticism (r = .31).  Negative schizotypy (flat affect, few 
close friends, social anxiety, and paranoid ideation) was associated with 
conscientiousness (r = -.25), extraversion (r = .50), agreeableness (r = .38), and 
neuroticism (r = .51).   
 
Nelson and Rawlings (2008) found that unusual experiences significantly correlated with 
agreeableness (r = -.23), conscientiousness (r = -.24) and neuroticism (r = .25). 
 
Kwapil et al., (2008) found that positive schizotypy was associated with increased 
neuroticism and decreased scores on both agreeableness and conscientiousness, while 
negative schizotypy was related to introversion (low extraversion) and decreased 
agreeableness.  A linear regression indicated that positive schizotypy was associated with 
openness to experience (β = .33, Δr2 = .11), while the negative symptom dimension was 
negatively associated with openness (β = -.40, Δr2 = .15), with each schizotypy 
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dimension independently accounting for more than 10% of the variance in this subscale.  
The researchers used the Perceptual Aberration, Magical Ideation, Revised Social 
Anhedonia, and Physical Anhedonia scales in their study, that is, they did not include 
measures of cognitive disorganisation or impulsive nonconformity. 
 
In a recent study with 355 participants, LeBoutillier (2015) found that the unusual 
experiences subscale shared 7% of variance with neuroticism, and 2% with openness to 
experience.  Cognitive disorganisation shared 8% with extraversion, 4% with 
conscientiousness, and 18% with neuroticism.  The introvertive anhedonia subscale 
shared variance with will of the Big Five personality dimensions: extraversion 9%; 
agreeableness 4%, conscientiousness 3%, openness to experience 4%, and neuroticism 
1%.  Impulsive nonconformity shared 2% of variance with conscientiousness and 7% 
with neuroticism. 
 
Swami, Pietschnig, Steiger, and Voracek (2011) found that unusual experiences was 
significantly correlated with the Big 5 subscales as follows: neuroticism (r = .3), 
extraversion (r = -.1), openness to experience (r = .2), agreeableness (r = .2) and 
conscientiousness (r = .2); introvertive anhedonia was significantly correlated with the 
Big 5 subscales as follows: neuroticism (r = .2), extraversion (r = -.6), opennesss to 
experience (r = -.2), agreeableness (r = -.4), conscientiousness (r = -.2); impulsive 
nonconformity was significantly correlated with the Big 5 subscales as follows: 
neuroticism (r = .2), agreeableness (r = -4), conscientiousness (r = -.5), and cognitive 
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disorganisation was significantly correlated with the Big 5 subscales as follows: 
neuroticism (r = .7), extraversion (r = -.4), agreeableness (r = -.3), and conscientiousness 
(r = -.4). 
 
In early work into schizotypy subscales, positive schizotypy (unusual experiences) and 
impulsive nonconformity were both found to load on the same factor as extraversion, 
while negative schizotypy (introvertive anhedonia) and cognitive disorganisation loaded 
alongside introversion (Claridge et al., 1996). 
 
These results suggest some shared variance between dimensions of personality and 
schizotypy, though relationships appear to vary depending on sample and measures 
administered.  Additionally, the dimensions measured by the schizotypy subscales are not 
orthogonal, as reported Mason and Claridge (2006).  A UK sample of 1926 participants 
revealed significant weak to moderate interrelationships between all four subscales (range 
of r = .07 to .48). 
 
Oldham and Morris (1995) state that both those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia as well 
as schizotypal persons display an „idiosyncratic style‟ when it comes to their thinking and 
behaviour which influences creativity.  It was outlined in section 2.2.2 that personality 
traits such as openness to experience and agreeableness were found in disproportionate 
numbers of creative persons, and reduced latent inhibition is another factor often linking 
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schizophrenia and schizotypy with creativity (Weinstein & Graves, 2002; Green & 
Williams, 1999).  Reduced inhibition is a factor because those experiencing it are able to 
make use of their access to apparently irrelevant information in creative problem solving 
(Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova, & Vartanian, 2008; Burch et al., 2006b).  Recent 
evidence has also suggested that persons diagnosed with schizophrenia and people high 
on scales of schizotypy both demonstrate certain right-hemisphere biases in their 
cognitive processing (Barrantes-Vidal, 2004; Glazer, 2009). Studying these relationships 
is complicated further by the multidimensional nature of the construct of schizotypy; 
indeed similar problems exist with investigating the somewhat subjective construct of 
creativity, and also the varied ways of measuring it. 
 
Positive schizotypy in particular has been implicated as a trait commonly shared by 
creative individuals (Schuldberg, 2000-2001; Dinn, Harris, Aycicegi, Greene, & 
Andover, 2002; Burch et al., 2006a).  O‟Reilly, Dunbar and Bentall (2001) found that 
creative art students scored higher than humanities students on the unusual experiences 
subscale of the O-LIFE.  This suggests that thinking styles such as „overinclusive‟ 
thought, which is the tendency to make remote associations and to link ideas in new and 
unusual ways (Mednick, 1962), and magical ideation (Eckbald & Chapman, 1983) may 
be conducive to creative endeavours.  Nettle (2005) also found poets‟ and visual artists‟ 
levels of unusual experiences that were especially high, and that these participants 
obtained similar creativity scores to a schizophrenic sample (Nettle, 2001).  Schuldberg 
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(1990) found that unusual experiences were positively correlated with creativity scores in 
a sizeable sample of students, creativity being measured by divergent thinking tasks.  
O‟Reilly, Dunbar and Bentall (2001) found that unusual experiences correlated with the 
Torrance (1974) measures of divergent thinking in humanities and creative art students, 
but not in controls.  This study concluded, however, that creative pursuits, rather than 
creative production per se were accounted for by schizotypy, that is, these differences 
were accounted for by the subject the participants were studying rather than their 
schizotypy scores.  Unusual experiences and magical thinking have also been linked to 
divergent thinking and creativity in students, professors, writers, and actors (Brod, 1997).   
 
Further support for a relation between artistic creativity and positive schizotypy  comes 
from Rawlings and Locarnini (2008) who found a tendency to make unusual word 
associations in participants high in these traits.  They postulate that causal links may exist 
between schizotypy indices and those of creativity and divergent thinking.  These may 
result from a wider attentional focus, reduced cognitive inhibition of normally-irrelevant 
stimuli via top-down processing, increased openness to experience, enhanced associative 
processing, and generation of more-distant and more-novel connections between thoughts 
and events in schizotypal individuals and those with schizophrenia (Rawlings & 
Locarnini, 2008).   
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Nettle (2005) looked at schizotypy and personal and familial mental health in groups of 
poets, visual artists, and mathematicians, and also assessed participants‟ 
psychopathological history and current diagnoses.  His results were intriguing.  He found 
increased cognitive disorganisation in artists who had described themselves as „seriously 
involved‟ with visual arts and poetry, while „professional‟ and „non-artist‟ groups were 
progressively lower in this trait, although the trend was non-significant.  The lack of 
cognitive disorganisation in the professional groups requires comment.  Those high in 
this trait may experience difficulties when making decisions and following conversations, 
intrusive and chaotic thought, and increased distractibility.  In addition they may 
experience social anxiety and a sense of purposelessness (Claridge, 1997).  An absence of 
this may have allowed the professional group to progress further in their creative 
endeavours than their cognitively disorganised counterparts.  The professional poets in 
Nettle‟s sample scored lower on cognitive disorganisation than both serious poets and 
those who said they engaged with and wrote poetry as a hobby.  Again, the severity of the 
schizotypal symptoms appears to matter, with the most successful individuals perhaps 
experiencing, without wishing to sound irreverent, „just the right amount‟ of schizotypy 
for their creations and creative achievements to be successful.  Nettle went on to find 
significant differences between the poet and non-poet groups on unusual experiences, 
cognitive disorganisation, and impulsive nonconformity, however, no difference was 
found for introvertive anhedonia.  When looking at the visual artists, a pattern of results 
emerges which includes yet another unique set of differences.  Unusual experiences were 
higher amongst visual artists, this positive schizotypal trait has now been implicated for 
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all creative groupings, and they differed from the non-visual artists on impulsive 
nonconformity and introvertive anhedonia.  The visual artists had similar „schizotypal 
profiles‟ to the poets.  Batey and Furnham (2008) found that both unusual experiences 
and impulsive nonconformity were positively related to self-reported creativity in 
undergraduates, with cognitive disorganisation being significantly negatively related.  In 
a study involving 1108 college students it was revealed that positive symptoms of 
schizotypy were positively correlated with creativity and that negative symptoms were 
negatively correlated (Schuldberg, 2000-2001).  Collectively this suggests that a different 
pattern of results may emerge depending on how one approaches the problem.  It is clear 
that it matters whether one focuses on „artists‟ as a homogenous group of creative 
individuals or whether one studies creative samples by their respective genres, i.e. poets, 
visual artists, writers, scientists, and whether the individuals themselves achieve a certain 
level of success or creative professionalism.  To say that if you have schizotypal 
experiences you will be more creative is overly simplistic in light of the literature 
presented.  Additionally the constructs are multidimensional, that is, both creativity and 
schizotypy are measured on many differing dimensions.  Furthermore, when one 
differentiates between creative professionals and other „less serious‟ creative individuals, 
the various relationships with schizotypal thought often disappear (Simonton, 2014).  In 
early studies looking at the schizotypy-creativity relationship the distinctions previously 
described regarding the possibility of domain-specificity of creativity and the nuanced 
nature of schizotypal thought were not always made.  Subsequently conclusions were 
often generalised and oversimplified.  Additionally studies in this area rarely consider the 
  82 
severity and intrusiveness of the schizotypal experiences for the creative individual, 
though it may be that some interesting findings have been missed because of this.  
Different creative outputs may arise depending on whether someone frequently 
experiences distressing and intrusive schizotypal symptoms compared to someone for 
whom experiences such as these are rare or less distressing. 
 
Such attributes as overinclusive thinking, magical ideation, and loose and remote 
associations typical of positive schizotypal thinking are purported to be of creative 
benefit (Andreasen, 1987).  Andreasen and Powers (1974) found that thinking styles of 
this nature were present in both patients with schizophrenia and patients in the „manic‟ 
phases of bipolar disorder.  However, as has been highlighted, most instances of 
schizophrenia do not lend themselves to structured and organised productivity, the 
debilitating thought processes typifying this disorder instead giving rise to disordered and 
aberrant attentional biases and behaviours (Simonton, 2005).  Therefore it may be that it 
is the underlying cognitive styles which are important in creative generation, so often 
facilitating unusual and apt creative connections.   
 
Another theory relevant to the current discussion of the relationships between creativity 
and schizotypy is Finke‟s (1996) concept of „chaotic thinking‟ in creative cognition, a 
model of creative imagery which was outlined in Chapter 1 (section 1.3.1).  This is 
exemplified by „imaginative divergence‟, a view of the world as unpredictable and full of 
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intricate associations, and these characteristics are reminiscent of elements of schizotypal 
thought described above.  The relationships may not be as straightforward as they at first 
seem however, as Boden (2004) has asserted.  She states that it may actually be „relative 
randomness‟ that facilitates creativity, as chaotic thinking alone may imply 
disconnections from the original problems, and it is the top-down constraints that are key 
here.  Chaotic cognition is of particular interest in the present thesis, as it is found that the 
thoughts typically displayed in chaotic thinkers, such as impulsivity, playfulness in 
imagery and cognition, and unstructured thought, facilitate creativity that is “strikingly 
original” (Finke, 1996, p. 390), and these facets of the construct appear particularly 
relevant to schizotypy too. 
 
Nettle (2001) and others (Richards et al., 1988; Kinney et al., 2000-2001) theorise that it 
may be creative thought itself that holds the answer as to why certain psychopathological 
traits remain in the human gene pool at all.  Nettle‟s (2001) claim, along with other 
appropriately named creativity-benefit theorists, is that creative thought has evolved, like 
any other trait, by virtue of clear evolutionary advantages, and that the cost of this benefit 
is the presence of mental disorder in all societies.  These disorders persist along with 
creativity because they are “flip sides of the same coin” (Nettle, 2001, p. 11), and it is 
precisely because of the benefits to creative thought that these disorders pervade all 
cultures.  That there appears to exist such a preponderance of creative persons presenting 
with schizoaffective diagnoses, that so many great ancient and contemporary thinkers 
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have taken note of this relationship, the links between schizotypal traits and creative 
behaviours in non-eminent creative individuals and their families, and finally the 
influence of perceptual and imaginal phenomena for these individuals all complicate the 
relationship, while at the same time providing  interesting avenues of research to explore.    
Fisher et al. (2004) and McCreery and Claridge (2002) support the notion of a „healthy 
schizotypy‟, which can be described as “the uncoupling of the concept of schizotypy 
from the concept of disease” (p. 144), which dovetails with the notion that the genes 
related to schizophrenia persist in the population despite schizophrenia‟s frequently 
maladaptive nature.   
 
Recent claims surrounding the dimensional view of schizotypy are particularly relevant 
to interpretation of the literature, such as the observation that some symptoms from the 
schizoid and bipolar spectrums are not mutually exclusive (Acar & Sen, 2013).  For 
similar reasons, the relatively new intermediate diagnosis of „schizoaffective‟ disorder 
may further complicate interpretation of research findings into the creativity-schizotypy 
debate (Barrantes-Vidal, 2004).   
 
2.4.1 Schizotypal creatives 
Prentky (2000-2001) states that the clinical literature appears to suggest that many 
famous creative individuals, examples including Franz Kafka (writer), Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (philosopher), Samuel Coleridge (poet and philosopher), Samuel Johnson 
  85 
(poet), John Stuart Mill (poet), Edgar Allan Poe (poet and author), Virginia Woolf 
(writer), and Hart Crane (poet), reputedly had some “affective disturbance” (p. 101).  The 
literature also suggests that others may have had symptoms which were more likely to be 
associated with schizophrenia, for example, Alan Swift (poet), August Strindberg 
(writer), and Charles Baudelaire (poet).  These are again post-hoc diagnoses, and Prentky 
notes that “there are no discrete nosological entities or even nosological categories that 
capture all psychiatrically disturbed, highly creative individuals” (p. 101, 2000-2001).  
The attention now turns specifically to schizotypal creative individuals; eminent creative 
people who some claim may have had schizotypal personalities.  Examples of these 
include Albert Einstein (physicist), Isaac Newton (physicist), Salvador Dali (artist), and 
Franz Kafka (writer) (Glazer, 2009), Lord Byron (poet and playwright), Heinrich Heine 
(poet), Blaise Pascal (mathematician), and August Strindberg (novelist playwright, poet 
and painter) (Prentky, 2000-2001), and René Descartes (philosopher, mathematician, 
writer) (Sass, 2000-2001).  Sass (2000-2001) suggested that those with increased scores 
on schiztoypy measures were superior and innovative in their creation compared to those 
displaying affective disorders, and it is suggested that their particularly unusual or unique 
thinking styles coupled with their lack of psychosis could explain why they are able to 
produce such exceptionally creative works.  To take Albert Einstein as an example: many 
think of a stereotypical scientist when they think of Einstein, and his reportedly eccentric 
and unpredictable characteristics and proneness to fantasy are emblematic of traits often 
typified by schizotypal individuals.  Perhaps the impression that Einstein had schizotypal 
tendencies comes from the observation of an unusual personality, characterised by 
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atypical, overinclusive and idiosyncratic thought, characteristics which synonymous with 
some schizotypal behaviours as conceptualised by current researchers in the field.  It is 
worth elaborating on an observation made earlier.  Rothenberg had the notion that 
“Deviant behaviour, whether in the form of eccentricity or worse, is not only associated 
with persons of genius or high-level creativity, but it is frequently expected of them” 
(Rothenberg, 1990, p. 149).  Again one is reminded of the „role expectation‟ of creative 
people which was mentioned earlier.  Have those eminent in their creative fields felt the 
need to conform somehow to society‟s view of how „a creative‟ should behave?  Or could 
these behaviours be associated with the cognitive styles typifying schizotypal 
personalities?  The classic notion that creativity arose via divine intervention meant that 
creative individuals were traditionally bestowed with a “mystical and superior quality” 
(Barrantes-Vidal, 2004, p. 63), so it may not be a tenuous suggestion that some 
embellishment of symptoms may have ensued.  However, Barrantes-Vidal makes the 
important point that this „myth of genius‟ does not account for the preponderance of 
psychopathological traits in non-eminent creative individuals.  The same could be said 
about the disproportionately heightened schizotypy scores often related to creative 
performance and endeavour. 
 
Naturally, the connection under review, that of a relationship between creativity and 
„madness‟, has been observed by creative individuals themselves, Salvador Dali famously 
declaring that “the only difference between me and a madman is that I am not mad” 
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(Nelson & Rawlings, 2008, p. 1), a prescient statement one may think in light of latter 
claims that he may have been high in schizotypy , for this could even be considered as a 
colloquial explanation for schizotypy itself, that is, the characteristics of „madness‟ 
without the psychiatric diagnosis.  William Shakespeare alludes towards the tendency for 
people to view creativity as synonymous with mental disorder in „A Midsummer Night‟s 
Dream‟, demonstrated with the following quote:  
 
“One sees more devils than vast hell can hold; 
That is the madman… 
… The poet‟s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,  
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The form of things unknown, the poets‟ pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name.”  (Shakespeare, 1590-1596, cited in Nettle, 2001, 
p. 2).  
 
Having considered the empirical evidence surrounding the link between schizotypal 
thought and creativity, both eminent and non-eminent, it appears that there is something 
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about the quality of schizotypal thought which relates to unusual and novel creative 
productivity, or the tendency to engage in artistic pursuits.  However, the evidence is 
mixed, and it appears that there are other factors which influence the relationships, for 
example, the nature of the tools and the type of creativity which is considered.  The 
admittedly lengthy quote above reflects this and has been included for a number of 
reasons.  Shakespeare‟s observation is pertinent as not only is he specifying a relationship 
between creativity and mental illness, but he is also alluding to the function of mental 
imagery in the creative process, a process whereby previously unanticipated forms are 
adapted and given meaning.  The wording has a certain „schizotypal‟ quality to it; 
creating meaningful entities from „things unknown‟, from „airy nothings‟.  This 
description brings to mind elements of positive schizotypy, such as the tendency to 
encounter shapes and forms despite there being no external stimuli present.  One may 
again notice the somewhat stereotypical view of the „madman‟ portrayed here too, 
characterised by bizarre behaviour and speech, and frenzied, rolling eyes.  Yet here 
Shakespeare is describing not a madman, but a poet.  Having unusual perceptual 
experiences, indicated by high scores on measures of positive schizotypy, so called 
because it resembles the „positive‟ symptoms of schizophrenia such as hallucinations, 
magical ideation and other unusual cognitive experiences, is associated with increased 
creativity in a wide range of vocations (Nettle, 2005).  For example, O‟Reilly, Dumbar 
and Bentall (2001) found that art students scored higher than humanities students on 
items measuring unusual experiences, supporting the supposition that these cognitive 
characteristics may contribute to their artistic pursuits.  The propensity to view things in 
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an unconventional light or to make bizarre connections is common among individuals 
high on positive schizotypy scales, as are pseudo hallucinations and anomalous 
perceptual experiences (Claridge et al., 1996).   
 
 
There appear to be associations with creativity between both schizotypal thought and 
mental imagery, yet these associations are far from straightforward.  Rather than 
focussing on the creativity-imagery debate on one hand, and the creativity-schizotypy 
debate on the other, and in light of the evidence presented thus far, it may be time to 
consider the interrelationships between the three constructs and the possibility that 
schizotypy and imagery are themselves related. 
 
2.5 Drawing the Three Constructs Together  
An example which may demonstrate the interconnectedness of the three constructs under 
consideration relates to the relational aspects of certain schizoaffective constructs, 
specifically schizotypy, with elements of mental imagery.  It was suggested earlier that 
the focus of researchers on distinct creativity-imagery and creativity-schizotypy links 
may have left a potentially worthwhile area relatively unexplored, that of the imagery-
schizotypy link.  The word „relatively‟ is used here because some studies have been 
conducted more recently which make associations in related areas.  In their research with 
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hallucination-prone individuals from the normal population, Aleman, Nieuwenstein, 
Böcker, and De Haan (2000) demonstrated that the „high hallucination-prone‟ individuals 
in their study reported higher imagery vividness than „low hallucination-prone‟ 
comparisons, suggesting an underlying link between these experiences, which are 
perceptual in nature.  In their paper which looked at whether the confusion of internal and 
external imaginal stimuli resulted in hallucinations, Böcker, Hijman, Kahn, and De Haan 
(2000) found no differences between hallucinating and non-hallucinating participants in 
perception, but again found that the former group reported having more vivid imagery.  
While hallucinations, and indeed pseudo-hallucinations, are not synonymous with 
imagery, these examples highlight a certain „imaginal‟ aspect to the construct.  This is 
also relevant because, as has been shown, pseudo-hallucinatory experiences are 
associated with positive schizotypy, which is related to creativity.  Sack et al. (2005) 
outlined the similarities between imagery and hallucinations by stating that mental 
images also have perceptual qualities and can occur in the absence of appropriate stimuli.  
However, the important difference between hallucinations and mental images comes 
from whether one may control these perceptual experiences, for hallucinations typically 
occur beyond control and intention (Bentall, 1990).  Mental images by contrast are 
intentionally and actively generated and can thus be more easily controlled.  This last 
point requires one caveat, however, and that is that the ability to control mental imagery 
is not one enjoyed by all at equal levels.  A related point comes from Barrett (1993, cited 
Sack et al., 2005) who found that people experiencing hallucinations had more vivid 
imagery but worse control of images in comparison to people who did not experience 
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hallucinations.  Additionally, Barrett and Etheridge (1992, cited in Sack et al., 2005) 
claimed that hallucinations were often associated with hypnagogic and hypnopompic 
sleep, which has already been shown to be linked to creativity (Chapter 1, section 1.1.1).    
 
Sack, van de Ven, Etschenberg, Schzta, and Linden (2005) suggest that enhanced 
imagery vividness may possibly indicate a trait marker of schizophrenia, which would 
therefore theoretically demonstrate some association with schizotypy.  Especially 
relevant to the present discussion is that strong correlations between increased vividness 
of mental imagery and the presence of positive schizotypal traits have been reported (van 
de Ven & Merckelbach, 2003).  Bell (2010) suggests that the link between imagery and 
schizotypy may only materialise when considering imagery in a range of sensory 
modalities such as visual, auditory, gustatory, and cutaneous.  As was shown in Chapter 
1, mental imagery has been related to creativity in a wide range of settings, and the 
examples just outlined demonstrate further overlaps in the constructs under investigation 
in this thesis.  None of these studies looks at mental imagery control, however, and it may 
be that some interesting associations exist between this ability and schizotypal thought, 
and subsequent relationships to creativity. 
 
In an investigation of conceptual expansion, creativity, mental imagery, and respective 
relationships with psychopathology, Abraham, Windmann, Daum, and Gunturkun (2005) 
found the high-psychoticism group in their sample to perform well on Ward‟s (1994) 
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animal drawing task which measures conceptual expansion.  This was supposedly due to 
defocused top-down processing which allowed this group of participants‟ access to a 
wider conceptualisation of relevance and to ignore schemas of common earth creatures, 
therefore conceiving of more conceptually unique drawings, and it may be that 
performance on this task is additionally benefitted by enhanced imaging abilities.  
Barrantes-Vidal (2004) notes McConaghy‟s (1960) observation that such allusive 
thinking may be linked to predispositions to psychosis and to creative cognition, creative 
cognition, incidentally, also embodying mental imagery processes. She describes the 
often irrelevant associations typical of psychotic thought which arise due to impairments 
in attentional filtering, again due to defocused top-down processing, and notes an 
enhanced capacity for “making logical attributions” (p. 68) amongst overinclusive 
thoughts, that is, those which go beyond typical strategies and which may therefore lead 
to increased creative output.  It is conceivable that the creative person may also 
demonstrate these abilities, and that mental imagery processes may be involved as well.  
Unorthodox thinking and behaviours are also characteristic of schizotypy.  It has already 
been mentioned that Einstein, Coleridge, and Dali all engaged in elaborate mental 
imaging techniques to facilitate their creativity, and even more interesting is that they 
have all been said to exhibit schizotypal behaviours and traits (Glazer, 2009; Prentky, 
2000-2001).  It is acknowledged that there are problems with characterising and 
assigning traits to people who are dead, but the claim is still a compelling one and 
buttresses arguments to be presented throughout the thesis.   
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What I am proposing is that relationships between creativity and enhanced positive 
schizotypy may reflect elaborate and unconstrained imaginations, as well as 
uncontrollable and unusual imaginal experiences, the associations between creativity and 
imagery on the other hand reflecting the ability to control and reconceptualise visual 
images. 
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
It is evident that a multifaceted approach should be adopted studying relationships 
between creativity, mental imagery and schizotypy.  Despite significant developments in 
methodologies and models available to elucidate the complex connections inherent in the 
debates, conclusive findings are still far off.  The previous chapter and this one have 
highlighted potential reasons for the lack of progress, the most significant seemingly 
being the problems with operationalisation of all three constructs and subsequent failure 
to acknowledge the multidimensional nature inherent in each.  A new approach to these 
investigations is therefore proposed, which acknowledges the shortcomings previously 
described and addresses them accordingly.  The final section of this chapter provides 
details of such an approach. 
 
  94 
2.7 Theoretical Framework  
A related collection of traits underlying creativity 
The empirical evidence presented thus far suggests that there are links between visual 
imagery and creativity, and elements of schizotypy and creativity.  To suppose that 
creativity will inevitably be demonstrated by those high in positive schizotypal traits is 
naive, yet the evidence suggests that a relationship nonetheless exists (Nettle, 2006; 
Burch et al., 2006a; Fisher, 2004; Acar & Sen, 2013).  Could this be further explained by 
investigation of the imaginal abilities of these individuals?   
 
Finke (1996) states that creative thought and mental imagery utilise both conscious 
control and spontaneity, both of which can be explored by the tools and protocols to be 
employed in the thesis.  The conscious control of mental imagery will be measured using 
a tool explicitly designed for the purpose of assessing imagery control aptitudes, and the 
ability to conceive of and provide creative responses in divergent thinking tasks and 
activities which require mental imagery will allow a thorough exploration of these 
aspects of creative cognition. 
 
Another reason for the chosen design, one which has already been alluded to, is the 
supposition that positive schizotypy, specifically, is associated with mental imagery.  A 
number of the O-LIFE unusual experience items enquire about such things as seeing 
„shapes and forms‟ in the dark, and whether participants‟ daydreams seem „so true to life 
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that [they] sometimes think they are real‟ (Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995).  Another 
item asks „…have you seen a person‟s face in front of you when in fact no one was 
there?‟  It is argued that experiencing any of these things would necessarily entail mental 
imagery, and it may be that the imaginative and perceptual nature of some questions in 
the O-LIFE are alluding to a side of the argument which has been studied with relative 
paucity.   
 
Morrison and Wallace (2001) posit that both combinational play during mental synthesis, 
that is, the combination, separation and recombination of shapes in mental imagery, and 
analogical reasoning may be relevant to the generation of creative ideas due to the 
increased likelihood of original, unique, and previously unanticipated ideas.  It is possible 
that these cognitive abilities may be further facilitated by schizotypy due to loose-
associations and idiosyncratic thinking styles.  The potential interactions between 
performance on creative thinking tasks, schizotypal thought processes and experiences 
exhibited in both creative and non-creative persons, and objectively measured mental 
imagery control have not been comprehensively examined collectively.  Previous 
investigations into the somewhat mysterious processes leading to creativity may have 
failed to recognise that, rather than exploring psychopathology on one hand, and strong 
imaging abilities on the other, a focus on how these elements are related may yield more 
substantial and fruitful cues to the nature of the relationships.   
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2.8 Research Aims  
Bentall, Claridge and Slade (1989) and others (Dinn, Harris, Aycicegi, Greene, & 
Andover, 2002) claim that many mental disorders also have multidimensional structures 
(Hasenfus & Magaro, 1976; Glazer, 2009), another reason why unpicking relationships 
with creativity is so problematic.  I have now introduced three multidimensional 
constructs with which to contend; creativity, mental imagery and schizotypy.  This thesis 
aims to investigate whether the underlying cognitive processes which correspond to each 
are themselves related.  Visual imagery has been linked to enhanced creativity, however, 
the nature of these imaginal experiences ranges from the use of controlled and deliberate 
manipulation of images, to sudden and uncontrolled images (see Chapter 1, section 1.1.1 
and 1.2.2).  The type of imagery experienced by those scoring highly on measures of 
positive schizotypy is often unexpected and occurs outside of that person‟s volition, yet 
these individuals also often score highly on measures of creativity.  Visual imagery is 
implicated in both examples, and the thesis aims to uncover why this is. 
 
The development of an objective response-based measure of mental imagery, which 
reflects the multidimensional nature of the construct, will allow one to compare abilities 
in mental imagery with performance on creativity tasks.  Additionally it will enable more 
thorough investigation into which elements of imagery influence creative ability, into 
whether these elements are related to schizotypy, and into which types of creativity are 
benefitted by enhanced imaginal abilities.   By employing a range of measures of imagery 
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and creativity, and by exploring the cognitions of creative professionals in terms of their 
mental imagery, schizotypy, and creative cognition, the aim is that some of these as yet 
unresolved discussions will be disentangled. 
  
The research aims to investigate the nature and measurement of mental imagery control 
and to ascertain whether it is related to both creativity and schizotypal traits.  Whether 
enhanced creative performance is related to heightened schizotypy scores will also be 
studied, as will whether there are more pronounced relationships when visual artists are 
studied.  
 
2.9 Definitions 
The forthcoming discussions relate to creative „products‟, measured through creative 
visualisation tasks, creative imagery tasks, and to the often similar idiosyncratic thinking 
styles characteristic of those typically scoring highly in creative domains.  Individuals 
who work in professions commonly seen to involve imagination such as visual artists, 
writers, and sculptors may be referred to as „creatives‟.   
 
Mental imagery control has been defined as the ability to easily bring pictures to mind, to 
be able to combine and manipulate these images, and the ability to easily make shifts 
from the utilisation of object to spatial imagery (Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 
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2006).  Mental imagery, as defined by Kosslyn, Ganis, and Thompson, (2001), occurs 
when perceptual information from memory is accessed, in turn leading to the experience 
of “seeing with the mind‟s eye” (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). 
 
Schizotypy is defined as a multidimensional construct which encapsulates cognitive and 
behavioural traits and characteristics along four dimensions: unusual experiences, 
cognitive disorganisation, introvertive anhedonia and impulsive nonconformity (Mason, 
Claridge, & Jackson, 1995).  This definition results from a large body of work by Mason 
and Clarigde and their colleagues, who have found evidence for four schizotypy 
subscales.  Other researchers may only encapsulate positive and negative elements, and 
may not consider cognitive disorganisation and impulsive nonconformity, which may 
both be relevant to other constructs under scrutiny in this thesis (imagery control and 
creativity).  Another key aspect of Claridge‘s definition is that it is not predicated on the 
more traditional view which considers the dimensionality of psychotic traits, and instead 
―regards psychotic characteristics as no different from other individual difference traits ... 
that potentially have either healthy or unhealthy outcomes‖ (Mason & Claridge, 2006, p. 
205).  I have adopted Mason et al.‘s definition of schizotypy for a number of reasons 
related to this.  The first relates to the multidimensionality of the schizotypy construct, as 
well as the literature suggests that differential relationships may emerge between 
schizotypy and other constructs which reflect this characteristic.  Additionally, the O-
LIFE is intended for use in this thesis, and this tool has not only been found to be an 
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acceptable measure in terms of reliability and validity, but it also taps four dimensions of 
schizotypy.  Additionally, as has been seen, there are those who advocate a of a two-
factor model of schizotypy, with factors which correspond to positive and negative 
symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia (Kelley & Coursey, 1992; Raine & Allbutt, 
1989; Venables et al., 1990, cited in Ross, Luta, & Bailley, 2002), though less recent 
evidence for this exists.  Brod (1997) defined schizotypy as ―a set of behavioural, 
affective, and cognitive ‗eccentricities‘‖ (p. 276), and felt that these factors (which 
include the four factors measured by the O-LIFE) may be the ‗foundation‘ of psychotic 
illnesses.  The factors unusual experiences (or ―unreality‖, ―perceptual eccentricity‖, or 
―positive schizotypy‖), and individuals high on this factor are prone to magical thinking, 
aberrant perceptual experiences, hallucinations, suspiciousness, and paranoid ideation; 
social or physical anhedonia, characterised by withdrawn ‗schizoid‘ traits and 
introversion; cognitive disorganisation, showing anxiety and social impairment, attention 
difficulties, and neuroticism, and finally impulsive nonconformity, which, according to 
Brod, overlaps with psychoticism, extraversion, and impulsiveness.  Acar and Sen (2013) 
note the tendency of many researchers to generalise schizotypy to psychosis-proneness, 
and also state that measures of schizotypy typically resemble Meehl‘s (1962) four 
schizotypy traits.  These traits and symptoms include cognitive slippage, interpersonal 
aversiveness, anhedonia, and ambivalence.  The Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales 
(Winterstein et al., 2011) also look at positive and negative schizotypal symptoms, such 
as perceptual aberrations, magical ideation and anhedonia, but do not assess other traits 
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such as cognitive disorder and impulsivity.  These alternative definitions are briefly 
revisited in Chapter 5, section 5.3).   
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CHAPTER 3 A NEW PERFORMANCE-BASED MEASURE OF IMAGERY 
CONTROL 
 
1
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As was described in Chapter 1, the phenomenology of mental imagery, along with 
problems relating to the psychometric properties of popular tools designed to measure it, 
make it an inherently difficult attribute to inspect.  Whilst self-reported information about 
the vividness or control of mental imagery has yielded some interesting findings (Marks, 
1973), a performance-based measure may offer new and more reliable insights to the 
                                                 
1
 Images taken from the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT).  For illustration. 
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field.  In addition to the ability to move away from the introspective and subjective tools 
of mental imagery which pervade the field, an objective mental imagery control tool will 
allow researchers to investigate associations between imagery control and other measures 
of spatial ability.  Utilisation of an objective tool alongside more subjective tools of 
mental imagery may help to resolve some of the issues surrounding the reliability and 
validity of self-report measures, and around the interpretations drawn on the basis of 
scores derived from these tools (Lane, 1977; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2001-2002, 2003; 
McKelvie, 1995).  These issues are outlined after an account of the neuropsychological 
evidence for the multidimensionality of imagery is presented. 
 
3.1.1 Neural correlates of mental imagery: support for a collection of abilities   
The similarities in the cognitive processes underlying visual percepts and visual images 
have been discussed extensively by Kosslyn and his colleagues (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; 
Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, 2001; Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003).  They 
propose that, like visual percepts, visual images involve analog working memory 
representations which include spatiotopic (world-centered) information.  Loomis, 
Klatzky, Avraamides, Lippa, and Golledge put it nicely: “the model encompasses 
imagery mechanisms at multiple functional and cortical levels” (2007, p. 35), and 
evidence from neuropsychological research has consistently backed this claim up 
(Gansler et al., 2011).  Findings from neuropsychological studies reveal similarities 
between deficits in visual imagery and visual perception (Farah et al., 1988) and 
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functional neuroimaging has revealed brain regions which activate during both visual 
imagery and perception (Ganis & Schendan, 2008; de Lange, Hagoort & Toni, 2005; 
Ganis, Thompson, Mast & Kosslyn, 2003; Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, 2001; 
Barnes et al., 2000).  These overlapping areas are those which are implicated when 
engaging the visual buffer which organises visual input, such as delineating figure from 
ground.  The visual buffer initially operates through two pathways, one processing object 
properties of visual input and another for processing spatial properties (Kosslyn, 2005). 
 
In Baddeley and Hitch‟s (1974) „classical‟ working memory model (see also Baddeley, 
1986), the visuo-spatial sketch pad is conceived of as one uniform system which also has 
distinct visual and spatial components (Repovs & Baddeley, 2006).  Studies by Klauer 
and Zhao (2004) and Logie and Marchetti (1991) support the claim that there are separate 
visual (object) and spatial subcomponents in the visual-spatial sketchpad of working 
memory.  Dean and Morris use Baddeley‟s distinctions to assess spatial content and its 
influence on the phenomenological experience of images.  They found that three separate 
classes of imagery processes influenced performance on 2D spatial tests, representing 
pictorial resolution (or quality), formation, and spatial extent, all essential processes 
when performing spatial imagery tasks (Dean & Morris, 2003).  Purportedly the 
specificity of the stimulus, whether it is an image of an everyday scene or a line drawing, 
leads to the involvement of different cognitive sub-processes depending on its nature.  
Their findings revealed that self-report ratings of qualities of visual images appeared to 
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be at least moderately related to performance on the spatial tests participants were 
introspecting on, which is encouraging when considering the mixed reviews presented 
within this chapter.   
 
Early claims that mental imagery involves analog spatial representations (Kosslyn, 1994; 
Shepard & Cooper, 1982) were supported by Zacks (2008) in his meta-analysis of the 
mental rotation literature.  Areas of the brain responsible for motor planning and 
execution in the posterior frontal cortex were found to activate during mental rotation 
(Cohen & Bookheimer, 1994, cited in Zacks, 2008).  De Lange, Hagoort, and Toni 
(2005) used fMRI to compare brain activity when participants were engaging in „right-
left judgements‟ about pictures of hands to activation during „right-left judgements‟ 
relating to alphanumeric symbols.  They uncovered two distinct sets of regions which 
activated during the trials and their findings suggest that participants were engaging in 
motor simulations.  These findings lend further support to the claims that visual imagery 
is a multidimensional construct and therefore investigations into its nature should reflect 
this. 
 
Evidence for the specificity of neural activity implicated during different visual imagery 
tasks, such as the finding that rotation of 2D and 3D stimuli utilise different brain areas 
(Voyer & Hou, 2006), coupled with multitudinous double-dissociations described in the 
literature suggest it may not simply be the experimental approaches and methodologies 
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employed which lead to the disparate findings in visual imagery research.  Wraga, 
Shephard, Church, Inati, and Kosslyn (2005) employed functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) while participants imagined rotating objects in two conditions, one 
involving an „object-relative‟ reference frame, where participants imagined the object 
rotating in front of them, and a „self rotation‟, which involved an egocentric reference 
frame, where participants imagined rotating themselves around a specified object.  Their 
findings showed that distinct cortical regions activated according to the spatial-
transformations being performed, as well as some common regions, yet more evidence 
that multiple spatial-transformation mechanisms are involved in the cognitive processing 
of mental imagery.  Conclusions such as these have been delayed by a failure to 
adequately operationalise mental imagery also and with the observation that the majority 
of spatial tools concentrate on just one type of rotation task, either object or self-rotation, 
(Barnes et al., 2000; Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998).  The 
dissociations described dovetail with the body of empirical evidence which indicates that 
spatial transformations conducted in imagery are subserved by multiple neural 
mechanisms (Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, 2001; Zacks et al., 1999).   
 
Tomasino and Rumiati (2004) looked at hemispheric lateralisation and „stimulus-
dependent‟ strategies used during mental rotation in persons with lesions in either their 
left or right hemispheres and revealed double dissociations.  It is claimed that these 
stimulus-dependent strategies engaging either motor or visual cognitive processes can be 
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consciously prompted or are triggered implicitly (Tomasino & Rumiati, 2004; Kosslyn, 
Ganis, & Thompson, 2001).  Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert (1998) showed 
that the strategy applied can be manipulated by the experimenter‟s instructions, and 
suggest that methods of mental rotation may vary depending on whether somatomotor or 
visuo-spatial operations are being imagined, in this case imagining the rotation of limbs 
compared to strategies applied when rotating visual objects.  Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga, 
and Alpert (2001) provide evidence that shows that when one imagines using their own 
hands to mentally rotate an object, an endogenous force, cortical motor processes are 
implicated in mental rotation, while exogenous forces such as imagining external 
manipulation of object do not reveal activation in cortical motor areas.  Kosslyn et al., 
(1998) found that rotating Shepard and Metzler‟s mental rotation stimuli increased 
parietal lobe activation bilaterally, while rotating hands induced activation only in the left 
parietal lobe and left motor and premotor areas.  Different frames of reference may also 
result in the selection of different mechanisms for solving mental rotation tasks (Zacks et 
al., 2002).  The supposition for the existence of dissociable neural systems is further 
supported by the finding that allocentric image transformations, where the object itself is 
the reference frame, and egocentric transformations in imagery, that is, those from the 
perspective of the viewer, entail “different chronometric patterns” (Tomasino & Rumiati, 
2004, p. 878).  Tomasino, Toraldo, and Rumiati (2003) found double dissociations in the 
performance of patients with left hemisphere lesions and patients with right hemisphere 
lesions depending on whether they were rotating mental images of body parts or images 
of objects, buttressing the previously outlined notion that operations underlying mental 
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rotation are distinguishable depending on the stimulus (Dean & Morris, 2003).  Left 
hemisphere lesions lead to impaired performance when patients were rotating mental 
images of their hands but not when they were rotating mental images of external objects, 
and the opposite result was found for those with right hemisphere lesions.  Double 
dissociations were also uncovered when comparing mental rotation operations in patients 
with left-hemisphere (LH) lesions compared to right-hemisphere (RH) impaired patients 
(Tomasino & Rumiati, 2004), with rotation of hands versus puppets, for example, 
showing activation in distinct neural areas for these brain-injured patients.  It has also 
been found that brain areas associated with vision are activated during mental rotation, 
along with the parietal cortex, premotor regions, and the primary motor cortex (Tomasino 
et al., 2003).  Evidence from experimental studies has shown object and spatial imagery 
to be distinct both functionally and neurologically (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; 
Milner & Goodale, 1995, cited in Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006) with lesions 
in the temporal cortex affecting object imagery but not spatial imagery, the reverse 
resulting from lesions to the posterior parietal cortex (Levine, Warach, & Farah, 1985; 
Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988).   
 
Barnes, Howard, Senior, Brammer, Bullmore, Simmons et al., (2000) found 
„overlapping‟ brain activity in participants engaging in both perceptually-sourced and 
imagery-based spatial tasks requiring rotation and transformation of shapes and lines, 
suggesting functional similarities between imagery and perception.  Barnes et al. also 
  108 
found differences in cortical activity depending on whether participants were engaged in 
perceptual mental rotational, i.e. when they were actually rotating physical objects or the 
same tasks using imaginal processes, demonstrating once again that there lies a complex 
relationship between visual imagery and perception, with findings such as these pointing 
to multitudinous avenues of exploration for imagery researchers. 
 
Complimentary conclusions regarding the multifaceted nature of mental imagery have 
been reached despite visual imagery researchers utilising uncomplimentary 
methodologies.  Additionally, the notion that visual imagery and perception share neural 
correlates but do not draw on identical processes is one which substantial evidence 
supports, as has just been outlined.  The very nature of imagery, the fact it engages so 
many cortical areas, is experienced in such diverse ways, comes in many 
„phenomenological flavours‟, may be influenced by memory, and evokes emotions means 
that it would be conducive to study it in such a way that reflects these complexities.   
 
The cognitive and neuroscience evidence en bloc suggest that to conceptualise and 
investigate visual imagery in the over-simplified manner with which it has been 
approached by some in the past, such as when vividness ratings are taken to demonstrate 
overall „imagery ability‟, may have obscured the issues contributing to the imagery-
creativity debate, rather than elucidating them.  To treat „vividness‟ as though it reflects 
all aspects of mental imagery is a flawed approach (Burton, 2003; Burton & Fogarty, 
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2003), and one should instead acknowledge that mental imagery is a collection of 
abilities.  Where no relationship is found between mental imagery and creativity one 
needs to consider whether the tools used to measure each construct have obscured 
relationships that would have emerged had alternative measures been employed instead.  
For example, does the relationship reveal itself when figural as opposed to verbal 
creativity tasks are used, suggesting that visual imagery is more beneficial in visual 
creativity?  Or could it be that some other element of mental imagery is related but had 
simply not been measured.  The following discussion will specifically address the 
problems with existing measures of mental imagery and will go on to describe a new tool 
which has been designed in order to fulfil the need for a more effective, response-based 
measure of mental imagery control.   
 
3.1.2 What is wrong with current mental imagery measures? 
There are a great number of tools which offer the measurement of various aspects of 
mental imagery, for example, imagery vividness, imagery control, ability to rotate mental 
images, ranging from questionnaires to measures of accuracy and reaction time.  These 
are described below, and throughout the forthcoming review the problems inherent in 
conducting research using some of these tools will be outlined in order to place the need 
for a new mental imagery tool in context. 
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A. Richardson‟s (1969) revised version of Gordon‟s Test of Visual Imagery Control 
(TVIC) is a commonly used questionnaire that requires participants to state whether they 
can visualise images about a car.  Response categories of “Yes”, “Unsure”, or “No” may 
be selected, and the tool includes items such as „Can you see a car standing in the road in 
front of a house?‟ and „Can you now see the same car laying upside down?‟  This tool 
does not have a performance element, and therefore the actual ability of participants to 
manipulate the mental image is hard to ascertain.  The psychometric properties of the 
TVIC have been investigated and have produced mixed results (Ashton & White, 1974; 
Kihlstrom, Glisky, Peterson, Harvey, & Rose, 1991; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2001-2002).  
LeBoutillier and Marks (2001-2002) found pervasive response leniency in this tool, and 
claim that it fails to satisfy univariate assumptions of psychometric testing.  Nevertheless, 
the TVIC is shown to have acceptable test retest and split-half reliabilities, though there 
is disagreement as to the internal factorial structure (Campos, 2009-2010; LeBoutillier & 
Marks, 2000-2001).  The TVIC authors purport that is measures a single ability, yet at 
least three latent variables may be tapped by this measure (Kihlstrom et al., 1991; 
LeBoutillier and Marks, 2001-2002).  The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(VVIQ; Marks, 1973) is a frequently used questionnaire in imagery research.  A self-
report tool, acceptable reliability and validity have been found for the VVIQ (McAvinue 
and Robertson, 2006-2007; Kihlstrom et al., 1991).  A small number of the VVIQ items 
pertain to the control of mental imagery, though there is no precise way to determine 
whether participants are accurately depicting the intended images.  There is evidently no 
way to discern whether an accurate internally image of, for example, „the sky clear[ing] 
  111 
and surround[ing] the sun with blueness‟ is visualised (Marks, 1973), as there is no 
objective element to the tool.  This is an obvious but common problem with self-report 
imagery questionnaires.   
 
Some theorists claim that imagery questionnaires do not measure mental imagery 
vividness and control at all, instead tapping abilities such as spatial memory, memory for 
experiences, or memory for visual stimuli (Ernest, 1977; Hiscock, 1978; Slee, 1988).  
When this is considered alongside purported problems such as social desirability, demand 
characteristics, and experimenter expectancy (Lequerica, Rapport, Axelrod, Telmet, & 
Whitman, 2002; Neisser, 1972; Sheehan & Neisser, 1969) it suggests that new methods 
should be developed.  Many of the published performance-based measures for assessing 
spatial imagery abilities focus upon the visualisation and rotation of stimuli (McAvinue 
& Robertson, 2006-2007).  In Shepard and Metzler‟s Mental Rotation Task (1971), in 
which participants to look at pairs of 2D or 3D images, one of which is rotated, and judge 
whether they are the same or mirror images, response times are usually found to have a 
linear relation to the angle or degree of rotation, known as the „symbolic distance effect‟ 
(Moyer & Bayer, 1976).  That is, that increased angles or rotations lead to inflated 
reaction times, demonstrating that participants form an image of the shape and mentally 
rotate it until it matches the orientation of the other, whereby a mental comparison takes 
place (Shepard & Cooper, 1982).  Paivio (1971) stated that spatial tests based on findings 
from the mental rotation literature show that the linear relation between angle and 
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response time can indirectly serve to measure imagery ability.  Paivio‟s (1978) Mental 
Clocks task assesses participants‟ ability to internally compare two images of clock faces, 
one of which is rotated, and this tool also demonstrates the symbolic distance effect, 
which is demonstrated by many rotation tasks and is the observation that the time taken 
to solve the tasks increases linearly with the degree of rotation required.  Most mental 
rotation tasks have one thing in common:  they present images of the final form alongside 
alternative incorrect options available for selection.  The issue here in relation to 
measuring visual imagery ability is that these are perceptually-sourced tests, and though 
effective at assessing spatial-imagery abilities, they do not require visual imagery alone 
to solve.  When asked to mentally manipulate an item, it may be easier to imagine it 
rotating and transforming when you can see the image in front of you, and when an 
example of what the item would look like upon completion of the task is also presented.  
There is no doubt that mental imagery is involved in these rotation processes, yet what is 
suggested in this thesis is that the requirement to engage in these processes without 
perceiving these stimuli would require a higher level of image control and maintenance.  
The mental clocks task and other spatial tasks such as the Flags Test, (Thurstone & 
Jeffrey, 1956, cited in McAvinue & Robertson, 2006-2007), the Space Relations Test, 
(Bennet, Seahore, & Wesman, 1974, in McAvinue & Robertson, 2006-2007), and the 
Paper Folding Test, (Kyllonen, Lohman, & Snow, 1984), are psychometrically acceptable 
measures of spatial ability, however, they do not reflect other facets of visual imagery 
which may be utilised by individuals, such as object imagery. Admittedly, there may not 
be much to be said about the detail involved in these task stimuli, usually consisting of 
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cubes grouped together in various ways, though the point remains that only measuring 
reaction times on this task may fail to give a true „flavour‟ of other processes involved in 
mental imagery.  Originally designed to measure spatial abilities, these tools undoubtedly 
require the controlled mental manipulation of visual images, and generally have good 
psychometric properties (Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006).  They lack a 
performance-based element, however, with no objective way to ascertain the efficacy of 
participants‟ visual imagery control.  
 
The Spatial Imagery Test from the Imagery Testing Battery (Version 1.0, Hollenberg, 
1970, cited in Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006) requires selection of the correct 
depiction of an image from a number of new perspectives (such as above or below) after 
being presented with a cube which has a thin line running along the surface.  Participants 
must also mentally rotate and combine images of 3D shapes, and again select the 
resultant image from six options.  Lastly, images of unfolded templates of patterned 
boxes are presented.  After participants have folded the box in their mental imagery, they 
have to select the correct unfolded template.  The self-report ratings were found to 
correlate with mental rotation performance and predicted performance on spatial imagery 
tests.  A search of the academic databases PsychINFO and Ebscohost has indicated this to 
be a rarely used tool. 
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Carroll (1993) found several factors underlying spatial ability, including „visualisation‟, 
pertaining to the manipulation of visual patterns, and „spatial relations‟, which refers to 
the speed of manipulating visual patterns using rotation and transformation.  These 
findings support claims that mental imagery is multidimensional (Kosslyn, 1983; Kosslyn 
et al., 2004).  Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, and Motes (2006), and others (Farah, 
Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1998; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992) have 
found visual imagery to be comprised of at least two distinct subsystems involved in the 
encoding and processing of spatial imagery; object imagery, and spatial imagery.  Object 
imagery alludes to the form, size, colour, shape and aspects of literal appearances of 
objects in imagery.  Spatial imagery on the other hand alludes to the spatial relations 
between objects in an image (Blajenkova et al., 2006).  Blajenkova and her colleagues 
(Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006; Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009) have 
developed two self-report tools to assess imagery abilities which do not treat „imagery‟ as 
a single, undifferentiated construct.  These evaluate the qualities, preferences and 
experiences of those engaged in object and spatial imagery, as well as verbal cognitive 
styles.  The Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ, Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & 
Motes, 2006) and the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (OSIVQ, 
Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009) are derived from findings in cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience which have shown object and spatial imagery to be distinct subsystems 
in terms of the neurological processes underlying each of them (Blajenkova et al., 2006), 
yet in the past tools have been designed which fail to address this possibility, often 
asserting that a measurement of „imagery‟ more generally would suffice.  In the OSIQ, 
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preferences for pictorial or schematic representations are assessed on a Likert-type scale, 
as are qualitative characteristics and the ease of maintenance and transformation of 
images.  It has been suggested that visual-object ability, the processing of shape, colour, 
and texture, should be treated as a new dimension of non-verbal intelligence as it features 
the same essential characteristics.  In their words, these characteristics are “ecological 
validity, capacity to support abstract spatial processing in engineering and scientific 
fields, as well as unique qualitative and quantitative characteristics supported by 
cognitive research” (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010, p. 277).  Also claimed is the 
suggestion that visual-object imagery is necessary for the processing of visual-spatial 
properties, another rate-limiting quality of imagery, and evidence has been cited that has 
shown both of these non-verbal constructs to be cortically distinct from verbal-spatial 
imagery (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010).  Spatial ability tasks undoubtedly require 
the controlled mental manipulation of visual images, and generally have good 
psychometric properties (Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006) making them 
invaluable for research into spatial imagery and also for assessing concurrent reliability 
of performance-based imagery questionnaires.   
 
The Shapes Questionnaire (Dean & Morris, 2003) is a self-report tool which seeks to 
measure a wide range of properties of mental imagery including the ease of evocation, 
maintenance, and stability of image, ease of rotation, amount of detail and the changes to 
this detail.  Dean and Morris (2003) purport that the tools is less open to influences of 
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egoistic responding, a form of social desirability often found in „agency-related‟ contexts, 
where there is a tendency to respond in ways which reflect control, mastery, autonomy, 
and independence.  This is a problem with a number of imagery tasks as has been 
described, however Dean and Morris suggest three ways to reduce such confounds in 
mental imagery research: requesting participants to respond honestly, to discard results 
from those showing socially desirable responding, and to „partial out‟ these influences.  
The Shapes Questionnaire was developed to reflect Kosslyn's assertion that the 
multidimensional nature of imagery should be reflected in tools designed to measure it.  
In factor analyses of the Shapes Questionnaire, four factors were revealed; ease of 
forming an image, the pictorial stability of an image, the ease of rotating an image, and 
the relative size at which the stimulus is imagined.  This provides support for the 
generation processes, rotation sub-process and maintenance processes operating on the 
visual buffer, identified in Kosslyn‟s model of imagery (1980, 1994), and resembles 
processes employed in creative cognition. Welling (2007) states that four mental 
operations are at work during creative cognition, namely application, analogy, 
combination, and abstraction.  Welling discusses both the „sudden-gradual‟ problem and 
the „special-ordinary‟ paradox, and states that insight problem-solving is insufficient to 
study the range of creative operations.  In a paper which provided encouraging results for 
the field of imagery research in terms of the application of self-report measures, Dean 
and Morris (2003) found that participants in their study were able to effectively introspect 
on several different properties of their images, and also found that the imagery ratings 
reflected the multidimensional nature of mental imagery in that they captured specific 
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imagery processes more effectively than did vividness.  The self-reported ratings also 
predicted performance on tests of spatial ability, a development in light of previously 
reported findings.  
 
The Degraded Pictures Test (Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shepard, 2005) comprises a 
series of perceptual closure problems.  The recognition of images which are obscured by 
„noisy‟ backgrounds is required and these tasks demand top-down processing to 
complete.  The tool therefore taps object-imagery due to the reliance on mechanisms 
underlying this construct.  Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shepard (2005) supported this with 
their finding that object imagers identified the degraded pictures more accurately than 
spatial imagers. 
 
Scores on spatial ability tests are frequently found to be independent of subjective reports 
of mental imagery ability and it has been suggested that self-report questionnaires and 
spatial tasks actually measure entirely different abilities (Campos, 2009-2010; Burton, 
2003; Campos, 1998; Blajenkova et al., 2006), yet they are treated as though they 
measure comparable ones, despite the lack of theoretical justification for this.  It is 
suggested that the lack of relationship may result from the types of item which comprise 
many self-report imagery questionnaires (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Dean & Morris, 2003; 
Reisberg, Culver, Heuer, & Fischman, 1986).  These primarily tap aspects of object-
imagery, focussing on, for example, the brightness, vividness, and colourfulness of 
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mental images, and do not usually enquire about elements of spatial-imagery.  Dean and 
Morris (2003) state that “the failure to find a relationship between self-reports of imagery 
and spatial tasks could be a result of existing imagery questionnaires failing to adequately 
capture the properties and processes of imagery that are relevant” (p. 248), often treating 
it as a unitary construct.  However, most response-based tests of imagery ability measure 
the transformations and spatial relations between imagined forms.  Dean and Morris‟ 
(2003) Shapes Questionnaire was found to have a stronger relationship with objective 
spatial tasks than other self-report measures of imagery ability, such as the Vividness of 
Visual imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973).  Dean and Morris state that vividness, for 
example, is just one way to examine imagery, yet claim that treating it as an exhaustive 
measure of imagery, as it often is, may be misjudged.  They found that self-reported 
scores of vividness did not correlate with self-ratings of transformation and manipulation 
of geometric stimuli, but that mental rotation scores were related to these ratings.  This 
view is echoed by Blajenkova et al., (2006) who state that it is the differences in the types 
of stimuli contained in the disparate tasks utilised to operationalise visual imagery that 
exacerbate the inconsistencies found in the literature.  Dean and Morris observed that 
“The large differences in stimuli type raise the question of how valid it is to assume that 
the processes and quality or performance of imagining these different types of stimuli is 
functionally equivalent” (2003, p. 248).  They purport that differential cognitive demands 
could result from different content in imagery and agreed with earlier theorists who 
suggested that an internal visuo-spatial mental representation exists and plays a central 
role in the solution of spatial problems (see Carpenter & Just, 1986; Kyllonen, 1996; 
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Poltrock & Agnoli, 1986, all cited in Dean & Morris, 2003).  They purport three possible 
explanations for the lack of relationship between objective and self-report imagery 
measures, which often load on orthogonal factors, involving a lack of theory-driven 
questions regarding current imagery paradigms.  Their first offering is unlikely, and states 
that “the phenomenological experience of a mental image either plays no functional role 
in spatial tasks or does not reflect the processes that do” (p. 246).  Recent neurological 
studies showing aspects of mental imagery to involve distinct and overlapping brain 
regions and the double dissociations subsequently reported have shown this to be untrue 
(Wraga, Shephard, Church, Inati, & Kosslyn, 2005).  These findings support the 
argument for multiple imagery and spatial abilities which should not be investigated 
using tools that confound these constructs.  The next reason for the lack of relationship 
concerns problems with introspective (self-report) means of gauging imagery ability 
which, as has already been outlined, may be susceptible to demand characteristics and 
egoistic response biases from participants (LeBoutillier & Marks, 2000-2001; McAvinue 
& Robinson, 2006-2007).  Lastly, there is an assumption that vivid visual imagery is 
„better imagery‟ which is implied through the terminology of items (Morris & Hampson, 
1983), and people tend to report having highly controlled or vivid imagery whether their 
experience reflects that or not.  This is known as „acquiescent responding‟ and is a 
tendency to provide affirmative answers to questionnaire items (Hinz, Michalski, 
Schwartz, & Herzberg, 2007).  Tools that conceptualise „imagery‟ as a single ability are 
especially problematic (Paivio, 1989) especially when considering the evidence that 
imagery is in fact better thought of as a collection of abilities (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; 
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Farah, 1984).  Dean and Morris (2003) suggest that it may be more beneficial to conceive 
of imagery vividness as a “reflection of the combination of the properties and processes 
involved in imagery” (p. 247), and not an indication of the multiple abilities involved in 
spatial imagery tasks.  I will later suggest that it may also be beneficial to conceive of 
imagery control in that way too. 
 
Burton (2003) has investigated both performance-based and self-report methodologies 
thoroughly in relation to each other and the two main factors of spatial imagery, namely 
visualisation (VZ - derived from American spelling; vizualisation) and speeded rotation 
(SR), (Carroll, 1993).  Little relationship was found between these factors, purportedly 
due to the different to-be-imagined stimuli of scenes and objects compared to geometric 
shapes and capital letters.  A more recent contribution to the study of mental imagery is 
Campos‟ Measure of the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery, or MASMI (Campos, 
2009-2010), which is an objective tool which requires participants to answer questions 
about an unfolded cube decorated with geometric shapes.  The picture of the cube is 
visible throughout, as is the case with a number of spatial ability tasks, meaning that it is 
not purely a mental imagery task but rather a perceptually-sourced one.  It could be 
argued that being able to see this image could enhance a participant‟s capacity to 
correctly generate and answer questions about a mentally rotated version of it. 
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It is claimed by Burton (2003) that the stimuli involved in imagery tasks influences the 
relationships uncovered in imagery research.   Self-report ratings of images of shapes are 
supposedly more likely to relate to conventional spatial tasks, such as mental rotation or 
mental comparison tasks, than are self-report ratings of images retrieved from long term 
memory.  Indeed, it has been found that if the stimuli are similar in type, for example, 
when geometric or alphanumeric shapes are imaged, the relationship between self-report 
imagery tasks and spatial tasks is stronger than when the stimuli to be brought to mind 
are of scenes or relatives (McAvinue & Robertson, 2006-2007).  Notwithstanding these 
inconsistencies, tests of spatial performance have traditionally been accepted as 
„objective‟ measures of imagery control due to the requirement to manipulate internal 
images in order to complete the task (Burton, 2003). 
 
An alternative imagery protocol, the image generation approach, has emerged from the 
cognitive literature.  The image generation approach looks primarily at the emergence of 
creativity through visualisation and mental synthesis of imagined forms (Finke, 1996; 
Finke, Ward & Slayton, 1992; Finke & Slayton, 1988).  The tasks utilised in this 
paradigm tap into processes of controlled mental imagery and mental rotation that are of 
particular relevance to an understanding of individual differences in mental imagery.  
Finke, Pinker and Farah‟s (1989) Guided Image Manipulation Task, though not explicitly 
designed to measure imagery control, seeks to understand whether participants can assign 
new meanings to imagined combinations of shapes and letters, and asks them to detect 
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any number of „emergent forms‟ (new shapes or objects) from their internal 
representation.  It is likely that success on this task would not be possible without 
controlled mental imagery, and it is interesting to note Burton and Fogarty‟s (2003) 
finding that convergent and divergent problem solving tasks were located next to 
objective tests of imagery on their continuum of self-report imagery and objective spatial 
tasks, representing their inherent similarities.  They scrutinised six studies which looked 
at mental imagery in their investigation of the factor structure of visual and spatial 
imagery and provided the following model (Figure 3.1) depicting their continuum 
representing the tools utilised, from self-report questionnaires at the left to more objective 
spatial ability tasks towards the right.   
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Continuum of self-report imagery and spatial tasks.  From Burton and Fogarty (2003) 
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The measures described thus far are sufficient in terms of their individual application, 
whether measuring spatial ability, mental rotation capacity, or imagery vividness, 
however a performance-based indicator of imagery control may offer new insights into 
the field of mental imagery research, as common tools may not accurately reveal 
individual differences in this attribute.  It is clear that controlled mental imagery is 
imperative for success in these imagery tasks, as some degree of manipulation or mental 
comparison is required in all of them, however, a true and accurate account of imagery 
control skill fails to be uncovered through these methodologies.  Additionally, mental 
imagery control is likely to be required for some creativity tasks and tools utilised in the 
image generation approach. 
 
The focus of Studies 1 and 2 is to develop an easy-to-administer measure of mental 
imagery control, which adopts an objective investigation into individual imaging abilities.   
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) was developed to assess individual 
differences in imagery control and involve increasing numbers of imagery 
transformations combining to form familiar objects or ambiguous shapes.  The tool will 
allow objective investigation of levels of ability and will demonstrate that, for some, 
mental images can be easily manipulated when in possession of controlled mental 
imagery, even those with a relatively high degree of complexity.  The ICRT could not 
only have applications in investigations into imagery research in general, but could also 
be used in examinations of creativity, visuo-spatial ability, and the aforementioned and 
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seemingly paradoxical finding that self-report imagery control measures do not tend to 
correlate with objective measures of spatial ability (Burton, 2003; LeBoutillier & Marks, 
2001-2002; Ashton & White, 1980; Richardson, 1995).  The design process of the ICRT 
is described in the next section. 
 
3.2 The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) – designing the tool 
3.2.1 Initial design stage 
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) is based on Finke, Pinker and Farah‟s 
(1989) image task, originally designed to investigate whether new „patterns‟ can emerge 
from manipulated mental images.  The ability to see these new forms is claimed to be 
beneficial in creative endeavours, and the ability to manipulate these images undoubtedly 
requires mental imagery control.  Finke and his colleagues designed a series of three and 
four „stage‟ tasks which required participants to mentally join and rotate shapes to form 
familiar objects, such as a TV or a stickman.  Their protocol involved a series of three 
and four-stage tasks which required participants to mentally join and rotate shapes to 
form familiar objects.  The ICRT differs from Finke et al.‟s tool in that theoretically a 
higher level of image control is required during the image manipulations; there are more 
steps involved than were provided in their tool, thereby creating levels of difficulty in the 
task.  The ICRT is also comprised of a larger number of problems it is hoped should yield 
a normally distributed range of scores.  This can then be employed as an individual 
differences measure of mental imagery control which has applications in many settings. 
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A series of image tasks was designed involving increasing numbers of transformations, 
the longer of which should theoretically present more of a challenge to those lacking 
strong mental imagery control.  These tasks require the manipulation of images in various 
ways, and controlled mental imagery should aid these processes.   
 
It would aid comprehension of the following material if a series of definitions for 
common terms related to the ICRT were first provided.  These definitions refer to those 
used in this chapter and all others to follow in the thesis. 
 
Definitions relating to the terminology of the ICRT: 
Table 3.1 presents a description and outline of terms used in the Image Control and 
Recognition Task.  This aims to provide clearer understanding of the tasks in subsequent 
discussions and chapters. 
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Table 3.1 
Terminology and definitions in the Image Control and Recognition Task  
 
Term 
 
 
Definition 
 
Image Control and Recognition 
Task (ICRT) 
 
 
The complete set of imagery control tasks  
 
Imagery control The combination of the ability to generate, maintain, rotate, 
manipulate, and recognise forms in mental imagery 
 
Imagery task/Recognition task  These terms refer to an individual Image Control and 
Recognition Task in its entirety.  The terms refer to the 
instruction items that make up that task, the internal depictions 
which are internally generated and manipulated as a result of 
hearing these items, and the final image itself.  These terms are 
used interchangeably 
 
ICRT item/ICRT instruction Items in the ICRT are the instructions which make up each 
imagery task and which are read out to participants during the 
image generation and recognition phase of the task.  These 
contain the directions for the image transformations 
 
Intended Image The mental image participants should see in imagery having 
correctly followed the items making up each imagery task.  The 
shapes and letters each form to make a recognisable or 
nameable image which participants have to try and name from 
their mental imagery before drawing it 
 
Stages/Number of stages When the ‗number of stages‘ is referred to it corresponds to the 
total number of instruction items within an imagery task.  
Imagery tasks are each comprised of discrete stages of 
instruction (the items), so imagery tasks which require the 
correct manipulation of three instruction items in order to 
generate the intended image are referred to as ‗three-stage 
tasks‘, those with four items are ‗four-stage tasks‘ and those 
requiring the correct manipulation of five and six instructions 
are five-stage and six-stage tasks, up to nine-stages. 
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3.3 Study 1 – Piloting the Image Control and Recognition Task 
The aim of Study 1 was to administer the pilot set of Image Control and Recognition 
Task to participants in order to assess the efficacy of the protocol for measuring mental 
imagery control. 
 
3.4 Method 
3.4.1 Participants 
Twenty-nine students participated as part of their undergraduate psychology course 
requirements and received course credit.  Participants provided informed consent and 
demographic details were not recorded. 
 
3.4.2 Materials 
A series of twenty two imagery tasks were presented to participants in Study 1 which 
served as a pilot study.  The imagery tasks were intended to have varied levels of 
difficulty with between three-stages and nine-stages required to solve each of them.  
Participants were provided with a pencil and sheets of plain paper on which to draw their 
responses. 
 
  128 
Tasks consisting of three to nine image manipulations, or „stages‟, were designed, 
resulting in a series of 22 imagery tasks.  The ICRT requires participants to combine, 
manipulate and transform a series of geometric shapes and/or letters as instructed, step by 
step and without sketching, and then to draw the resultant mental images.  Upon correct 
completion of the task, either a familiar object or a nondescript shape should present 
itself.  The inclusion of random shapes was in order to dissuade participants from 
attempting to guess the final image.  Examples of four- and five-stage tasks are provided 
in Table 3.2 with the associated images depicted in Figure 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 
Examples of three, four and five-stage image tasks from the ICRT 
a) Three-stage imagery task 
1. Imagine a triangle pointing upwards 
2. Imagine another downward pointing triangle so that it is directly underneath the first 
one and the horizontal lines overlap 
3. Remove the horizontal line 
 
b) Four-stage imagery task 
1. Imagine a tall, thin rectangle so it is standing vertically 
2. Add a very short vertical line to the bottom of it so it looks like it‘s sticking out 
3. Rotate the entire shape configuration 180° 
4. Attach a teardrop to the top of the shape so that it is touching the line 
 
c) Five-stage imagery task  
1. Imagine a capital letter ‗D‘ 
2. To the left of it, imagine a triangle pointing left with the vertical edge nearly touching 
the side of the letter ‗D‘, but not touching it 
3. Join the two shapes with a short horizontal line 
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4. At the right of the ‗D‘, outside it, imagine a vertical wavy line touching the curve 
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right (clockwise) 
 
 
     
(a)  (b)  (c) 
Figure 3.2  
Example answers to the imagery tasks in Table 3.2 
 
The longer of these imagery tasks should present more of a challenge to those lacking 
strong mental imagery control as greater image manipulation is required. 
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Scoring: Participants received 1 for correctly depicting the shape and 0 for drawing 
anything else. 
 
The wording of the instructions was such that they aimed to eliminate overt reliance on 
memory beyond that which is required to maintain the image.  For example, when 
moving through stages, the instruction often included a repeat of the initial stimulus 
shape (see example (c) in Table 3.2 above).  However, specific instructions regarding 
orientation, rotation, and addition or subtraction of elements of the image were not 
repeated in this way as these are the elements of mental imagery which it was aimed 
would be evaluated. 
 
3.4.3 Procedure 
Participants read an information sheet and provided informed consent prior to 
commencement of the imagery tasks.  They completed the ICRT in individual sessions in 
research cubicles and sat at a table away from the experimenter.  They were advised not 
to attempt to memorise the instructions while the task progressed, but rather to create a 
clear mental image as they heard each instruction.  No notes or sketches were allowed, 
participants could close their eyes if they wished to, and they were instructed to indicate 
when they were satisfied with their mental image after each instruction being provided.  
Completion of the tasks had no time limit, and repetition of the current instruction was 
allowed.  However previous instructions were not repeated once the participant had 
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moved on to the next stage.  After the last instruction of each task was presented, they 
were requested to draw whatever final image they „saw‟ in mental imagery.  Upon 
completion of all imagery tasks the participants were told their score, if they wanted it, 
were debriefed as to the aims of the study and any questions about the session were 
answered.   The information sheet, consent form, and debrief sheet are all presented at 
Appendices A – C. 
 
3.5 Results 
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) was piloted in this study.  Face validity 
was of interest, but more important was investigation of whether the tasks got more 
difficult as the number of instruction stages increased.  A number of steps were taken to 
investigate this, and each stage of the analysis is outlined below. 
 
Item Analysis 
Initial analyses were qualitative, with investigation into wording and face validity of the 
tool informed by observations made by myself, and retrospective reports collected from 
participants.  These highlighted a number of problematic items, which are described 
below: 
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Lack of clarity.  Two of the items lacked clarity, with participants asking questions 
concerning the manipulations on every occasion.  These instructions were not written in 
clear, unambiguous language. 
Additional stages required.  Three items were removed where suitable additions would 
have increased the length of the task. 
Inconsistent task requirements.  An item was removed as it was the only ICRT which 
required participants to think of and manipulate two separate images simultaneously, and 
then to combine them. 
 
The data relating to these six items were omitted from further analyses, revealing 16 
items that were suitable. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The distribution of the correct ICRT scores was normal with a mean score (5.86) slightly 
lower than a to-be-expected middle score with a 0-16 potential range of scores. Non-
significant z-score transformation values were calculated for both skew (z(29)= 1.01, p > 
0.05) and kurtosis (z(29)= -1.44, p > 0.05).  Descriptive statistics for the 29 participants 
on total number of imagery tasks solved revealed a mean score of 5.86 (SD = 4.31), with 
a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 16.   
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Inferential statistics 
In order to investigate whether the items increased in difficulty as the number of stages 
increased solvability percentages were generated for the 16 imagery tasks and these are 
presented in Table 3.3.  
 
A significant negative correlation was revealed (r(27) = -.65, p = .003) between number 
of steps and difficulty, that is, as the number of stages increased the percentage of people 
who solved them decreased.  It is argued that only those with a high degree of mental 
imagery control can successfully complete the longer items from the ICRT, so one would 
expect to find a negative correlation here because fewer steps should results in an „easier‟ 
task. 
 
Table 3.3 
Solvability Percentages for items in the Image Control 
and Recognition Task 
 
Number of stages Name of task 
Percentage 
solved * 
3 Shape 1 59% 
3 Shape 2 59% 
4 TV 52% 
4 Heart 48% 
5 Clock Tower  48% 
4 Walkie Talkie 34% 
4 Candle 34% 
7 Stickman 34% 
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5 Cottage 31% 
5 Sailing Boat 31% 
9 Star  31% 
8 Face 28% 
8 Shape 3 28% 
6 Cat 24% 
6 Christmas Tree 21% 
6 Snowman 21% 
 Note.  N=29.  * Listed by order of magnitude. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the solvability figures for Study 1.  It is possible to group some of these 
figures together representing number of stages, suggesting that the number of stages does 
have a direct relationship with how easy the imagery task is to complete.  However, the 
seven- and nine-stage imagery tasks seem to be too easy, with solvability percentages 
above all six-stage imagery tasks in the table, and above two eight-stage ones 
(demonstrating the ease with which they were solved).  This highlighted that imagery 
tasks constituting each „set‟, i.e. those with the same number of instruction stages, were 
not appropriately difficult, with the six-stage imagery tasks being solved by the fewest 
participants, while some actually solved seven-, eight-, and nine-stage imagery tasks 
despite failing to solve any six-stage ones.  This needs to be addressed as these six-stage 
imagery tasks should not be so easy to solve.  There should be clear separation between 
the stages, and a rate-limiting effect will ideally emerge, that is, is should not be possible 
to solve six-, seven-, and eight-stage imagery tasks if one has failed to solve three-, four- 
and five-stage ones. 
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To test whether the number of instruction stages correctly solved was linearly related to 
scores, a trend analysis was conducted on the pilot study data.   Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicated that the number of stages significantly affected the percentage of 
imagery tasks solved by participants, (F(3, 115) = 4.83, MSe = 1400.25, p = .03, 2 = 
.11).  Bonferroni tests indicated that imagery tasks with fewer stages were associated 
with significantly higher solvability percentages than those requiring more steps to solve 
them, as shown in 3.4 below.  The trend analysis indicated that the data fit well to a linear 
model with the linear component accounting for a substantial proportion (11%) of the 
variance in solvability. 
 
Table 3.4 
Study 1 ICRT Item Solvability Percentages as a Function of Number of Stages 
Number of 
Stages 
Mean 
(%) 
Std. 
Deviation 
(%) 
3 59
A 
44 
4 42
AB 
35 
5 37
AB 
40 
6 22
B 
30 
Note.  N = 29; Figures with the same 
letter in their superscripts do not differ 
significantly from one another according 
to a Bonferroni test with a .05 limit on 
familywise error rate. 
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The results of the pilot suggest that it is possible to use the ICRT as a performance-based 
measure of mental imagery control that goes some way to distinguish between different 
competencies in this attribute.  The solvability percentage scores decreased according to 
how many stages were involved in each imagery task, suggesting that participants found 
the longer tasks harder to complete.  Some participants reported that they attempted to 
memorise the instructions, rather than concurrently amending their mental images, so a 
forward digit span task will be introduced in Study 2 to establish whether verbal working 
memory skill was associated with the ability to solve ICRT tasks.  Participants may have 
been able to guess the resultant images in two of the items, so these instructions were re-
ordered to prevent the possibility of any guessing.  Three-stage imagery tasks were also 
introduced as a practice trial.  In summary, Study 1, which was designed to pilot and 
develop the ICRT, provided a sound rationale for Study 2, which aims to evaluate the 
reliability and validity of the tool.   
 
3.6 Study 2 – Development of the Image Control and Recognition Task 
This study was conducted in order to ascertain whether amendments to the ICRT had 
improved the ability to assess individual differences in visual imagery control.  
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3.7 Method 
3.7.1 Participants 
Thirty-one psychology English speaking students participated as a component of their 
undergraduate research methods course.  Demographic details such as age and gender 
were not recorded. 
 
3.7.2 Materials 
IMAGE CONTROL AND RECOGNITION TASK 
The problems with a number of ICRT items were addressed following the pilot study, so 
an amended version of the ICRT (16 items, Appendix D) was administered to 
participants. 
 
Scoring: This was the same as for Study 1. 
 
WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE (WAIS) FORWARD DIGIT-SPAN TASK 
The WAIS Forward Digit-Span task (FDS; Wechsler, 1944) was employed in the present 
study.  The FDS taps cognitive processes which are implicated in solving the ICRT, for 
example, the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad (Goldstein, 2011).  Working 
memory is a multifaceted system, as is mental imagery, and so the FDS test was felt to be 
a good choice for these reasons.  Administering the FDS allowed me to study the 
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relationship of verbal working memory to imagery control.  Phonological working 
memory processes are almost certainly at work whilst completing ICRTs, yet the ability 
to apprehend and manipulate the mental objects in imagery without putting too much 
‗cognitive strain‘ on these processes is what supposedly makes one able to succeed in 
controlled manipulation and combination of imagery in this way.  The FDS includes 14 
number strings of increasing length (3 – 8 digits) which were read aloud to the participant 
who then repeated them in order.  Reliability for Digit-Span tests range from .70-.90 
(Conway et al., 2005).   
 
Scoring: Scores were totalled out of 14 and discontinuation on this task was after failure 
on two consecutive number strings of the same length. 
 
3.7.3 Procedure 
The procedure for Study 2 was the same as Study 1 apart from the following 
modifications:  Two three-stage imagery tasks were introduced as practice trials to ensure 
that there were no confounds owing to task confusion, and this time it was explained that 
some of the tasks may involve the 90° and 180° rotation of items in imagery.  
Additionally, having completed the ICRT in a response booklet (Appendix F) they 
answered the following question.   
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Please tick the strategy or strategies you feel you used most while solving the imagery 
control task:  
 Visual imagery Memory  
 Both  Unsure 
 Other (if other please specify) ______________________ 
 
The forward digit-span task was presented in a counterbalanced presentation format with 
the ICRT.  This was to control for order effects whereby success or failure on one task 
influenced performance on the other.  Participants were given as much time as they 
needed to visualise each image transformation though were told at the outset that the aim 
was to move through the stages quickly.  They indicated either verbally or by nodding 
when they were ready for the next instruction stage.  At the end of the session they were 
debriefed and handed a sheet containing information about the study (Appendix G). 
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3.8 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.5 presents descriptive statistics for Study 2. All of the participants managed to 
correctly transform and draw at least one imagery transformation task, suggesting that the 
changes to the wording and the inclusion of practice trials increased participants‟ 
understanding of the task as this time no participants failed to solve any of the tasks.  This 
lead to a more normal distribution of scores (Figure 3.3).  
 
Table 3.5 
Descriptive Statistics for Measures used in Study 2 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Total number of imagery tasks solved 7.42 3.78 1 14  
Forward Digit-Span score 8.16 2.39 3 13  
Note.  N = 31. 
  141 
 
 
 
          Total number of ICRTs solved 
Figure 3.3 
Distribution of Solvability Percentages for Study 2 
 
As is shown in Figure 3.3 the distribution of correct ICRT scores was normal and 
revealed a mean score approximating the to-be-expected middle score (with a 0-16 
  142 
potential range of scores).  Non-significant z-score transformation values for both skew (z 
= 0.29, p > 0.05) and kurtosis (z = -1.07, p > 0.05) support the use of this measure in 
future psychometric studies into mental imagery control.  
 
Inferential statistics 
Forward digit-span scores were not significantly correlated with ICRT scores, r(29) = 
0.26, p = .08, suggesting that verbal working memory ability had little relation to the 
ability to solve the image tasks. 
 
Solvability figures were generated for each imagery task in Study 2, and these are 
presented in Table 3.6.  The correlation between the number of stages and solvability was 
again calculated with low solvability percentages indicating more difficult tasks.  A 
significant negative correlation (r(29) = -.65, p = .01) was found between number of 
stages and task difficulty, demonstrating that the more stages an imagery task has, the 
harder it is to complete.  A Fisher‟s r to z transformation was conducted to check whether 
the results of the two studies different significantly and indicated that the correlations 
from Studies 1 and 2 were not significantly different (z = 0.19, p > 0.05).   
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Table 3.6 
Solvability Percentages for items in the Image Control and Recognition Task – Study 2 
 
 
Number of stages 
 
Name of task 
 
Percentage 
solved* 
3 Shape 1 87% 
3 Shape 2 71% 
5 Clock Tower 61% 
4 TV 58% 
4 Heart 58% 
4 Candle 58% 
9 Star 45% 
7 Stickman 42% 
5 Cottage 42% 
5 Sailing Boat 39% 
8 Bowtie 39% 
4 Walkie Talkie 35% 
6 Cat 32% 
6 Christmas Tree 32% 
8 Shape 3 23% 
6 Snowman 19% 
 Note.  N = 31.  * Listed in order of magnitude. 
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As can be seen from Table 3.6 solvability improved for all imagery tasks except two 
(„shape 3‟ and „snowman‟) which both got harder, as was intended because these tasks 
were previously too easy.  The changes to instructions were therefore effective, with the 
experimenter observing that fewer participants asked for clarification during the tasks.  It 
is noteworthy that one of the eight-stage imagery tasks was solved by over 38% of 
participants, while the other eight-stage imagery task was solved by only 22% of 
participants.  This is a large discrepancy considering both imagery tasks should be equal 
in terms of their difficulty.  The nine-stage task was solved by over 45% of participants, 
problematic as this meant it was easier than all six-, seven-, and eight-stage tasks, as well 
as a four-stage and a five-stage one.  While the results were not identical to Study 1 
sufficient percentage groupings emerged from the data for three-, four-, five, and six-
stage ICRTs. 
 
Solvability percentages that were close in size within each set of ICRT were selected and 
mean solvability figures for the pairs were calculated.  These mean solvability 
percentages are graphed in Figure 3.4 and the figures are presented in Table 3.7 below.  
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Figure 3.4 
Mean solvability for three-stage to six-stage Image Control and Recognition Tasks 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3.4, solvability decreased according to increasing numbers of 
stages, indicating that fewer participants succeeded at tasks requiring higher levels of 
imagery control.  These results seem to suggest that it appears possible to distinguish 
between „exceptional‟, „high‟, „mid‟ and „low‟ range imagery controllers, highlighted in 
the clear pattern of responses by participants. 
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Table 3.7 
Study 2 ICRT Solvability Percentages as a Function of Number of Stages 
Number of 
stages 
Mean  
(%) 
Std. Deviation  
(%) 
3 79 
A
 28 
4 52 
B
 35 
5 47 
B
 31 
6 28 
C
 31 
Note.  N = 31; Means with the same 
letter in their superscripts do not differ 
significantly from one another according 
to a Bonferroni test with a .05 limit on 
familywise error rate. 
 
To test the hypothesis that the number of ICRTs correctly solved was linearly related to 
the number of instruction stages required to complete them, a trend analysis was 
conducted.  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that the number of stages 
significantly affected the percentage of ICRTs solved by participants, F(3, 120) = 14.18, 
MSe = 979.29, p < .001, 2 = .26.  As shown in Table 3.7, Bonferroni tests indicated that 
ICRTs with fewer stages were associated with significantly higher solvability percentages 
than were imagery tasks consisting of more stages.  The data fit well to a linear model 
with the linear component accounting for a significant proportion (26%) of the variance 
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in solvability as indicated by the trend analysis, an increase of 15% in the proportion 
explained in Study 1.  This is a more sensitive tool, though development is still needed, 
as is discussed in the final section of the chapter. 
 
Regarding the self-reported strategies employed to complete the ICRT, 20 participants 
provided an answer to the question about method(s) used.  Of these participants, 40% 
said they relied on their mental imagery when completing the tasks, while 35% said their 
memory was more important.  15% of the participants claimed to use both mental 
imagery control and memory, and 2 participants (10%) responded “don‟t know” to the 
question. 
 
3.9 Discussion  
The aim of these studies was to design, refine and pilot a new measure of mental imagery 
control and the results suggested it was possible to objectively measure individual levels 
of mental imagery control.  This is notable in light of the extensive literature pointing to 
problems with mental imagery tools and the conclusions drawn from studies using them.  
The ICRT revealed clear differences in ability and the task induced a good range of 
scores.  It appears possible to distinguish between different levels of visual imagery 
control aptitude, for three to six-stage tasks at least.  How much extra discrimination is 
uncovered from the longer ICRT problems however is unclear and will be scrutinised in 
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future studies.  The trend analyses on the solvability figures of Studies 1 and 2 indicated 
that the imagery tasks increase in difficulty along with increasing numbers of stages, and 
therefore it would be fair to suggest that they require increasing mental imagery control 
to correctly solve.  Some people simply do not have the ability to control their mental 
imagery, though at least one three-stage task was completed correctly by all participants 
in Study 2. 
 
Forward digit span scores were not found to be related to ICRT solvability scores, though 
the small sample size means there is limited power.  Verbal working memory processes 
are almost certainly utilised in order to keep the internally generated images „in mind‟, 
and the correlation between scores on the forward digit-span and the ICRT, although not 
statistically significant, approached significance. it is theorised that verbal working 
memory is a fundamental aspect of what I conceptualise as „imagery control‟, that is, 
working memory abilities, such as procedural and phonological working memory, are 
required for tasks of this nature. 
 
The manipulation of geometric and alphanumeric shapes is related to spatial imagery, yet 
it is possible that elements of object imagery come into play upon successful completion 
of the Image Control and Recognition Task, with form, size, and shape of individual parts 
being appraised as a whole image.  Also related to spatial imagery is of course mental 
rotation, and many of the imagery tasks entail some mental rotation in order to correctly 
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solve.  In future it would be interesting to study the implications of this, that is, whether 
mental rotation serves as a rate-limiting factor of the ICRT.  The ability to rotate images 
may be found to be a fundamental aspect of visual imagery control, as is suspected based 
on findings from recent literature (Blajenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010). 
 
The tools available to measure mental imagery and spatial ability would be 
complemented by this response-based measure, which entails elements of visualisation, 
mental rotation, manipulation, and spatial and object imagery aptitude, which 
theoretically are all components of mental imagery control.  The to-be-imagined shapes 
in the ICRT are not perceptually-sourced, that is, there are no images in front of 
participants during experimentation.  Rather participants hear the instructions and then 
imagine the forms without having seen them.  If administered alongside self-report 
imagery measures, the ICRT could also provide researchers with more information 
regarding the finding that self-report imagery control scores do not correlate with 
measures of spatial ability (Burton, 2003).  This measure does not rely on self-reporting 
and arguably taps a number of elements of imagery control, namely, object and spatial 
imagery, and rotation.  There is therefore potential for further elucidation of the lack of 
relation between these types of tools and administration of a mental rotation task 
alongside the ICRT and self-report imagery tools would allow for this. 
 
  150 
As an additional measure of individual differences of imagery ability, future studies 
could record response times.  The way the ICRT had been designed meant that this was 
not possible.  The instructions were read aloud and were in pen and paper format, and so 
time-keeping using a manual stopwatch wold have been necessary.  This would not have 
produced particularly accurate timings.  It was noted during experimental sessions that, 
for high scorers especially, the processes required of them to accurately complete these 
imagery tasks appeared effortless, moving through the stages quickly, without asking for 
repetition or clarification.  It was also observed from post-experimental conversations 
that those who reported using strategies other than imagery control alone when 
completing the tasks, for example, those who said they had relied more on their memory 
than their imagery, took longer to begin drawing after completion of all instructions.  
They appeared to take longer to complete each stage of the task.  The few participants 
who were asked about this did not claim that they used memory alone, but rather that 
they used their memory more than their imagery when moving through the stages 
(though it is unclear why they did not select „both‟ for their responses).  Accurate records 
of these strategies and details of response times of both the transformation phase and the 
drawing phase would enable investigation of the efficacy of participants‟ attempts to 
memorise and „go back‟ through previous stages.   
 
The problems found in some imagery measures requiring introspection (e.g. response 
leniency, social desirability, and demand characteristics; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2000-
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2001; Sheehan & Neisser, 1969; DiVesta, Ingersoll & Sunshine, 1971) are less likely to 
influence the ICRT due to the objective test-format the nature of the task.  It would be 
hard, if not impossible to achieve high scores on the ICRT simply due to wishes to do 
well on the test, or to appear in a favourable light to the experimenter.  
 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 revealed previously unanticipated advantages with using 
this new tool in imagery research.  There was no relation between the number of imagery 
tasks solved and working memory ability which may seem somewhat surprising 
considering the cognitive demands which may be placed on this system.  As was noted 
however, those who were able to effectively solve a large number of the imagery tasks 
did not appear to have any problems with simultaneously processing the instructions and 
subsequently adapting their mental images, and they did so quickly.  It certainly seemed 
as though the ability to perform well on these tasks was effortless and was carried out 
without having to especially to focus on any specific element or aspect of the task; not on 
following the instructions, not on manipulating the shapes, and not on drawing the 
images after all stages were presented.  These participants efficiently carried out all parts 
to each task.  The one element which many appeared to find quite difficult was the ability 
to recognise the intended image from their imagery before they draw it on paper, a 
process which theoretically requires object imagery due to the necessity to comprehend 
all aspects of the image as one and to look for clues in details of the image.  Very few 
participants were able to name the picture from their mental imagery before they drew it.  
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The exact number of participants who were able to do this was not recorded because this 
aspect of the ICRT was not intended and was unanticipated (hence the meaningless, un-
nameable shapes). Despite being able to complete the stages to perfect accuracy, a 
sizeable number of these people apparently could not recognise the intended image until 
they had drawn it, much to their own surprise.  Why could only a small number of people 
do this?  The few who were able to recognise and name images before drawing them 
reported that they „popped out‟ at them.  Once they knew the instruction phase was over 
they were able mentally „stand back‟ and inspect the image.  While many were able to do 
this they could not name what they saw in their „mind‟s eye‟, and one possible reason 
could be the requirement to simultaneously employ the visuo-spatial sketchpad and the 
phonological loop systems of working memory (Baddeley, 1986), the necessary 
requirement to engage both systems at the same time in order to be able to effectively 
carry out this last step may simply result in cognitive overload for some, but controlled 
mental imagery for others.  Future studies should seek to record the number of images 
people are able to recognise from imagery alone as detail regarding this would provide 
clues as to the processes underlying mental imagery control.  It would also be interesting 
to look at whether the short imagery tasks are more easily recognised compared to the 
longer ones as this would also go some way towards understanding whether the increased 
cognitive demands required during these long tasks interfere with the ability to name the 
mental image.  In order for this to be done there must be agreement on what the intended 
images depict, and so a study investigating the „nameability‟ of the images would be 
beneficial.  If there is agreement about what the images are, and if the images which 
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result from short tasks are as easy to recognise as the longer ones, then the failure to 
recognise these images would not be a result of the images themselves but some other 
aspect of the cognitive processing implicated in these tasks.   
 
3.10.4  Limitations 
I was not able to analyse and present the results of the counter-balancing because the 
order of presentation was not recorded, that is, which task the participant completed first 
was not detailed in the scoring sheet.  This unfortunate oversight meant the while order 
effects were controlled, it was not possible to see whether there were differences between 
the participants who completed the ICRT first and the ones who started with the forward 
digit-span task.  That being said the sample sizes in these studies were relatively small 
and so splitting the groups in order to carry out statistical comparisons may have been 
foolhardy. 
 
3.10.5  Future research 
The scoring of the ICRTs is stricter than Finke et al.‟s (1989) method.  Finke allowed 
„partial‟ responses, which were drawings which did not exactly match the desired image.  
The conservative procedure employed in the present study was decided upon to because 
the view in the present thesis is that if participants had strong mental imagery control 
then they should have been be able to easily adapt any incorrectly positioned shapes 
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while both creative visualisation and mental imagery tasks (for example, after hearing the 
instruction „Imagine a triangle pointing left with the vertical edge nearly touching the 
side of the „D‟, but not touching it‟ in the example provided in Table 3.2, section 3.5), 
and if they were unable to do this then this would be reflected in a lower overall imagery 
control score.  The scoring procedure could replicate Finke's however, and could include 
a „partial‟ classification in addition to the existing „correct‟ and „incorrect‟ classifications.  
Any images which were not complete could be analysed as it would be fruitful to try to 
examine the point at which participants went wrong.  Perhaps there were occasions on 
which participants narrowly missed out on points due to the strict scoring procedures, or 
because they confused „left‟ with „right‟.  It is conceivable that those failing at longer 
transformation sequences were actually high scorers who made but one faulty 
transformation during the image manipulation phase, thus influencing any further, 
otherwise correct transformations.  However, it can be argued in light of the evidence 
presented, that those with controlled mental imagery were able to do these image 
transformation tasks with ease due to being able to freely imagine and manipulate the 
images, and this was indeed observed on numerous occasions.   
 
The results tentatively suggest the use of the ICRT as a „hybrid‟ tool, so called because it 
encapsulates numerous elements of mental imagery control, namely, image evocation, 
rotation and manipulation, as well as tapping aspects of spatial and object imagery.  In 
order to look more closely at the unanticipated nature of some aspects of the tool a series 
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of related studies was designed which looked in more detail at these distinct properties of 
the ICRT.   
 
This chapter has introduced a new measure of the control and manipulation of mental 
imagery, the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT), which yielded a good range of 
scores, varying across individuals, and mapping a theorised relationship between number 
of stages and level of difficulty.  This is what the study set out to do and it indeed appears 
possible to objectively measure spatial imagery aptitude, a characteristic offered by few 
measures, and additionally highlights individual differences for other facets of mental 
imagery control.  The most encouraging finding is that the tool appears to tap a range of 
imaging abilities which encapsulate „mental imagery control‟ and thus reflects the 
multidimensional nature of the imagery construct. 
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CHAPTER 4 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE IMAGE 
CONTROL AND RECOGNITION TASK 
2
 
                                                 
2
 Images taken from the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT).  For illustration. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Three investigations are reported in this chapter.  Initially an investigation of the non-
ambiguity of the intended images from the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) 
is conducted.  This relatively simple study asks whether it can be certain that the 
imagined images look the way there are supposed to look, so that future versions of the 
ICRT may confidently measure more than one aspect of participants‟ mental imagery 
abilities, that is, the ability to recognise and name an image from mental imagery alone as 
well as the ability to complete the imagery task and to draw it accurately, whether it is 
recognised from imagery or not.  Following this, the relationship between performance 
on the ICRT and a mental rotation task is presented in order to investigate the previously 
outlined finding that scores on visual imagery tools and spatial ability tasks, such as those 
from the mental rotation paradigm, are largely unrelated.  The final study provides an 
analysis of the ICRT in terms of its psychometric properties.  The tool is deconstructed 
and elements relating to the individual responses to the items and processes underlying 
these are scrutinised.  Riquelme (2002) suggested that discovery in visual imagery was a 
holistic process, involving rotation, inspection, and manipulation of various parts of a 
figure at the same time.  The studies to be reported in this chapter directly investigate this 
possibility. 
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4.2 Rationale – ‘Nameability’ study 
The aim of this small-scale study (Study 3a) is to ascertain whether the intended images 
in the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) are accurate depictions of their 
intended form, or how nameable they are.  These images are the resultant internal 
depictions one should get when correctly solving the imagery problems in the ICRT.  
This tool requires participants to combine and manipulate geometric shapes and/or letters 
as instructed, step-by-step and without sketching, and upon correct completion of the 
task, a familiar object shape should emerge in imagery.  Participants are then required to 
try and name the mental image before they draw it.  These tasks may be scored on two 
criteria; participants can be awarded one point for each image control task they correctly 
draw, but they can also be scored on the number of images they manage to correctly 
name from their mental imagery before drawing.  This element of the ICRT means it can 
be treated as a hybrid tool, one that measures mental imagery control, which was the 
initial intention, but one that can also be used to measure the related constructs of spatial 
and object imagery (Blajenkova, 2005).  It would therefore be constructive to be in a 
position where the final images are unambiguous in what they represent.  The reasons for 
this are twofold: firstly, it would aid with scoring.  It would be beneficial to have clarity 
and minimal ambiguity these images which will influence the selection process for the 
developed version of the tool.  Secondly, future uses of the ICRT may constrain the tasks 
further by not requiring participants to draw their image at all, instead requiring them 
only to name the final image from imagery.  Those scoring highly using this method 
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would certainly be demonstrating not only enhanced imagery control, but also an ability 
to apprehend their mental images with much clarity.  It is important the images are 
unambiguously emblematic of their intended forms.   
 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
Thirty five participants took part in this study.  The sample consisted of undergraduate 
psychology students, academics from two London universities, and acquaintances of the 
researcher.  Age and demographic details of these participants were not recorded.  They 
took part for no monetary reward or course credits.   
 
4.3.2 Materials 
A booklet containing forty
3
 intended images from the ICRT, including all practice trials, 
printed large on separate sheets of paper was provided to participants.  Each page also 
featured a space in which to assign a title for the shape.  The intended images are 
depicted in Figure 4.1. 
 
                                                 
3
 This booklet included intended-images for the entire collection of images tasks which had been designed, 
including original items, a number of newly created ones, and some which were not subsequently 
selected.  
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Figure 4.1 
Intended images for all ICRT image tasks and practice trials 
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4.3.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the booklets either on university property, in individual offices, a 
research cubicle or their lab classroom, and some took them home and returned them 
within a week.  They read an information sheet explaining the nature of the research and 
informing them of the anonymity of their responses and signed a consent form 
(Appendices G and H).  Participants were then asked to look at the booklet containing 40 
images of everyday or recognisable items and to give each one a name or title.  They 
were told not to try to be creative, and to simply write down what they thought the picture 
looked like.  Upon completion a debrief form was provided (Appendix J) and participants 
were thanked for their time.  If they had been unsure of any images and enquired about 
them, the intended title was revealed.   
 
DATA REDUCTION 
All names provided for the each of the ICRT images were entered into a spreadsheet for 
analysis.  Spelling errors were corrected. 
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4.4 Results 
Table 4.1 contains the nameability agreement percentage for each of the image tasks from 
the ICRT.  This includes all data for the entire pool of imagery tasks and the practice 
trials. 
 
Table 4.1 
The amount of agreement obtained for the names of intended items in the ICRT in order 
of recognisability 
Image name 
Percentage 
agreement  
Stick man 100% 
Fish 100% 
Drink 100% 
Snowman 100% 
Envelope 100% 
Traffic lights 100% 
Christmas tree 100% 
Lamp (Practice) 100% 
Cottage/House 97% 
Boat 97% 
Television 97% 
Diamond 94% 
Heart 94% 
Clock tower 94% 
Mouse (Practice) 94% 
Umbrella 91% 
Candle 91% 
Ice cream 91% 
Balloon (Practice) 91% 
Sweet 86% 
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Mug  86% 
Cat 86% 
Hanging star 82% 
Bow 80% 
Pencil 80% 
Mobile phone 77% 
Present 77% 
Church 77% 
Hanger 77% 
Pine tree 74% 
Head and hat/Clown 72% 
Cake 71% 
Scales (Practice) 71% 
Happy face 66% 
Bag 66% 
Rocket (or Pencil) 51% 
Butterfly (Practice) 46% 
Scissors (Practice) 43% 
Cherries 23% 
Teddy bear 17% 
 
Table 4.1 shows that high agreement was found for the names of the majority of the 
images.  The lowest percentages are associated with the cherries and teddy bear images, 
followed by two of the practice trial images (butterfly and scissors).  This is unsurprising 
considering that three of these were newly designed tasks, that is, they were not part of 
the pilot or early studies and this demonstrates that these tasks did not benefit from the 
feedback and resultant modification that the initial tasks enjoyed.  The finding that 
„cherries‟ was an ambiguous image was not problematic because the practice trials are 
always explained to participants prior to commencement of the mental imagery control 
tasks proper.  The evidence of low agreement suggests that some of the tasks should be 
removed from subsequent versions of the ICRT. 
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4.5 Discussion of Study 3a 
The results of the study are encouraging, with considerable agreement being found 
between participants on the titles of the ICRT intended images for the vast majority of the 
depictions.  The intended-images of the mental imagery tool do depict what they aim to 
depict, and this means that an „image recognition‟ score for participants in future studies 
may be accurately obtained.  The ability to accurately execute and follow the instruction 
in the image tasks is a related but separate skill to being able to „view‟ and name the 
image from the mental image, and appears to require a shift in the type of imagery being 
used.  When following the instructions within the ICRT, which involves manipulating 
and amending multiple shapes, one is utilising mental imagery control, spatial imagery, 
and mental rotation, however when the task is to envisage the separate shapes as a whole 
image, one must engage a more holistic approach, and this entails imagery vividness and 
the ability to see the details of mental images clearly.  
 
Tasks which conclude in imagined-images which are more ambiguous (less than 85% 
agreement) will not be included in subsequent versions of the ICRT.  This will allow 
further development of this performance-based imagery control tool.   
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4.6 Rationale - Mental rotation study  
As has already been outlined in detail in Chapters 1 and 3, much of the research into 
mental imagery and its various attributes employs self-report measures to investigate 
them, despite a growing body of evidence to suggest that these tools are problematic for a 
number of reasons such as response leniency and social desirability (LeBoutillier & 
Marks, 2001-2002, see Chapter 3, section 3.1.1).  Also described earlier in the thesis was 
the finding that scores on introspective self-report tests often bear no relation to more 
objective measures of mental imagery abilities, such as mental rotation (Burton, 2003, 
see Chapter 3, section 3.1.2).  In order to try and elucidate these inconsistencies and to 
further investigate the properties of the ICRT, this study (Study 3b) administered three 
mental imagery tools in order to ascertain whether the self-report tool bears any relation 
to the more objective measures, as the literature often reports that they do not (Burton, 
2003).  It was expected that the self-report vividness of imagery tool would fail to 
correlate with both the imagery control task and the mental rotation task, and that mental 
rotation would be associated with high scores in visual imagery control. 
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4.7 Method 
4.7.1 Participants 
Thirty nine psychology students (32 females, 7 males) took part as a requirement of their 
research methods training and received course credit for their time.  Their age was not 
recorded. 
 
4.7.2 Materials 
IMAGE CONTROL AND RECOGNITION TASK 
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) required participants to follow verbal 
instructions and combine geometric shapes and letters.  They were then required to name 
and draw the resultant image.  This tool aims to measure mental imagery control and was 
the focus of Chapter 3 (Studies 1 and 2).  The results and experience gained from the 
previous studies allowed a pool of ICRTs to be produced.  Some replaced old tasks which 
resulted in meaningless images, as well as those which were deemed unsuitable for 
reasons discussed in the previous chapter.  This resulted in a pool of 40 tasks and practice 
trials (Appendix E), and 8 of these were selected for use in the present study (see section 
4.10 below)
4
. 
 
                                                 
4
 Study 3b took place after the analyses reported in section 4.10. 
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Scoring: Each correctly depicted image was given 1 point while incorrect drawings 
receive 0.  These points were summed (ICRT Total) and each image correctly identified 
from mental imagery received 1 point (ICRT Recognition). 
 
MENTAL ROTATION TASK 
Participants completed the Mental Rotation Task (MRT, Shepard & Metzler, 1971) 
which required them to view 48 pairs of 3D shapes and to mentally rotate one of them in 
order to decide whether the other was the same or a mirror image.  The angles of rotation 
ranged from 0 - 330º.  Studies investigating the reliabilities of mental rotation tasks have 
revealed them to have acceptable to good reliabilities (Hirschfeld, Thielsch & Zernikow, 
2013).  Two examples from the MRT are provided at Figure 4.2.  
 
 
 
 (a)  (b)  
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Figure 4.2 
Examples of Mental Rotation task stimuli: Mental Rotation Task (Shepard, 1978) stimuli.   
Participants are required to mentally rotate the shape on the right (of each example) and indicate 
whether it is a mirror image or the same as the shape on the left. 
 
Scoring: The median response times for correctly identified shapes were also averaged 
for each participant (MRT-RT).  The total number of images the participants correctly 
identified were also summed to give an MRT Total score (Kanoy, et al. 2012)
5
.   
 
VIVIDNESS OF VISUAL IMAGERY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Participants were also given the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, (VVIQ, 
Marks, 1973, Appendix K).  The VVIQ is a pen and paper questionnaire which they 
completed twice, once with their eyes open and also with their eyes closed.  The VVIQ 
measures how vivid participants rate their mental images when introspecting on specific 
imagined scenes and scenarios and was described at length in Chapters 1 and 3.  The tool 
contains 16 items which require the visualisation of people and scenes.  Participants must 
rate how vivid their mental images appear on a 5 point Likert-type scale
.
 
 
                                                 
5
 It was not possible to calculate the slopes and intercepts due to the fact these data were not available for 
all participants.  The MRT was administered on a website and therefore results were only temporarily 
available. 
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Scoring: A mean of participants‟ ratings was computed for each version of the VVIQ 
(eyes-open [VVIQ-O] and eyes-closed [VVIQ-C]). 
 
4.7.3 Procedure 
Participants were seen individually in research cubicles, provided informed consent 
(Appendices K and L) and completed the battery of tests in a randomised order.  The 
MRT was completed on a PC in an internet browser.  The relevant page was loaded 
before the participant arrived.  Participants read a paragraph of text about mental rotation 
and then followed on-screen followed instructions using the keyboard which lead them to 
the MRT.  The participants completed the VVIQs at a desk away from the computer.  The 
ICRT required participants to complete a paper answer booklet in which they provide 
their responses to 16 image control tasks read aloud to them by the experimenter.  After 
hearing all instruction items in each image task the participants provided a name for their 
internal imagery, if they could, and then drew the item underneath it.  They were not 
permitted to change the image in any way once they had drawn it.  However they were 
allowed to give it an alternative name.  The three-, four-, five-, and six-stage ICRTs were 
randomised in their presentation.  No time-limits were set for any of the tasks and the 
session lasted around 30 minutes.  Upon completion of all tasks a debrief form was 
provided (Appendix N) and any questions were answered. 
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DATA REDUCTION  
The VVIQ scores were reversed so that high scores reflected more vivid imagery and in 
order to anchor them in line with the other measures in the study. 
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4.8 Results 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the study are presented in Table 4.2.  The VVIQ 
and MRT results were not collected for some participants (VVIQ n = 9, MRT n = 3) so 
these participants were excluded pairwise from analyses. 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics from the mental rotation study for all imagery tasks 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VVIQ eyes open 
 
30 1.31 4.30 2.61 0.86 
VVIQ eyes closed 
 
30 1.60 5.00 2.97 0.88 
MRT Total  36 19 48 29.53 8.13 
MRT-RT 36 .36 3.44 1.66 0.73 
ICRT Total Solved 39 .00 6.00 2.51 1.74 
ICRT Recognition 39 .00 5.00 1.00 1.39 
Note.  VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire; MRT-RT = Mental Rotation 
Task response time; ICRT = Image Control and Transformation Task. 
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Correlation coefficients were calculated between all variables and no significant 
relationships were found between MRT-RT and imagery scores.  MRT Total scores were 
significantly positively correlated with ICRT total scores (r(34) = .40, p = .02) but not the 
number of ICRTs named from imagery  (r(34) = .09, p = .64).  The correlation between 
Total ICRT solved and ICRT Recognition was medium, positive and significant, r(37) = 
.44, p = .005.  No relationships were found between the number of ICRT imagery items 
correctly completed and MRT-RT, or between the number named from mental imagery 
and MRT-RTs. A large, significant correlation was found between the eyes-open and 
eyes-closed versions of the VVIQ, r(28) = .53, p = .002.   VVIQ-O scores were not 
correlated with either of the MRT indices, however, VVIQ-C was positively significantly 
correlated with MRT Total scores (r(30) = .51, p = .01). 
 
INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Given the small sample size, high and low scores were derived from a median split on the 
MRT median response times (for correctly answered tasks) and independent groups t 
tests between the „faster‟ and „slower‟ groups on the indices of imagery control revealed 
that the participants who were better mental rotators had significantly higher ICRT Total 
score and ICRT Recognition scores, with the group who could rotate their mental images 
faster scoring a mean of 3.13 (SD = 1.67) on ICRT Total, with slower rotators scoring a 
mean of 1.69 (SD = 1.49), t(21) = 2.57, p = .015, d = .90, and the faster mental rotation 
group also recognising significantly more ICRT images from imagery (M = 1.69, SD = 
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1.49) compared to the slower group (M = .38, SD = .62), t(21) = 3.25, p = .003, d = 1.15.  
This is relevant because it suggests that those who were able to quickly rotate and inspect 
mental images in their mind were not only able to follow image manipulation instructions 
accurately in their mental imagery, but were also better at correctly recognising and 
naming their mental image when compared to those for whom fast and accurate mental 
rotation was problematic.  High and low scoring groups were derived from a median split 
on the total MRTs correctly answered and independent groups t tests between ‗high‘ and 
‗low‘ groups on the indices of imagery control were conducted.  These revealed no 
significant differences on any imagery index apart from VVIQ eyes-closed, with better 
rotators reporting significantly more vivid mental imagery, t(21) = 2.15, p = .04, d = .94. 
 
4.9 Discussion of Mental Rotation Study 
The correlations between the Mental Rotation Task (MRT) and the Image Control and 
Recognition Task (ICRT) indices were non-significant, however the median split 
between „fast‟ and „slower‟ participants on the MRT revealed that these participants 
differed significantly not only on their ability to solve ICRT problems but also on how 
many images they were able to name from their mental imagery alone before drawing 
them.  This suggests that the two tasks are tapping the utilisation of the same 
psychological constructs, namely the ability to mentally manipulate and „inspect‟ internal 
images, and to effectively recognise and describe properties of these images.  The finding 
that the total number of correctly identified MRT tasks correlated with the ICRT Total 
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scores was expected.  Mental rotation is required for success on the majority of ICRTs, 
and so this result may not be altogether surprising.  This result does provide further 
construct validity for the ICRT, for the MRT is a well-validated measure of spatial 
ability.  The lack of significant correlations between ICRT scores and MRT-RT, but the 
finding that significant differences emerged between strong and poor image rotators on 
imagery control (as measured by the ICRT) does merit comment as this may reflect a 
non-linear relationship between the two.  It may be that the ability to rotate images is 
only useful for enhanced performance on the ICRT when the ability is exceptionally high, 
and this may be reflected in this result.  The time taken to complete each ICRT could be 
recorded in future procedures, for is was not possible to ascertain an accurate relationship 
between rotation on each task due to the nature of how the ICRT instructions are 
delivered and the fact it is currently a pen and paper-based task.  Only one of the VVIQ 
indices was correlated with MRT Total scores, namely the eyes-closed version, and high 
and low MRT Total groups were significantly different on this index.  This finding was 
surprising. As has been outlined, there exist mixed relationships between self-report and 
performance-based measures of mental imagery ability, with a lack of relationship 
commonly being reported measures which purport to measure the same attribute.  
Another interesting element to this result is that the VVIQ indices each had different 
relationships with the MRT Total scores, while these imagery vividness indices were 
related to each other.  This suggests that completing the VVIQ with eyes closed or open 
may actually engender different elements of mental imagery, and that when participants 
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complete this self-report tool with their eyes closed, they are able to more accurately 
report their mental experience of rotating and manipulating images. 
 
Although the MRT measures response time and the ICRT require the accurate 
manipulation and recognition of internal images, both can be said to contribute to the 
overall construct of mental imagery control.  As has been outlined (Chapter 1, section 
1.1.1), empirical literature exists which points to a great number of creative individuals 
who cite the ability to rotate and manipulate internal images and who use this to their 
advantage in a wide range of ways.  The fact that mental imagery control entails these 
facets, that is, that it encapsulates the ability to maintain and manipulate images at will, to 
rotate them and change their size and discover new combinations, means it is easy to see 
why these abilities might be important, and even conducive, for creative thought.  
Similarly, it is likely that being able to recognise when a new „pattern‟ or idea emerges in 
mental imagery is equally as important for creativity and generation of novel output.  All 
of the spatial and imagery measures investigated so far in the present thesis involve 
mental rotation and image manipulation, or what could be conceived of as „mental 
imagery control‟. 
 
Rock (1974, 1988) proposed an underlying mental rotation mechanism and stated that a 
limited amount of information may be rotated at any one time.  Rock‟s claim was that 
parts of mental images may fade when the requirements of the task go beyond these 
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capacity limitations.  It is suggested that the ability to overcome limitations on this 
mechanism may be what sets an exceptional „imagery controller‟ apart from those with 
more ordinary capabilities in this area.  Some rotate increasingly complex forms and 
patterns in mental imagery with apparent ease and flexibility and appear to have a 
substantial aptitude for mental image rotation, as was seen in the pilot study (Study 1, 
Chapter 3, section 3.6).  This included nine stage imagery tasks and though this was a 
small study in terms of sample size, it was nonetheless observed that for some 
participants, these tasks were just as easy as the three and four stages ones.  In Mast and 
Kosslyn‟s (2002) study into the reinterpretation of mental images they found evidence to 
suggest that mental rotation abilities and reinterpretation were intrinsically linked.  The 
results of this analysis of mental rotation in relation to the ICRT support this claim.  
Those performing well on the ICRT are using enhanced imagery skills which not 
everyone possesses.  Mast and Kosslyn's study showed that participants who could easily 
rotate images mentally were more likely to correctly reinterpret their rotated image and 
the present results support this finding.  They concluded that “not everyone can perform 
this task.  Rather, only people who are adept at relevant imagery processes can carry out 
key aspects of the task, allowing them to succeed” (p. 69), and this finding has been 
replicated here. 
 
Reisberg and Chambers (1991) utilised an objective rotation task where participants were 
first shown a rotated image of an appropriate „recognisable‟ outline, such as the US state 
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of Texas, were asked to memorise it, and were then told to rotate it mentally and to report 
any new „discoveries‟ in their image, concluding that very few participants were able to 
correctly identify the „new‟ image.  However, research has been published which presents 
conflicting findings, revealing that in actual fact people are able to assign new meanings 
to imagined forms and rotated images (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002).  Mast and Kosslyn 
challenged Reisberg and Chambers‟ claim that mental images cannot be easily 
reinterpreted, a conclusion which had been reached after a small number of participants 
were unable to correctly complete the image reconstrual task.  The issue of image 
reconstrual and whether participants are able to comprehend new patterns in imagery 
have implications for creative productivity, as it is necessary to be able to reinterpret and 
„play with‟ forms in mental imagery when conceptualising ideas and theories.  It was also 
found by Mast and Kosslyn (2002) that mental rotators were better at detecting novel 
images, which has relevance for forthcoming studies looking at the relationship between 
imagery and creativity.  The problem as to whether people can reinterpret images may lie 
with the term „reinterpreted‟.  Does it ask whether participants see the newly formed 
shape as it is intended to look, which many clearly do, or does it ask can they see what 
the image is supposed to represent?  This is pertinent to the discussion, and is one reason 
that the name of the imagery control tool developed for this thesis includes the term 
recognition.  This represents something in addition to reinterpretation, and it 
acknowledges that another element of mental imagery is likely involved in the ability to 
actually understand the mental picture „as something‟, as opposed to it appearing as a 
collection of shapes.  By using the term recognition, it reframes the hypothetical question 
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to something more along the lines of is it possible to take the ability to accurately control 
and combine mental images one step further and to see this image as something different 
to the parts it is composed of?  This is admittedly long-winded, though it makes the point 
that the ICRT enables the investigation of fundamental and useful questions regarding the 
multidimensional nature of mental imagery.  This tool therefore has promising 
applications in research looking at individual differences in mental imaging abilities.   
 
To conclude this section it seems fair to suggest that mental rotation abilities are crucial 
to the effective internal execution of the ICRT.  Attention now turns to the properties of 
the individual imagery tasks which are included within the tool and looks at the 
specificity of what these measure. 
 
4.10 Breakdown of the Image Control and Recognition Task 
In order to further investigate the psychometric properties of the Image Control and 
Recognition Task (ICRT), analyses were conducted on individual instruction items 
included in it and are broken down in the sections that follow.  It may be useful to present 
at the start of the section a reminder of the terminology related to the ICRT, so the 
following table (Table 4.3) is repeated from Chapter 3. 
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Table 4.3 
Definitions relating to the ICRT 
 
Term 
 
 
Definition 
 
Image control and recognition task 
(ICRT) 
 
 
The complete set of imagery control tasks (including the practice 
trials) 
 
Imagery control The combination of the ability to generate, maintain, rotate, 
manipulate, and recognise forms in mental imagery 
 
Imagery task/Recognition task  These terms refer to an individual item from the ICRT in its 
entirety.  The terms refer to the instruction items that make up that 
task, the internal depictions which are internally generated and 
manipulated as a result of hearing these items, and the final image 
itself.  These terms are used interchangeably 
 
ICRT item/ICRT instruction Items in the ICRT are the instructions which make up each 
imagery task and which are read out to participants during the 
image generation and recognition phase of the task.  These contain 
the directions for the image transformations 
 
Intended Image The mental image participants should see in imagery having 
correctly followed the items making up each imagery task.  The 
shapes and letters each form to make a recognisable or nameable 
image which participants have to try and name from their mental 
imagery before drawing it 
 
Stages/Number of stages When the ‗number of stages‘ is referred to it corresponds to the 
total number of instruction items within an imagery task.  Imagery 
tasks are each comprised of discrete stages of instruction (the 
items), so imagery tasks which require the correct manipulation of 
three instruction items in order to generate the intended image are 
referred to as ‗three-stage tasks‘, those with four items are ‗four-
stage tasks‘ and those requiring the correct manipulation of five 
and six instructions are five-stage and six-stage tasks 
(respectively) 
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4.10.1 ICRT item analysis 
The individual imagery tasks in the ICRT certainly require scrutiny in order to ascertain 
their reliability.  However, it was not appropriate to conduct a reliability item analysis on 
the tool (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).  The items making up each imagery task do not 
each assess the same „level‟ or aptitude of mental imagery control, with some items 
requiring participants to simply imagine a geometric shape such as a square or circle, 
with others which require shapes to be altered in some way, such as turning a circle into 
an oval, and there are also items in which individual or conjoined shapes are rotated 
through 90 or 180 degrees.  The tasks were not suitable for this process as the ICRT are 
not designed to assess equal levels of mental imagery control, on the contrary, they each 
intend to measure differing levels of mental imagery control.  In addition, „items‟ in this 
tool are conceived such that they consist of between three and six separate instructions, 
which could each themselves be considered as individual „items‟.  These too would be 
unsuitable for use in traditional reliability analyses.  The differential imaginal elements 
which are tapped by the ICRT were therefore investigated.  The data analyses were 
conducted on results from participants recruited for Study 4 (Chapter 5), but the results 
are reported here as they relate to the collection of studies reported in this chapter. 
 
„Complex‟ and „Rotational‟ imagery tasks 
Three new dichotomous variables were computed.  First, tasks which utilised „complex‟ 
terms and which included potentially complicated instructions were separated from those 
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which did not include such terms.  „Complex‟ tasks were defined as those asking 
participants to add and manipulate „horizontal lines‟ or „vertical lines‟.  It was recorded in 
concurrent notes taken during the sessions that a great number of participants, despite 
being reminded of the distinction in the practice trial, commonly confused the terms and 
some had to exert considerable effort in order to remember, and continue to remember, 
which was which.  Secondly ICRT items were separated by those which involved 
mentally rotating elements to successfully complete the task, and those which did not 
require any mental rotation.  Finally, ICRT items which contained both „complex‟ and 
„rotational‟ components were grouped as „complex rotation‟ and those which only had 
complex or rotational components were classed „either/or‟.  Table 4.4 below presents 
these categories. 
 
Table 4.4 
Criteria for categorisation of ICRT 
Categorisation Criteria 
Complex (C) instructions include terms "horizontal line‖ or ―vertical line" (may or 
may not include mental rotation) 
Non-complex (NC)  instructions have no complex terms (may or may not include mental 
rotation) 
Rotational (R)  task requires 1 or 2 rotations (may or may not include complex terms) 
 
Non-rotational (NR) task does not require any rotations (may or may not include complex 
terms) 
 
Complex rotation (CR) has both ‗complex‘ and ‗rotational‘ instructions 
 
Either/Or (EO) has either ‗complex‘ or ‗rotational‘ instructions (i.e., these are items 
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which were not selected as ‗CR‘).   
 
The groupings allowed in-depth analysis of the imaginal properties of the Image Control 
and Recognition Task.  The groups were not mutually exclusive across type, that is to 
say, a task in the ICRT could be rated as „complex‟, „rotational‟, and „complex 
rotational‟. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Paired samples t tests were conducted between types of task to ascertain differences 
between these newly categorised ICRT groups.  These were found to be significant when 
comparing „rotational‟ (M = 5.85, SD = 2.74) to „non-rotational‟ (M = 3.29, SD = 1.62) 
ICRT mean scores, t(95) = 9.31, p < .001, d = 1.14, and „complex‟ (M = 6.12, SD = 2.45) 
with „non-complex‟ (M = 2.89, SD = 1.79) ICRT mean scores, t(95) = 12.80,  p < .001, d 
= 1.50.  A significant difference was also found between ICRT with tasks containing with 
„complex and rotational‟ (M = 3.78, SD = 1.89) instructions and those with just one of 
these components, that is, the „either/or‟ tasks (M = 5.36, SD = 2.02), t(95) =  -8.41, p < 
.001, d = .81).  These results will be considered during item selection for the final version 
of the ICRT. 
 
An investigation of the differences between items by number of stages was then 
conducted.  Table 4.5 below provides this information. 
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Table 4.5 
Rotations and complexity of ICRT by number of stages 
Number 
of 
stages 
Number of 
rotational 
tasks 
Number of 
complex 
tasks 
Number of 
complex 
rotations 
Number of items containing 
either complex or rotational 
components 
Explanation 
 
      
3 3 rotation 5 complex 1 complex 
rotation 
7 either/or This group of imagery tasks contains the fewest complex 
rotations reflecting the relative simplicity of these items 
 
4 7 rotation 5 complex 5 complex 
rotation 
3 either/or The four-stage tasks may focus too heavily on 
‗rotational‘ instruction, making these harder than the 5 
stage tasks 
 
5 4 rotation 6 complex 3 complex 
rotation 
5 either/or The five-stage tasks have few ‗rotational‘ instructions, 
potentially making this set easier than the 4 stage tasks 
 
6 7 rotation 6 complex 7 complex 
rotation 
1 either/or The six-stage tasks have the most rotational and complex 
instructions, reflecting the intention for these to be most 
difficult 
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Table 4.5 highlights differences between ICRT stage groups, with the four-stage tasks 
relying mainly on rotational instructions, while the five-stage tasks were possibly too 
easy due to only half involving rotational instructions and mainly containing complex 
ones.  Table 4.6 below shows how many of each type of task is present in the ICRT.  The 
results indicate that there were roughly the same number of „complex rotational‟ imagery 
tasks as there were ones which included either rotational or complex terms.  This bodes 
well because a range of imagery abilities theoretically require a range of tasks in order for 
accurate measurements to transpire. 
 
Table 4.6 
Total number of items in the ICRT broken down by type 
 
Type of task Total 
‗Rotation‘ 21 
‗Non-rotation‘ 10 
‗Complex‘ 22 
‗Non-complex‘ 9 
‗Complex rotation‘ 15 
‗Either/or‘ 16 
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Inspection of Table 4.7 below highlights the varying levels of imagery that each task 
entails.  It can be surmised that success on these imagery tasks depends on a number of 
things.  The ability to generate, maintain and rotate items is obviously essential in the 
majority of these tasks, but also critical is the ability to modify and then hold multiple 
shapes together while rotating them, and the capacity to rotate the shapes in the right 
direction.  I am suggesting that these capabilities are essential elements of mental 
imagery control.     
  186 
Table 4.7 
Classification of Image Control sand Recognition Tasks by Rotational Components and Complexity 
No. 
Stages Name 
No. 
rotations 
Rotational (r) 
/Non-rotational (nr) 
Complex (c) 
/Non-complex (nc) 
Degrees 
per 
rotation 
Rotation and 
Complex (rc) 
Either/Or (e) Actual use of complex term(s) Horizontal Vertical 
          
3 Diamond 0 nr c  e ―remove the horizontal line‖ 1  
3 Rocket 1 r c 90° rc ―imagine a horizontal rectangle‖1 1  
3 Fish 0 nr c  e ―imagine a horizontal oval‖1 1  
3 Umbrella 1 r nc 90° e    
3 Cherries 1 r nc 180° e    
3 Sweet 0 nr c  e ―imagine a horizontal oval‖1 1  
3 Head and hat 0 nr c  e ―remove the horizontal line‖ 1  
3 Teddy 0 nr nc  e    
          
4 Heart 1 r c 90° rc ―remove the horizontal line‖ 1  
4 Mug 1 r nc 90° e    
4 Mobile phone 1 r c 90° rc ―add a horizontal line‖ 1  
4 Candle 1 r c 180° 2 rc ―add a vertical line‖  1 
4 Stick man 1 r c 180° 2 rc ―add a vertical line‖  2 
4 Hanging star 1 r c 180° 2 rc ―add a vertical line‖  1 
4 Present 1 r nc 90° e    
4 Happy face 0 nr nc  e    
          
5 Boat 1 r c 90° rc ―add a vertical wavy line‖  2 
5 Clock tower 0 nr nc  e    
5 Cottage 0 nr c  e ―add a vertical rectangle‖ 1  1 
5 Church 1 r c 90° rc  1  
5 Cake 0 nr c  e ―imagine a trapezoid‖ and ―add to the horizontal side‖ 3 1  
5 Pine tree 1 r c 90° rc ―add a vertical line‖ 1 1 
5 Bag 2 r nc 90° e    
5 Drink 0 nr c  e ―add a horizontal line/diagonal line‖ 4 1  
          
6 Cat 1 r nc 90° e ―add a question mark‖ 5   
6 Snowman 1 r c 90° rc ―add a vertical line‖  2 
6 Ice cream 1 r c 90° rc ―add a vertical line‖  1 
6 Envelope 1 r c 90° rc ―add vertical lines‖ and ―add a horizontal line‖ 1 2 
6 Bow 1 r c 90° rc ―add a horizontal line/vertical line/diagonal line‖ 1  
6 Pencil 2 r c 90° rc ―imagine a rectangle so that it is standing ‗vertically‘‖ 1   1 
6 Traffic light 1 r c 90° rc ―imagine a rectangle so that it is lying horizontally‖ 1 1 1 
          
1 Labelled as ‗complex‘ because, though not particularly difficult imaginal requirements, some participants sought clarification of what was meant by these instructions.  
2 These instructions were accompanied with the instruction ―that is, turn it upside down‖. 
3 Participants were required to think of a trapezoid which does not appear to be a shape that is commonly familiar.  Just one horizontal edge of this shape was then specified in the instruction.  This task was classed as ‗complex‘ for 
these reasons. 
3 A diagonal line was to be added so it was sticking out of the top of a triangle.  Again, this appeared to be a complex instruction for many.   
4 Many found it difficult to attach and rotate the question mark. 
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There are some caveats to this last point, such as the observation that rotating geometric 
and alphanumeric shapes appears to be easier than rotating more complex shapes such as 
question marks.  It was noted that people write their question marks in different ways, in 
varying „personal fonts‟ if you like.  It is also advantageous to know left from right, to 
remember the difference between clockwise and anticlockwise rotations and to remember 
what horizontal and vertical lines look like, and so discussions clarifying confusions 
related to these should take place during the practice trial where necessary.  Being sure 
that participants are able to accurately follow the instructions relating to horizontal and 
vertical lines, and ensuring they have practiced which is „left‟ and which is „right‟, would 
make it easier to isolate imagery control abilities.  I shall repeat a point made earlier 
however, which is that proficiencies in the ability to manipulate images according to 
instructions about lines of certain orientations and the left or right sides of shapes are 
common amongst people who efficiently progress through the stages of the imagery 
tasks.  Put differently, those who exhibit exceptional mental imagery control appear to 
have no problems following these types of instructions. 
 
Trend Analysis on ICRT data  
To test whether the number of ICRT correctly solved was linearly related to the number 
of instruction stages, a trend analysis was conducted with „number of stages‟ as an 
independent variable and „percentage solved‟ as the dependent variable.  One way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that the number of steps significantly affected 
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the percentage of ICRT solved by participants, F(3,380) = 23.27, MSe = 902.104, p < 
.001, 2 = .15.  Bonferroni-adjusted t tests indicated that ICRT with fewer stages were 
associated with significantly higher solvability percentages than ICRT requiring more 
steps to solve them (Table 4.9).  The trend analysis indicated that the data fit well to a 
linear model with the linear component accounting for a substantial proportion (15%) of 
the variance in solvability.  As shown in Table 4.8, significant differences were 
uncovered between three-stage ICRT set and the four, five and six-stage ones.  The four-
stage tasks were significantly different from all except the five-stage tasks, suggesting 
that the longer tasks which comprise of five stages are not statistically harder than the 
four-stage ones, as intended.  The five-stage tasks were significantly harder than the 
three-stage ones, and significantly easier than the six-stage imagery tasks. 
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Table 4.8 
ICRT Solvability Percentages as a Function of Number of Stages 
Number of 
Stages 
Mean           
(%) 
Std. 
Deviation 
(%) 
3 79
A 
25 
4 59
B 
32 
5 54
B 
32 
6 43
C 
33 
Note.  N = 96.  Means with the same letter in 
their superscripts do not differ significantly 
from one another according to a Bonferroni-
adjusted t-test test with a .05 limit on 
familywise error rate. 
 
This analysis indicates that overall the ICRT increases in difficulty as a function of the 
number of stages involved in the formation of the final intended-image.  The aim was to 
develop a measure of mental imagery control which treats it as a continuous variable and 
measures individual levels of ability in controlling mental imagery and this has been 
achieved.  The ICRT may be administered in order to assess differences in the ability to 
control mental imagery, although the non-significant difference between the four and 
five-stage tasks remains.  These tasks will be refined further in response to this finding. 
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4.10.2 Number of ICRT named from imagery 
As another index of the efficacy of the ICRT as a measure of mental imagery control, 
mean scores were calculated of the number of images correctly named from imagery 
alone, that is, the number of items which were named before the drawing phase of the 
task.  The mean number of ICRT images named from imagery was 4.12 (SD = 3.06), with 
a minimum score of zero and a maximum score of 11.  
 
No participant was able to name all ICRT images from their imagery alone, and the mean 
showed that on average four intended-images were recognised in mental imagery, which 
is just a third of those presented (16).  It is noteworthy that the majority of participants 
however expressed surprise at how easily they were able to name the image once they 
had drawn it.  This has implications for the study of mental imagery more generally, as 
many researchers assert that mental imagery is akin to perception in terms of overlapping 
cognitive and cortical structures underlying them (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Ganis & 
Schendan, 2008; Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004).  However this finding suggests 
that many find it difficult to inspect the images produced in the ICRT effectively enough 
in order to recognise them.  Even those who successfully solved sizeable numbers of 
imagery tasks and were able to draw accurate depictions of their mental images were 
usually unable to provide titles for these before drawing them.  If the aforementioned 
tenet were true, they should have a clear enough mental image that naming it should be as 
easy as it clearly is when attempting to do so having drawn it.  Therefore the ICRT offers 
more than one way to distinguish high mental imagery controllers from those less capable 
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in these areas.  There is a sizeable literature on the topic of whether images many be 
reinterpreted in mental imagery (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989; Reed, 1974; Reed & 
Johnsen, 1975; Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 1992; Brandimonte & Gerbino, 1993) and 
the results seem to very dependent on the nature of the task stimuli, a recurrent theme that 
runs throughout this thesis.  Chambers and Reisberg (1985) found that participants 
usually could not solve the 'duck/rabbit' problem when attempting this in mental imagery.  
This task presents participants with a figure which can be seen as both a duck and a rabbit 
(Figure 4.3).  Participants, having previously entitled the image and memorised the 
figure, are later instructed to recall it from memory and try to reverse this „bistable 
configuration‟. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 
The duck/rabbit figure. From Chambers and Reisberg (1985). 
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Reisberg and Chambers (1991) argued that mental images are meaningful depictions and 
that this may be one reason people find it difficult reinterpret them.  They investigated 
when people can and cannot discover something „new‟ in their mental imagery, and 
reported that few people were able to „see‟ alternative images in mental imagery.  In their 
words, “images, like percepts, include both information about stimulus geometry and also 
specification about how that geometry is understood” (p. 338).  Slezak (1991) states that 
the geometrical shapes which are often used as stimuli in spatial imagery tasks lack 
semantic interpretations (to a degree) when compared to a duck or rabbit and states that 
this may reflect the differences in mental reinterpretation of these respective types of 
images.  When one considers the image depicted above (Figure 4.3) it may be hard to 
imagine what types of semantic interpretations would result from viewing this especially 
simple image.  It could be argued that it lacks sufficient detail to activate many semantic 
networks, it is unlikely to remind someone of other ducks they may have seen, for 
example.  Admittedly, however, Slezak may have been referring to more traditional 
duck/rabbit images, such as that depicted in Figure 4.4, which are used when this task is 
physically presented for inspection, rather than being memorised and retrieved from 
memory (as was the case in Chambers and Reisberg‟s study).  
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Figure 4.4  
A traditional example of the duck/rabbit image. Image by Thompson, 2012 
 
However, as mentioned, results in this area are mixed.  Evidence has been found showing 
that parietal activation increases in direct relation to the computational demands which 
are required during the visuo-spatial processing required during mental rotation.  
Carpenter and Just (1979) suggested that the more complex a to-be-rotated figure was the 
more difficult it was to discriminate once it had been rotated.  Just and Carpenter later 
suggested that this may be a result of the mental rotation of complex figures involving the 
rotation of “different parts of the figure in separate rotation episodes” (1985, p. 143).  Just 
and Carpenter (2001) consider a „rotation workload hypothesis‟ which asserts that more 
neural activity is observed in correspondence with the “number of successive rotation 
steps” (p. 495) representing increasing cognitively challenging tasks.  Just and 
Carpenter's study revealed increasing cortical activity as participants were required to 
rotate more and more steps.  They also obtained images of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 
while participants were engaged in a task which required the simultaneous execution of 
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verbal instructions and mental rotations.  They found increased activation in the IFG on 
the tasks of longer path length, that is, those which required more rotation steps.  The 
reason offered for this result is that the verbal encoding of task instructions is processed 
in the IFG through encoding and rehearsal
6, while the “cognitive coordinate system is 
generated for the required rotations” (p. 497).  This relates to the discussions earlier 
regarding the multidimensional nature of mental imagery and the supposition that 
„cognitive overload‟ may be experienced by some people during execution of the ICRT, 
while others may progress through the tasks quickly and easily, thus demonstrating their 
mental imagery control abilities.  The findings appear to lend support to this and 
inspection of the incorrect drawings generated during the ICRT suggests that rotating 
multiple shapes together „as one‟ is something that proved difficult for some. 
 
Much research has been published presenting conflicting findings in the area of mental 
imagery and reinterpretation of visual images, revealing in fact that people are able to 
assign new meaning to imagined forms and rotated images (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; 
Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989; Reed & Johnsen, 1975; Slee, 1980 Brindimonte & 
Gerbino, 1993).   Pinker and Finke (1980) found that participants were able to discover 
new shapes that emerged after rotation of a three-dimensional configuration, and Shepard 
and Feng (1972) asked participants to rotate, for example, the letter “N” through 90 
                                                 
6
 The type of rehearsal referred to here is different to that of the rehearsal strategies outlined and discussed 
earlier in relation to the ICRT.  This rehearsal activity is a cognitive mechanism which is executed much 
faster than the decidedly deliberate mental operation of returning to the beginning of s task and repeating 
each stage once again. 
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degrees, and they were able to reconstrue the new image as “Z”.  This latter task is 
however relatively simple, with only one rotation of one object required prior to being 
asked about the new image.  The ICRT requires not only the reinterpretation of figures in 
mental imagery, but also depends on the participant's ability to complete the image 
manipulations in order to reach this penultimate stage of the process, that is, naming the 
final image before drawing it.   
 
Ganis, Thompson, and Thompson (2004) raise an interesting point about visual imagery 
and the nature of tasks which require the inspection of mental representations.  They state 
that “The mere requirement to extract certain information may cause that information to 
be included in the representation” (p.238).  The example provided is that when someone 
is asked to visualise a cat and is then asked whether that cat has curved claws, most 
people report that they only add the claws when they are asked the question.  This is 
relevant to the ICRT because even though the participants knew an image or picture 
would emerge at the end of the task, and even when they got the shape configuration 
correct in their imagery, they were not always able to contemplate it in its entirety and 
give it a name.  It is clear from this that the internal image is not always perceptually 
equivalent, that is, not as clear as perceiving a drawing would be, for when participants 
actually drew the image the intended form immediately became apparent. 
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Whether participants are able to name ICRT images from their mental imagery alone can 
be taken as another index of mental imagery ability.  High scores on this index show that 
such participants not only follow each instruction accurately, but then internally 
assimilate their mental image, inspect it, and then decide what it may portray.  As has 
been discussed elsewhere in the thesis (in Chapter 1, section 1.2.2), mental imagery can 
be conceptualised as consisting of at least two distinct subsystems, including spatial 
imagery and object imagery (Blajenkova, 2006).  Possessing high spatial imagery skills 
allows internal images to be manipulated and relations between mentally imagined 
objects to be assessed, and object imagery refers to the generation of highly „pictorial‟ 
images, which are detailed and colourful.  Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, and Motes (2005) 
found that people in professions who utilised mental imagery in their work often had a 
preference for one or other of these types of mental imagery, and showed visual artists to 
prefer object imagery while providing results indicating that the scientists and engineers 
in the study had tended to be what Blajenkova and her colleagues called „spatial 
imagers‟.  It is conceivable however that to be described as someone with „controlled‟ 
mental imagery one would need to be adept in both areas.  The ability to utilise both 
spatial and object imagery may be indexed by the ICRT.  The cognitive processes 
involved in both the generation of the intended image and the naming phase, where 
participants must inspect the manipulated mental image as a whole, and finally those 
responsible for the contemplation of what this new form may represent, seem to suggest 
that both imagery subsystems are utilised.  Therefore, further analyses were conducted 
treating the number of ICRT images named from mental imagery as an additional 
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indication of imagery ability.  These analyses look at the relation of this construct to other 
indices of mental imagery and appear in the sections which follow. 
 
4.10.3 The Forward and Backward Digit-Span Tasks 
The digit-span is a verbal working memory (WM) task which has two forms, forward and 
backward.  The first involves participants repeating a series of digits in the order they 
were presented to them, known as the forward digit-span task, whereas the backward 
digit-span task requires recall and repetition of the numbers in the reverse order to the 
order in which they were presented.  Different skills are required to do forward DS 
compared to backward.  Essentially, the difference lies in the types of memory utilised 
when solving each one, the backward DS being thought to be more difficult due to the 
extra steps required to hold the digits in working memory for longer, and to manipulate 
these for repetition in the correct sequence.    ,.  This was first suggested by Terman 
(1916) who claimed that the backward DS test, “as a test of intelligence ... is less 
mechanical and makes a much heavier demand on attention” (p. 208, cited in Ackerman, 
Beier, & Boyle, 2005).  In their meta-analysis of the literature on WM and intelligence, 
Ackerman, Beire and Boyle (2005) found that when looking at g in relation to WM, a 
large correlation was revealed (r = .89).  Another finding from this study which is 
particularly relevant to the present thesis is that the relationship between g and spatial 
ability was comparably high (r = .86).  For this reason, though not explicitly measuring 
intelligence, any relationship between ICRT scores and backward DS scores would be 
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interesting to investigate.  The backward DS scores will therefore be used as an indirect 
indication of executive control in models testing relationships and covariates.  
 
A subset of participants (n = 47
7
) completed both the backward and forward digit-span 
(DS) tasks and their scores were correlated with scores on the ICRT.  This was in order to 
ascertain if verbal working memory or executive function related to mental imagery 
control skills, as it was expected that a relationship may be uncovered between backward 
digit-span and mental imagery control.  Descriptive statistics and correlations between 
the variables are presented in Table 4.9.  
                                                 
7
 This was a subset of the participants recruited for Study 4 who all had English as their first language. 
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Table 4.9 
Descriptive Statistics for Forward and Backward Digit-Span (DS) task with Pearson‟s r 
correlation coefficients with ICRT total scores 
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Correlation 
with ICRT (r) 
Forward DS (verbal 
memory) 
7.74 1.79 4.00 11.00 .15 
Backward DS 
(executive function) 
6.00 2.03 .00 10.00 .31* 
Note.  n = 47; * r is significant at 0.05. 
 
Forward DS scores (verbal memory) were not related to ICRT scores.  The forward DS 
can be taken as a measure of immediate verbal memory (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 
2005), so this is encouraging because should a relationship have been found, then it could 
indicate that verbal memory abilities were confounding the results and impacting the 
tool‟s ability to reveal individual differences in mental imagery control.   However a 
significant moderate relationship was revealed between backward DS scores (executive 
function) and ICRT scores, revealing that high scores on the backward DS task were 
related to better performance on the ICRT.  This was expected because the ICRT requires 
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participants to hold an image in one‟s mental imagery at the same time as receiving 
subsequent instructions about how to manipulate it. 
 
4.11 Selection of imagery tasks for final tool 
The previous analyses found there to be a suitable pool of imagery tasks from which to 
select for the final version.  The results into the complexity of each set of task 
instructions highlighted the items which were unsuitable for inclusion in the final tool.  
These items included instructions featuring complex shapes, tasks that were too easy and 
therefore participants were able to guess them before all instructions had been presented.   
 
 
Table 4.10 
ICRT final selection notes 
Name of item * Reason for rejection of item (where applicable) 
8
   
Diamond Too easy 
Rocket Too ambiguous 
Fish Too difficult (people confuse the location of the ‗eye‘ – left or right) 
Umbrella  
Cherries  Now a practice trial 
Sweet  
Head and hat  
Teddy Too easy 
Heart  
Mug  
Mobile phone Too ambiguous 
9 
                                                 
8
 Those with no comment in this column will retained for future versions of the tool. 
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Candle  
Stick man  
Hanging star Too difficult – confusing instructions 
Present  
Happy face Too easy and guessable 
Boat  
Clock tower Too easy – no rotation or complex terms and guessable 
Cottage Too easy – no rotation and guessable 
Church  
Cake Guessable and includes an uncommon shape (trapezoid) 
Pine tree  
Bag Confusing instruction ("inverted ‗U‘ or arch" and too ambiguous) 
Drink Too difficult (diagonal line sticking out at an angle) 
Cat Confusing due to use of a question mark  
Snowman  
Ice cream  
Envelope  
Bow Too easy 
Pencil Guessable 
Traffic light Guessable 
10
 
Note.  * Selected items in bold.  
Table 4.11 contains the imagery tasks which are most suitable for inclusion in the final 
version of the tool.  Selection of these has taken into account the previous analyses and 
the clustered solvability percentages presented in the table.  The remaining imagery tasks 
will either be dropped or will be modified for testing in future versions of the tool (see 
Table 4.10 above).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9
 Additionally, in the time since the design of this task the conception of what a mobile phone looks like 
has changed substantially.  The depiction of the ‗mobile phone‘ in the present version of the ICRT looks 
more like a walkie talkie.   
10
 This could be amended so that the addition of the telltale lights (three circles in a row) comes at the end 
reducing the likelihood of guessing. 
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Table 4.11 
Selected items for final version of ICRT with percentage of items solved by participants in 
the digit-span and mental rotation studies 
Name of imagery task Number of stages Overall percentage solved 
Umbrella 3 78% 
Sweet 3 78% 
Heart 4 60% 
Candle 4 58% 
Boat 5 37% 
Pine tree 5 42% 
Snowman 6 38% 
Envelope 6 37% 
Note.  Pooled result for the digit-span and the mental rotation study samples are presented here; n 
= 82. 
 
„High‟ and „low‟ imagery control groups were computed by conducting a quartile split on 
total percentage of ICRT solved.  Using independent groups t tests these participants 
were compared on total number of correctly solved three-stage, four-stage, five-stage and 
six-stage imagery tasks.  Additionally, an independent groups t-test was used to compare 
the groups on the number of images they were able to name from their mental imagery.  
The means were all significantly different and were in the expected direction, with highly 
controlled imagers scoring higher on all variables.  These figures are presented in Table 
4.12. 
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Table 4.12 
Means, t tests and effect sizes between high and low imagery controllers on the four 
levels of difficulty and number of ICRT images named from imagery 
 High control 
    (n = 21) 
Low control  
    (n = 26) 
   
 
Grouped stages 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
t 
 
p 
 
d 
Total three-stage tasks solved 3.86 0.36 2.15 1.01 7.37 < .001 2.25 
Total four-stage tasks solved 3.33 0.73 1.11 1.07 8.09 < .001 2.42 
Total five-stage tasks solved 3.57 0.60 1.04 0.96 10.55 < .001 3.16 
Total six-stage tasks solved 3.00 0.89 0.46 0.65 11.48 < .001 3.26 
Number of images named from 
imagery 
4.71 3.15 3.08 2.98 3.75 < .001 .53 
Note.  All results were significant; df = 45; the significantly higher mean in each pair is highlighted in bold. 
 
Having scrutinised the properties of the ICRT the observation is made that the tools 
should not be made „uniform‟ because as they stand they accurately reflect the 
multidimensional nature of mental imagery and effectively operationalise the construct of 
imagery control.  The fact that only some tasks require the rotation of imagined forms 
while others feature imaginal manipulations of other types is actually an asset to this tool 
because the result of this are accurate indices of a range of imaging abilities.  In future 
investigations which use the ICRT it will be possible to deconstruct these additional 
imagery abilities.  Indeed, the results even suggested that without elements of rotation in 
the imagery tasks a ceiling effect emerged as these tasks appeared to be quite easy.  This 
tool will therefore assist in the contribution to the understanding of mental imagery in a 
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large number of areas, and will complement already existing tools in their joint 
exploration of the many characteristics underlying this construct. 
 
Adaptations were made to the Image Control and Recognition Task, both in terms of the 
items themselves and the methodology utilised when implementing the tool.   
 
4.12 Evolution of the Image Control and Recognition Task 
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) has evolved over time.  Though it was 
initially designed to measure imagery control, as development and investigation 
continued it was clear that this tool could be used to indicate abilities in more than just 
one type of mental imagery.  The work by Blajenkova and colleagues (Blajenkova, 
Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006; Blazenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010) and many others 
(Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992; Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1998; Kosslyn, 1994; 
Levine, Warach, & Farah, 1985) has provided empirical support for at least two separate 
types of what could be conceived of as „imagery control‟, namely spatial imagery and 
object imagery, and their findings are frequently buttressed with neuropsychological 
evidence indicating distinct cortical areas responsible for these separate but related 
imaginal abilities (Chapter 3).  Also, the extensive body of research which employs 
mental rotation paradigms has further highlighted these distinct capabilities in mental 
imagery ability.   
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The findings from Studies 1 and 2 support the notion that the many previous attempts to 
operationalise mental imagery may have failed to adequately address its 
multidimensional structure, and have frequently treated their chosen measure, whether it 
be an indication of vividness, control, or rotation, as though it measured „imagery‟ as a 
more general construct, when in fact these tools only measure one of aspect of imagery, 
and even that is a tenuous claim when considering the problems that exist with so many 
of the self-report tools.  A serendipitous finding which came to light while the 
psychometric properties of the tool were being scrutinised was that the ICRT can actually 
be used to address these inconsistencies, that is, the nature of the processes required to 
solve them means that they tap all of the essential features of mental imagery control and 
treat it as a multidimensional construct. 
 
The ICRT requires the engagement of a number of mental imagery processes in order to 
successfully solve them.  The protocols for administration of the ICRT can be adapted 
depending on the nature of the investigation in question, so one can use the ICRT to look 
at „overall imagery control‟, but also at the related index of „image recognition‟.  These 
two indices are themselves only moderately correlated, suggesting that the control of 
mental imagery and the ability to recognise mental images may require subtly different 
processes.  Of course, in order to be able to recognise the mental image it would have had 
to be constructed correctly in mental imagery in the first place, so it seems that image 
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recognition is one part of mental imagery, along with maintenance, rotation and 
manipulation.  It has already been shown that to achieve creative greatness requires 
greatness in a number of areas, and actually it may be precisely this amalgamation of 
superior abilities in so many realms of imagery that allows for this greatness.  It appears 
that some people are able to use the strengths that they possess in these disparate areas to 
their advantage.  As has been said, no real conscious effort appeared necessary for some 
participants to manipulate the shapes, sizes and locations of forms in imagery, nor when 
they were asked to visualise and recognise the image as a whole.  Obviously conscious 
effort was required, for being able to transform a mental image requires the initial 
encoding of the spatial relations between the stimuli (Hyun & Luck, 2007), which, in the 
case of the ICRT, sometimes increase in number, as well as the rotation of the stimulus 
itself.  However, it was observed that the participants who accurately completed the 
ICRT did not seem at all „pressured‟ during these phases, instead thoroughly enjoying the 
challenge of the tasks and relishing in their successful recognition of the images. 
 
4.13  Limitations and future research 
It was not possible to statistically investigate the number of people who took longer to 
complete each imagery task due to nature of the ICRT‟s design.  The tool was not 
initially designed to be a reaction timed task and so these data are not available.  Future 
research could seek to adapt the tool further so that investigation into the tendency to 
deliberately rehearse instructions may be undertaken.  Having said that it has been found 
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that deliberate verbal encoding of visual images may in fact inhibit the ability to 
recognise alternative versions of these patterns.  Brandimonte et al. (1992) investigated 
whether phonological recoding in STM was related to visual imagery, and provided 
further support to the claim that the visual STM is responsible for performance on image 
subtraction tasks whereby an image is memorised followed by instructions to remove 
some part of that it order to reveal a new image.  An elegant study conducted to 
investigate this found that articulatory suppression during the image encoding phase lead 
to improved image subtraction for easy-to-name stimuli, but not for stimuli that were 
difficult to name, which were included to reduce the effect of phonological coding.  This 
effect was “attributed to the influence of verbal recoding in STM on encoding in LTM” 
(1992, p. 163) and suggest that ICRT instruction rehearsal is unlikely to lead to inflated 
scores because this strategy actually decreased subsequent recognition due to diminished 
encoding of image properties.  When pictures are recoded into a phonological form, 
performance on subsequent manipulation tasks is impaired, and this may also be true 
when manipulation of mental images is attempted according to repetition of phonological 
descriptions. 
 
McAvinue and Robinson (2007) stated that treating “Psychological properties as 
measures of imagery ability... [was the] next step in the development of objective tests of 
visual imagery” (p.203), and the analyses reported in this chapter certainly go some way 
towards this.  As has been noted, there exist at least four individual imagery abilities: the 
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ability to generate high-resolution images; the ability to compose images from separate 
parts; the ability to inspect imaged patterns, and the ability to rotate objects in images 
(Mast & Kosslyn, 2002).  It can be concluded that the results indicate that the ICRT taps 
a number of of these imagery abilities.  D‟Ercole et al. (2010) also ascertain that objects 
can be named, and these names can evoke images (of objects).  They state that “Mental 
representations have measurable characteristics” (Ercole et al., 2010, p. 3), and this 
certainly appears to be the case considering the overall results of this thesis en bloc.  
D‟Ercole et al. also looked at abilities in turning verbal descriptions into mental images, 
and vice versa, and how easy this is.  It may be that strengths here are related to visual art 
and many other domains, for example, literature, architecture, mathematics, and 
engineering, professions which often require the physical or written manifestation of 
internal, possibly verbal descriptions.  Denis (2008) found that images constructed from 
verbal information could contain accurate metric information.  His argument was that 
participants less adept in spatial ability (low imagers) had differing “amounts of 
computational resources available to them” (p. 209) which reflected their inabilities to 
mentally traverse and control their mental images.  A tentative suggestion is that 
exceptional artists and professionals in creative roles take advantage of exceptional 
computational resources in such a way that those with less controlled imagery cannot.  In 
their study into the reinterpretation of visual images, Mast and Kosslyn (2002) found that 
only participants who were adept at relevant imagery processes such as resolution, 
inspection, composition, rotation, and transformation, could recognise the new images.  It 
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may be that this collection of imagery abilities are the same processes which relate to 
increased creativity. 
 
The finding which was reported above regarding that observation that articulatory 
suppression improved the ability for participants to reinterpret visual image (Brandimonte 
et al., 1992) means that any strategies to memorise the ICRT instructions may actually 
have hindered the ability imagine and amend the shapes according to the instructions.  
This is encouraging because it can be taken as validation of the ability of the tool to 
accurately assess mental imagery control skills.  Should participants attempt to rely on 
rehearsal strategies for success on the ICRT then rather than improve their score, which is 
the confound that was originally feared, this may have meant their scores suffered as a 
result, more so than if they were instructed to form an image and prevented from 
mentally articulating details about this image.  Attempts to memorise the instructions and 
repeat them to themselves may have impaired the mental image due to the articulation of 
the instructions.   
 
The ICRT originates from the Geneplore model of creative cognition and employs the 
same steps of generate and explore.  Therefore it could reasonably be expected that the 
processes underlying successful completion of this tool are likely to be related to 
creativity in future studies. 
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CHAPTER 5 FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN CREATIVITY, SCHIZOTYPY AND MENTAL IMAGERY 
11
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin by placing the subsequent study in context, introducing an 
overview of research demonstrating links between creative performance, mental imagery 
capabilities and psychopathology, with a specific focus on the construct of schizotypy.  
The present study seeks to examine possible links between the three constructs outlined 
in preceding chapters.  Theoretical decisions for inclusion of all tools then follow, 
concluding with aims, expectations, and hypotheses for the present study. 
                                                 
11
 Image provided by a participant during the Creative Visualisation Task in the subsequent study.  For 
illustration. 
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5.1.1 Creativity, Schizotypy and Mental Imagery: Further exploration and points 
clouding the debate 
The evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 showed that increased levels of unusual ideas and 
remote associations has been associated with both creative thought and schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders.  However, as was put by Fisher, Heller, and Miller (2013), “this 
activation results in innovative output in one case and communication disturbances in the 
other” (p. 70).  Nettle‟s (2006) claim that there is an evolutionary explanation for the 
persistence of psychopathology in the human gene pool, namely that creativity may lie at 
the lesser extremes of the dimensions of schizotypy, is therefore all the more compelling.  
Schizotypy, which lies on a continuum between „normality‟ and schizophrenia, is posited 
to be present in the general population (Claridge et al., 1990).  The multidimensional 
construct of schizotypy, now regarded as a personality trait (Raine, Lencz, & Mednick, 
1995), has been related to creativity in a number of studies.  These have included studies 
of eminent creativity, shared trait research investigating similarities between creative 
groups, family studies involving the relatives of psychotic patients, and laboratory studies 
investigating the role of schizotypal thought in various creative tasks.  Other studies have 
also been published, however, which suggest that there exists little or no relationship 
between schizotypy subscales and creativity (Batey & Furnham, 2008).  Some evidence 
has also been found for a negative relationship between the constructs, with Fisher et al. 
(2004) finding that positive schizotypy was positively associated with creativity while 
negative schizotypy had a negative relationship in this study.  Mixed findings have also 
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been found involving specific levels of schizotypy in artists (Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley, & 
Corr, 2006a).  Many of these studies were outlined in Chapter 2, and Chapter 6 focuses 
on imagery and creativity in visual artists, however, further exploration of the most 
pertinent findings from this body of research which may be obscuring the debate is 
presented in this chapter. 
 
Some suggest that the positive association between creativity and schizotypy is explained 
by the cognitive patterns and associations which are characteristic of psychiatric 
disorders which facilitate original thought.  As was pointed out by van Os and Verdoux 
(2003), the dimensions of pathology which characterise these disorders are not exclusive 
to any one of them.  These include previously discussed traits which have been shown to 
be related to creativity, such as delusions, overinclusive cognitive style, perceptual 
distortions and idiosyncratic thought and language.  Claridge (1995) suggested that 
studying particular illnesses and how they each relate to creativity was a somewhat 
redundant practice considering this observation. 
 
Stoneham and Coughtrey (2009) investigated whether levels of schizotypy were related 
to creativity.  „Low‟, „medium‟ and „high‟ schizotypy groups, as indicated by scores on 
the short version of the O-LIFE (Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005), attempted a group-
problem solving task.  As was predicted in the aims of their study, they found that the 
high schizotypy group employed significantly more strategies when attempting to solve 
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the task, which the authors had designed to appear initially impossible to solve.  
Additionally they found that low schizotypy groups were associated with convergent 
thinking strategies while those with higher scores in schizotypal traits were more likely to 
employ divergent strategies during problem solving, and this latter group implemented 
twice as many strategies as their lower scoring counterparts.  The finding that low 
schizotoypy was related to convergent thinking is similar to the finding that scientists and 
mathematicians are associated with reporting lower levels of schizotypal symptoms, and 
this is noted by Stoneham and Coughtrey.  These professions arguably require higher 
levels of convergent thinking than other creative specialities such as visual art and poetry, 
which are, by their nature, far less constrained. The finding that differential relationships 
for members of different creative professions may be taken as further evidence that 
schizotypal traits are not always linearly related to creative performance or ability. 
 
As has been noted, research that has shown negative associations to exist between 
creativity and schizotypal variables (e.g. Schuldberg, 1990; Claridge & Blakey, 2009).  
Batey and Furnham (2008) reported a negative relationship between cognitive 
disorganisation and creativity.  However the impulsive nonconformity and unusual 
experiences scores were positively related to their ‗aggregate‘ creativity score comprised 
of self-judged creativity, a score on the Creative Personality Scale (CPS; Gough, 1979), 
and the Biographical Inventory of Creative  Behaviours (BICB: Batey, 2007, cited in 
Batey & Furnham, 2008).  These types of creativity indices, which are all self-report 
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measures, are highly dissimilar as a method of indexing or measuring creativity as are, 
for example, divergent thinking (DT) tasks and tests of creative imagery, yet they have 
been shown to correlate with these measures.  Other researchers have demonstrated that 
self-rated creativity is sometimes related to both DT and independently rated creativity 
(Batey & Furnham, 2006; Barron, 1955, cited in Batey & Furnham, 2008; Carson, 
Higgins, & Peterson, 2005).  Batey and Furnham (2008) found negative relationships 
between introvertive anhedoina and word fleuncy, DT fluency, and rated DT.  A negative 
association was revealed between introvertive anhedonia and ‗total creativity‘, a 
composite score and self-rated creativity as measured by the CPS.  A negative 
relationship were shown to exist between cognitive disorganisation and CPS.  Dinn, et 
al., (2002) found evidence suggesting negative relationships between ‗interpersonal 
difficulties‘, which is akin to introvertive anhedonia, and DT.  The finding that 
differential relationships emerge between creativity and schizotypy depending on which 
scales are used and which traits are measured has been supported by empirical research 
which has shown that some forms of schizotypy may be counterproductive for creativity 
while others may facilitate it (Acar & Sen, 2013). 
 
In their meta-analysis into the creativity and psychopathology link, which focussed 
exclusively on psychoticism (a unidimensional trait), and not schizotypy, Acar and 
Runco (2012) found that the index of creativity explained a large amount of the variance 
in the relationship.  Overall, mean effect sizes were small (lowest r = .10, highest r = 
.20), however the effect increased when the Eysenck Psychoticism Questionnaire (EPQ, 
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Eysenck, 1995) was taken as the indicator of psychopathology and when uniqueness 
scores were included as the index of creativity (r = .50).  Acar and Runco conclude that 
the relationship between creativity and psychopathology is only likely to be observed 
occasionally and in very specific circumstances, rather than it being a “broad and 
general” (p. 37) relationship. 
 
Much of the evidence that has been cited supporting a link between positive schizotypy 
and creative thought has tended to focus on the association between creativity and 
unusual cognitive style, bizarre thoughts, even magical ideation, and often does not 
consider the extent to which the unusual perceptual and imaginal experiences may be 
relevant to the relationship.  Their relevance may, of course, be implied by a high positive 
schizotypy score, for questions measuring this construct include such items as When in 
the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there is nothing there?, Have 
you ever felt when you looked in the mirror that your face seemed different?, and On 
occasions, have you seen a person‟s face in front of you when in fact no one was there? 
(questions from the O-LIFE unusual experiences subscale; Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 
1995).  It is argued that mental imagery is involved in these unusual experiences, for in 
order to perceive something which is not there it is likely that cognitive processes 
implicated in mental imagery would necessarily be engaged.  Though, unlike other types 
of imagery which has been implicated in enhanced creative performance, these perceptual 
occurrences may not be entirely controllable.  As was outlined in Chapter 3 (section 
3.1.3), the neural correlates of imagery and perception overlap to some degree (Ganis, 
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Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004), and, notably, it is the cognitive control processes that are 
comparable in terms of neural machinery.  The relevance of mental imagery to the 
schizotypy-creativity relationship appears to have been largely overlooked. 
 
Positive schizotypy has been linked to creative performance in a number of studies 
(Claridge et al., 1996; Venables, 1995; Brod, 1997).  Oldham and Morris (1995) describe 
positive schizotypy as possession of an idiosyncratic style and strange and eccentric 
behaviours.  Mason, Claridge, and Jackson (1995) found that creative art students scored 
higher on the positive schizotypy scale of unusual experiences when compared with 
humanities students.  Those scoring highly on scales of unusual experiences often 
experience anomalous perceptions of the world surrounding them and may have a 
propensity to fantasise.  A recent study by Fisher, Heller and Miller (2013) indicated that 
high scores on a positive schizotypy measure named „Odd Beliefs‟ was correlated with 
high scores on the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & 
Muris, 2001).  People who score high in this trait are characterised by making unusual or 
„loose‟ associations between ideas and may find it hard to express these verbally.  
Perhaps their imagery enables them to communicate these ideas more easily if they do so 
visually, and perhaps this is what ultimately leads to increased creatively in this group.  A 
disengagement from reality, thought and perception characterises positive schizotypy, 
and disengagement of this nature is purportedly conducive to creativity (Schuldberg, 
2000-2001).  The tendency or requirement to create something that is novel and 
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surprising may benefit from experiencing and thinking about the world in an unusual 
way.  These studies seem to illustrate the contribution of this unusual and idiosyncratic 
thought within creative domains, especially among visual artists.  A tentative argument is 
made that this propensity for visual artists to engage in this type of thought may be 
somehow influenced by unusual imaginal experiences. 
   
Another trait linking schizotypy and creative thought which has been briefly described is 
that of overinclusive thinking (Chapter 2, section 2.2.2).  This is characterised by the 
breaking of conceptual boundaries and incorporation of irrelevant ideas which may 
ordinarily be ignored.  This may lead to the generation of more original ideas due to the 
tendency to link remote associations and to therefore exhibit a more unique and often 
abstract style of thought (Eysenck, 1992).  Carson, Peterson, and Higgins‟ (2003) meta 
analyses suggested that those high in schizotypy appear to share the same overinclusive 
cognitive style as is often observed in highly creative individuals, and that this becomes 
apparent through reduced latent inhibition.  Similarly, Abraham and Windmann (2008) 
suggest those with increased schizotypy scores exhibit poorer cognitive inhibitory 
control.  It may be that the mental imagery associated with schizotypal thought, or, to 
coin a term, schizotypal imagery, is related to creativity, but perhaps it is not the control 
of mental imagery that counts here, but rather its nature and quality.  The tendency to 
attend to usually inhibited, possibly irrelevant information, or even the inability to ignore 
that which is only distantly related, may lead to an increased likelihood of unusual 
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associations, ideas and conceptualisations.  Eysenck‟s theory suggests that overinclusive 
thinking may result in a cognitive style characterised by an unusually wide conception of 
relevance (Abraham & Windmann, 2008).  Are these creative ideas and novel 
conceptualisations facilitated by mental imagery?  Perhaps the tendency to fantasise and 
to engage in such unusual, elaborate and creative thought is aided or even encouraged by 
imaginal processes and abilities. 
 
Introvertive anhedonia refers to flat affect and an isolated, often negative attributional 
style (Claridge, 1997).  Individuals scoring high on scales measuring this factor are often 
socially withdrawn and introverted.  Researchers such as such as Abraham et al., (2007), 
Schuldberg, (2000-2001), Dinn, Harris, Aycicegi, Greene, and Andover (2002), Nelson 
and Rawlings, (2010) have all found negative relationships between introvertive 
anhedonia and creativity, as measured by divergent thinking tasks and self-reports.  This 
is reflected in Acar and Sen‟s (2013) meta-analysis which looked at 45 studies that 
directly analysed the relationship of introvertive anhedonia to creativity, as opposed to 
general „psychoticism‟ or psychopathology.  They found that introvertive anhedonia and 
creativity were generally negatively related, however the effect size was small (r = -.09).  
Tsakanikos and Claridge (2004) showed decreased verbal fluency in individuals who had 
introvertive anhedonia scores which were one standard deviation above the mean.  Some 
research which was cited earlier by Cox and Leon (1999) found a positive relationship 
between divergent thinking (the Alternative Uses Task) and scores on introvertive 
  220 
anhedonia scales.  Again it can be seen here that the relationships between schizotypal 
thought and creative performance are convoluted and depend largely on how the 
respective constructs are measured, as was outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2). 
 
Another observation related to overlapping traits concerns magical ideation, which is not 
only found in persons with high unusual experiences but also in those who report 
frequent cognitive disorganisation (Eckbald & Chapman, 1983).  Cognitive 
disorganisation and introvertive anhedonia also both load with introversion in factor 
analytic studies.  Loaded alongside extroversion are unusual experiences and impulsive 
nonconformity (Acar & Sen, 2013).  It is also claimed from these meta-analytic works 
that schizotypal traits that load alongside extroversion may be conducive to creativity, 
whereas those traits which load onto introversion may potentially be detrimental to the 
creative process (Acar & Sen, 2013).  This is in contrast to Feist‟s (1998) finding that 
social isolation, an introvertive trait, was important for creativity and was found to 
distinguish both artists and scientists from less creative groups.  Findings such as these 
highlight once again the difficulties with research into creativity and schizotypy.  This 
thesis does not concentrate on The Big Five factor of personality (Costa & McCrae, 
1992).  However this observation that introversion and extroversion have relationships 
with schizotypy, alongside indications that personality factors have their own 
relationships with creativity (Huges, Furnham, & Batey, 2013), which may differ 
according to creative profession and vary depending on how creativity is operationalised 
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(Batey, Furhman, & Safiullina, 2010), once again accentuates the complexities relevant 
to the debate.  Naturally, the constructs which are related to creativity are not mutually 
exclusive of others.  However what is interesting, but what perhaps makes this 
investigation so complicated, is that many of these constructs are associated with each 
other as well as having independent contributions to creative thought and production.  
This observation is important because it may highlight why so many inconsistencies and 
conflicting findings have been found in this area of research, but also it supports the view 
that differential psychological profiles may be found amongst disparate creative groups, 
such as the finding reported earlier that scientists and visual artists differ significantly in 
their psychopathological experiences and characteristics (Post, 1994, 1996; Ludwig, 
1995; Storr, 2000; Feist, 1998).   
 
An experience of social anxiety may be prevalent in individuals experiencing cognitive 
disorganisation, with attentional deficits and neuroticism also common symptoms.  This 
may have negative associations with measures of creative thought production, as well as, 
arguably, mental imagery control, and negative associations between cognitive 
disorganisation and creativity have indeed been reported (Batey & Furnham, 2008).  Brod 
(1997) reported that disorganised thought was associated with a type of open-ended 
creativity due to a flow of ideas which may be difficult to constrain and control, and 
related this to poetry, literature, dance and musical creative domains.  An inability to 
„take hold of‟ disordered thought, however, may impair the ability to generate plausible 
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responses in creativity tasks, and the ability to control chaotic thought may facilitate more 
success at creative tasks.  Imagery control may be relevant for this.  However, in a study 
by Burch et al. (2006a), cognitive disorganisation scores were shown to be significantly 
higher in visual artists than the non-artists.  Nettle (2005) found no differences between 
non-artists, „hobbyists‟, „serious‟, and „professional‟ visual artists in cognitive 
disorganisation, though the lowest scores on cognitive disorganisation, unusual 
experiences and impulsive nonconformity were observed in non-artists and non-poets, 
and were highest in the serious artist and poet groups.  The professional visual artists and 
poets were slightly lower on all of these traits, suggesting once again that extremely 
pronounced schizotypy may actually be detrimental to exceptional creativity.   
 
The impulsive nonconformity factor of schizotypy is characterised by extroverted and 
impulsive behaviours and a lack of adherence to social norms (Claridge & Beech, 1995).  
The inclination to generate responses which others may consider „taboo‟ or inappropriate 
may be engendered by those high on the impulsive nonconformity scale, though these are 
rarely considered to be rated as „creative‟ (Brod, 1997).  According to Brod, the 
extravertive nature of impulsive noncomformist traits may be related to a heightened urge 
for creative expression, and it is noted that unusual experiences also „loads‟ with 
extroversion in factor analyses.  Those high in impulsive nonconformity may be more 
willing to express „shocking‟ or „rude‟ ideas which others may censor (Acar & Sen, 
2013), and may in some cases lead to heightened creativity scores for persons high in this 
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trait.  It is unclear what relationship, if any, may be revealed between impulsive 
nonconformity and mental imagery control.  Perhaps a controlled imaginal ability could 
facilitate a more elaborate imagination or suggestive imagery. 
 
This section has outlined complications and considerations which are relevant to the final 
two studies reported in this thesis.  These relate to overlaps and similarities between the 
cognitions which are frequently associated with creativity and the next section aims to 
further illustrate how visual imaginal processes may be relevant to the generation of 
creative products. 
 
5.1.2 Image Generation and Creative Cognition 
The image generation approach to creativity often utilises a specific type of creative 
imagery task requiring respondents to mentally combine geometric and alphanumeric 
shapes and letters, during which time they may engage in „combinatory play‟ in imagery 
(Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1999).  This involves the mental manipulation of images 
internally, and in the generation of an image or mental picture, often according to a list of 
predetermined criteria.  These criteria purportedly „map onto‟ creativity as they both may 
be conceived of along originality/novelty and practicality/usefulness dimensions.  
Creative cognition occurs when original and useful products are conceived and 
formulated in imagery without perceiving any concurrent stimuli, relying solely on 
internal representations (Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995).  The Geneplore model supposes 
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that first, one engages in the generative phase, where mental images („preinventive 
forms‟) are synthesised and combined in varying ways, which is subsequently followed 
by an exploration phase, where the mental image is restructured in order to discover 
some unanticipated form or invention (Finke & Slayton, 1988).  Mental imagery is of 
course utilised during tasks such as these, and the ability to control mental imagery 
during both of these phases would surely be of benefit.  It is suggested by Morrison and 
Wallace (2001) that the „emergent patterns‟ resulting from these mental imaging 
techniques may be crucial to elucidation of the imagery-creativity due to the imaging 
abilities which are involved which seem pertinent for creative discovery.  They gave 
participants the directed mental synthesis task (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989) and 
addressed both spatial scores and skills in mental image naming.  They found a positive 
correlation between the ability to name the image before drawing it and the accuracy of 
the imagined images (r = .55, p < .005
12
). 
 
When considering the evidence presented thus far it can be seen that the relationships to 
creativity of both schizotypy and mental imagery are unclear.   The implication of certain 
types of mental imagery in the phenomenology of positive schizotypy cannot be 
disregarded.  However, while it is possible that the imagery experienced by those scoring 
highly on measures of unusual experiences could be related to creative imagery and 
productivity, it may not be that this imagery is controlled, in fact, the descriptions suggest 
                                                 
12
 Exact p values were not published. 
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a lack of control over the characteristic perceptual and imaginal anomalies.  Perhaps one 
could even describe this imagery as „uncontrolled‟.  It may not be that imagery control is 
directly related to schizotypy, but that different types of imagery, both controlled and 
uncontrolled, are differentially related to creativity.  This may manifest in relationships 
between both unusual schizotypal experiences and creativity, and mental imagery and 
creativity.  It may even be that controlled imagery is related to different creativity tasks 
when compared to the schizotypal (uncontrolled) imagery often reported by those scoring 
highly on measures of unusual experiences. 
 
5.2 Rationale 
As has been outlined above, a items measuring unusual experiences enquire about such 
things as seeing shapes and forms in the dark, and whether participants‟ daydreams seem 
so true to life that [they] sometimes think they are real.  Another item asks …have you 
seen a person‟s face in front of you when in fact no one was there? (Mason, Claridge, & 
Jackson, 1995).  It seems fair to suppose that a „yes‟ response to these questions would 
necessarily involve elements of mental imagery, though a lack of control often appears to 
accompany these experiences.  The possibility that the associations seen in the literature 
implicating positive schizotypy in creativity may indirectly reflect an association between 
unusual schizotypal imagery, as well as unusual ideation.   
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Administration of the measures selected for this study (outlined below) will allow the 
relationships between mental image ability and creative performance to be investigated, 
as well as the enabling the scrutiny of the imaginal characteristics of schizotypal thought.  
The association of schizotypal traits to both imagery control and creativity will be 
analysed.  The thought processes typically associated with positive schizotypy may 
engender creativity because they allow abstract, unique and overinclusive thought, but 
the less controlled imaginal processes that are also characteristic for those high unusual 
experiences could also play a role in this association.   
 
There are problems that emerge when evaluating previous research and this is due to the 
types of tests commonly used in these studies.  As was reviewed in Chapter 2 (section 
2.5), both schizotypy and creativity are multidimensional constructs, and this is reflected 
both in the multifarious ways of describing and measuring each, as well as the differential 
results often reported.  There are a great number of tools which purport to measure 
schizotypal behaviours, tendencies and personality traits, and almost as many examples 
of divergent and creative thinking tasks, focusing on both visual and verbal creativity, 
and creative imagery and mental synthesis tasks (see Chapters 1, section 1.2.2 and 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.1).  Somewhat unsurprisingly perhaps, given the previous 
discussions, the same can be said for tools measuring imagery ability, some focusing on 
vividness, some on manipulation or rotation, some self-report, others performance-based 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3). 
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5.3 Justification for inclusion of all measures 
The tools and tasks which have been selected have been chosen in an attempt to uncover 
whether a collection of traits, characteristics, and abilities are related to enhanced creative 
performance.  The qualities of mental imagery control that are tapped by the ICRT, 
namely image manipulation, mental rotation and reinterpretation of mental images, are 
likely to account for much of the ability to score highly in tasks which employ image 
generation protocols, and the creative task has been chosen to reflect this as instructions 
also require participants to create something previously unanticipated in their mental 
imagery.  The idiosyncratic ideation and cognitive connections often made by those high 
in positive schizotypy, along with the unusual perceptual and imagined experiences also 
characteristic of these individuals, may mean that more unusual, and potentially therefore 
more creative responses are given by these participants. 
 
Image Control and Recognition Task 
As well as administering the Image Control and Recognition Task (Irving, Barry, 
LeBoutillier, & Westley, 2011) to further investigate its psychometric properties, the 
influence of mental imagery control on creative performance is also of interest.  
Additionally, the question of whether mental imagery is related to any factor of 
schizotypy may also be investigated by the inclusion of this imagery task, as well s those 
listed below.  Theoretically, positive schizotypal traits such as anomalous perceptions and 
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hallucinations may be associated with enhanced mental imagery, and cognitive 
disorganisation may be related to having less control over mental imagery.  Any 
associations found here may be investigated further in relation to creativity.   
 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire and Test of Visual Imagery Control 
The literature suggests that self-report mental imagery questionnaires and performance-
based tools do not relate to one another, however, self-report tools are often associated 
(Burton, 2003).  That the types of tools do not correlate strongly may be due to respective 
their psychometric properties, and could reflect that fact that the self-report tools may 
measure different aspects of mental imagery than do the objective measures of mental 
imagery and spatial ability.   
 
Morrison and Wallace (2001) used Finke and Slayton‟s (1988) mental synthesis task as 
an indication of divergent thinking and this index was shown to be  significantly related 
to the VVIQ-2 (an expanded version of the VVIQ) however these scores were unrelated 
to any measure of creativity (judged creativity of drawings and scores on the Creative 
Behaviour Inventory, CBI).  Spatial abilities, as measured by the Surface Development 
Task (SDT, Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976, cited in Morrison and Wallace, 
2001) were mildly associated with DT production (r = .21).  They were also significantly 
related to production of creative images, again suggesting an importance of image 
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controllability in creative productivity.  These authors also looked at mental image 
naming ability and found that this was mildly related to VVIQ scores and was related to 
DT (r = .46).  The Test of Visual Imagery Control (TVIC, Gordon, 1950) has also been 
found to correlate with „mental disorder‟ (Costello, 1956, 1957) and also with creative 
self-perceptions (Khatena, 1975b), so it would be interesting to study any relationship 
this tool may have with both schizotypy and creative visualisation.  These self-report 
imagery tools are included to shed further light on the relationships just described, and 
also to investigate the relationship(s) they each may have with creative performance and 
schizotypy (as mentioned above).   
 
Creative Visualisation Task  
By utilising an adapted version of Finke and Slayton‟s Mental Synthesis Task (MST13, 
1988), alongside the O-LIFE and a performance based measure of mental image control, 
it will be possible to see whether schizotypal traits, cognitions and behaviours are related 
to highly creative output.  Additionally, it will be possible to investigate findings reported 
in the literature regarding the ability to control and manipulate mental imagery and the 
relationship that this has to creativity. The creativity task chosen for Study 4 requires 
participants to mentally combine shapes and make images and pictures from no specific 
category, as opposed to being provided with object categories, that is, types of object 
such as tool, or toy.  Participants must mentally combine standard shapes into „interesting 
                                                 
13
 herein referred to as the Creative Visualisation Task (CVT). 
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objects and scenes‟.  This task will assess whether highly creative responses are 
associated with high positive schizotypy, and whether mental imagery control has any 
association with the type of schizotypal thought often related to creative performance. 
 
The Geneplore model of creative cognition describes two phases which are crucial in the 
creative process, the generation phase, where images are combined and „played with‟ in 
imagery, followed by an exploration phase, which is typified by consideration of the 
mental image after which decisions are made about this creative „product‟ (see above, 
section 5.1.2).  The ICRT could be also be conceptualised as utilising combinatory and 
exploratory imagery, the former throughout the task while listening to the instructions, 
and the latter when attempting to recognise the mental image before drawing it.  
Although this combinatory phase is guided by the experimenter, there are still two 
discrete phases in these imagery tasks: those who successfully complete these imagery 
tasks have combined mental images and then, presumably, in order to recognise and 
name it they must explore that mental image in some way.  Associations are expected to 
emerge between imagery control and creativity as a result of these similarities. 
 
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences 
Tools which measure schizotypy aim to either measure the whole schizotypal construct, 
such as the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE, Mason & 
Claridge, 2005), the Schizotypy Traits Questionnaire (STA, Claridge & Broks, 1984), the 
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Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991), or they may focus on specific 
schizotypal behaviours such as the Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales (Winterstein et al., 
2011), which measure Perceptual Aberration, Magical Ideation, Physical Anhedonia, 
and Social Anhedonia.  Some researchers treat schizotypy as a single unidimensional 
construct, rather than looking at individual dimensions of schizotypy, however, taking 
this approach would not be best suited to studying its relationship to creativity.  As has 
been described in previous sections (Chapter 2, section 2.4), it appears that differential 
relationships exist between those with varying levels of schizotypal traits and creative 
performance.  Important complexities related to the interconnectedness of these two 
multidimensional constructs may not have been unraveled had individual schizotypal 
factors (subscales) not been considered, and a multidimensional view of schizotypy will 
therefore be taken with the inclusion of the O-LIFE reflecting this. 
 
5.4 Aims and expectations 
The construct validity of the ICRT will be explored because the CVT utilises similar 
stimuli and may therefore require the utilisation of similar cognitive processes.  In light 
of the evidence presented thus far, it is a reasonable assumption to make that it would not 
be possible to obtain high creativity scores in tasks employing image generation protocols 
unless one also had controlled mental imagery due to the requirements of these tasks to 
manipulate, recombine and reinterpret images in imagery (Finke, 1990, 1996; Finke & 
Slayton, 1988; Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989), and so the expectation is that scores on the 
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CVT will correlate with ICRT scores.  The TVIC is expected to correlate with the other 
self-report measure of imagery, the VVIQ.  The VVIQ measures imagery vividness, 
which is theoretically different to imagery „control‟.  Again however, though not 
intending to measure imagery control itself, the VVIQ does require participants to 
manipulate and amend mental images, so some relation may emerge between these 
measures due to the spatial imagery processes which are required for each, though any 
association is not expected to be strong.  This is not only due to the fact they aim to „tap‟ 
subtly different constructs, but also because of the reported problems inherent in self-
report imagery tools of this type (see Chapter 3, section 3.1.1).  According to 
considerable anecdotal and empirical evidence, the utilisation of controlled mental 
imagery in creative endeavour is widespread amongst both eminent and non-eminent 
creative individuals (see Chapter 1, section 1.1.1).  For this reason, it is expected that 
significant relationships will emerge between imagery control scores and those obtained 
on the creativity task. 
 
Whether schizotypal thought and behaviour, as measured by the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 
1995) has any association with mental imagery will be investigated.  Some of the traits 
characteristic of positive schizotypy, such as the attribution of magical ideations, 
hallucinatory experiences and obscurities relating to everyday items and perceptions, may 
be related to mental imagery due to their inherent imaginal characteristics.  Whether 
increased scores on cognitive disorganisation are associated with increased imagery 
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control or creativity scores will be also studied, as will associations between introvertive 
anhedonia and creative output.  Impulsive nonconformity may engender unusual output 
in the creativity task, and whether these products are rated as creative will be studied. 
 
5.4.1 Research Aims 
1. To investigate whether scores on the Image Control and Recognition Task are 
associated with scores on either the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire or 
the Test of Visual Imagery Control, and to ascertain the interrelationships 
between these objective and self-report mental imagery tools. 
 
2. To establish whether there exist relationships between creative visualisation, 
mental imagery control, self-reported imagery abilities, and indices of schizotypy. 
 
3. To understand whether positive schizotypal traits are associated with enhanced 
creative performance. 
 
4. To investigate whether it is possible to predict creativity scores from imagery 
abilities and levels of schizotypy on the four subscales. 
 
5. To study the possibility of both linear and non-linear relationships between 
creative performance, mental imagery, and schizotypy. 
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5.4.2 Hypotheses 
1. Scores between objective and self-report measures of mental imagery will not be 
associated, while the two self-report tools will be associated with each other. 
2. Those who have strong mental imagery control will out-perform those with less 
enhanced mental imagery control in the creative visualisation task. 
3. Positive schizotypy (unusual experiences) is predicted to be associated with 
higher creativity scores. 
4. Negative schizotypy (introvertive anhedonia) will show negative relationships 
with creative performance. 
5. Cognitive disorganisation will be negatively related to mental imagery control 
with a tentative hypothesis that high cognitive disorganisation may be associated 
with lower creative visualisation abilities. 
6. It will be possible to predict creativity scores from levels of mental imagery 
ability and positive schizotypal thought (unusual experiences). 
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5.5 Method  
5.5.1 Participants 
The participants were 96 undergraduate first year psychology students from a North 
London university (70 females, 26 males) with an average age of M = 29.9 years (SD = 
6.5).  Participants took part in the study in exchange for course credit for their 
Psychology Research Methods course.  They responded to emails and notices posted 
around the psychology department, the only selection criterion being that English was 
their first language. 
 
 
5.5.2 Materials 
All tasks in the battery were presented in pen and paper format.   
Image Control and Recognition Task  
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) is a collection of 16 imagery tasks 
which together comprise an objective performance-based measure of mental imagery 
control, with participants manipulating common geometric and alphanumeric shapes 
according to verbal instructions (see Chapters 3 and 4).  When a participant follows the 
instructions correctly for each of the 16 imagery tasks the shapes join to make a 
recognisable figure.   
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An example previously outlined (CHAPTER 3, section 3.4.2) is provided below, this 
time along with a depiction of the intended image (Figure 5.1). 
 
1.  Imagine a tall thin rectangle so it is standing vertically  
2.  Add a very short vertical line to the bottom of it so it looks like it‘s sticking out  
3.  Rotate the entire shape together 180°, i.e. turn it upside down 
4.  Attach a teardrop to the top of the shape so that it is touching it 
 
 
  
Figure 5.1 
The four-stage ‘candle’ Image Control and Recognition Task 
 
Scoring: Participants were awarded 1 point for correctly drawing the image and 0 for 
producing an incorrect drawing, high total scores therefore indicating controlled imagery 
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(ICRT Total).  An additional index of imagery was provided by summing the number of 
images the participant was able to recognise and name from their imagery before drawing 
(ICRT Recognition). 
 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, VVIQ (Marks, 1973, (Appendix K), fully 
described in CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3) is a self-report tool which is said to have 
good internal consistency and moderate test-retest reliability (White et al., 1977).  This 
tool requires participants to indicate on a 1-5 Likert-type scale how vivid visual images of 
certain scenarios generated from memory are, with 1 being perfectly clear and vivid as 
normal vision, and 5 being no image at all, you only “know” that you are thinking of an 
object.  The 16-item tool contains items which require the visualisation of people and 
scenes and a mean of these ratings is calculated.  The questionnaire is divided into four 
sections for which the participant must imagine and answer questions about a mental 
image of a relative or friend, followed by a rising sun, then a regularly-visited shop and 
finally a country scene.  Example items from the VVIQ are as follows (with the 
subsection in brackets): 
 
The exact contour of their face, head, shoulders and body (relative or friend) 
The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness (rising sun) 
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A window display including colours, shapes and details of individual items for 
sale (familiar shop) 
The contours of the landscape (country scene) 
 
Participants completed the VVIQ twice, once with their eyes open and again with their 
eyes closed, and the ordering of this was randomised in presentation. 
 
Scoring: Mean scores for each version of administration (eyes-open and eyes-closed) 
were calculated for each participant (VVIQ-O and VVIQ-C). 
 
Test of Visual Imagery Control  
An adapted version of the Test of Visual Imagery Control, (TVIC, Gordon, 1950, 
Appendix O) was administered to participants.  The 13-item tool asks participants to rate 
how easy it is to control mental images involving a car.  In the original version of the tool 
„yes‟ or „no‟ responses indicated whether participants found it possible to manipulate the 
images.  However, in the present study a 5 point Likert-type scale was provided, with 1 
indicating no control and 5 indicating complete control.  The first three questions are as 
follows:  
1. Visualise a car standing in the road in front of a house 1........2.........3.........4.........5 
2. Visualise it in colour   1........2.........3.........4.........5 
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3. Visualise it in a different colour  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
 
The questions go on to describe changing environments and scenarios in which to 
imagine the car and to rate the ease of control of the image. 
 
Scoring:  A mean of the ratings provides the score for this tool, a high scoring indicating 
high self-reported imagery control (TVIC Mean).  
 
Creative Visualisation Task  
The Creative Visualisation Task, CVT (Finke & Slayton, 1988) requires participants to 
combine and manipulate geometric and alphanumeric figures into „images, objects or 
scenes‟.  The CVT is a measure of visual mental synthesis originally designed to 
investigate whether it was possible to make „creative discoveries‟ in mental imagery, and 
a modified version was employed in the present study.  Participants were given 10 sets of 
three stimulus shapes instead of generating multiple responses using the same three 
shapes.  This was so that participants were presented with a larger assortment of stimuli 
and meant that if they were unsuccessful with one set of shapes they still had other 
chances to make something with subsequent new sets.  Participants were shown 15 
geometric and alphanumeric forms (see Figure 5.2) and were instructed to familiarise 
themselves with these basic shapes and the names which described them. 
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Figure 5.2 
Parts used for the creative visualisation task. From Finke and Slayton (1988). 
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Figure 5.2 shows the shapes used in the CVT from which three were selected at random 
for each trial.  A restriction set by Finke and Slayton was observed, which was that the 
first 10 items which consist of simple geometric shapes, horizontal and vertical lines, and 
some capital letters (top two lines of Figure 5.2 were three times as likely to be selected 
as the last 5 forms).  The reason was the same as that provided by Finke and Slayton and 
is that the bottom line of Figure 5.2 includes more complex forms and the prevalence of 
more simple forms was desirable.  Two examples of recognisable patterns were provided 
so that the participants had an idea of what the task entailed and are as follows.  Example 
set 1 consisted of a capital letter „L‟, a circle, and a square and was accompanied by the 
image in 5.3 (a).  Set 2 included a horizontal line, a capital letter „L‟, and a capital letter 
„T‟ and the image is below in 5.3 (b). 
 
      
(a) ‘Flag’    (b) ‘Letter E’ 
Figure 5.3 
Examples provided with the CVT practice trials 
 
The individual forms comprising each example image were pointed out as well as being 
highlighted in the image itself.  These examples illustrated the ways the shapes could be 
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manipulated though were not particularly imaginative so as not to provide participants 
with ideas for their own creative generations.  Once the participant was informed of the 
three forms for that trial they were asked to close their eyes and combine them in their 
imagination to create an interesting object or scene.  All three of the shapes had to be 
used and it was not permissible to change or alter their basic form though they could be 
rotated and altered in size.  They were given 2 minutes for each task.  On the occasion 
that the same shape was chosen more than once, participants were instructed to use that 
shape the designated number of times.  Should they come up with more than one image 
for each set of three forms then they were instructed to choose and report the one they felt 
was the best.  This reflects recent findings which showed that when asked to choose what 
they considered to be their „Top 2‟ responses on divergent thinking tasks, objective 
ratings of these responses often correlated with these subjective ratings (Silvia et al., 
2008).  Although participants were not asked to deliberately consider this, in cases where 
more than one image was created this convention was implied.  Participants were not told 
to be creative when completing this task.  Before drawing each mental image, 
participants were required to record a title for it in the response booklet.  This provided 
certainty that participants were combining and creating images using mental imagery and 
not discovering creative images from their drawings.  If they were unable to think of 
anything they were instructed to leave the space designated to that particular trial on the 
response sheet blank.  This was repeated for 10 sets of three stimulus shapes. 
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Scoring:  In a modification to Finke and Slayton‟s scoring procedure, scoring for the 
CVT was done by two judges.  This is because the close proximity and discussion during 
the experimental sessions meant that impartiality when scoring would not be possible as 
all sessions were conducted by the researcher and not a naive experimenter.  Each image 
was first rated for acceptability, serving as a filter; if the shapes were not suitability 
represented in the picture, had been changed, or were repeated or absent then participants 
received a score of zero and no further scoring was conducted on that image.  Inter-rater 
reliability between the judges for acceptability was high, r = .83, p < .001.  The 
acceptable images were then scored according to two further criteria.  Firstly 
correspondence, where images were rated from 1 (impossible to identify) to 5 (easy to 
identify), gave an indication of how well the drawing related to the title which had been 
provided by the participant before they drew it (inter-rater reliability, r = .72, p < .001).  
Responses which received correspondence ratings of 4 or 5 were then further scored on a 
scale of 1 (not very creative) to 5 (highly creative), providing a creativity score (inter-
rater reliability, r = .78, p < .001).  These ratings were summed resulting in a potential 
range for creativity indices of 0 - 50 (10 trials).  As a far as can be ascertained (as no 
descriptive statistics were reported in their study) this is an additional modification to 
Finke and Slayton‟s scoring convention and meant that each participant received creative 
imagery scores on a continuous scale, rather than nominal ratings of „creative pattern‟, 
„non-creative pattern‟, „wrong parts‟, and „no pattern‟.  Scores could then be taken as an 
overall measure of these participants‟ creative visualisation (CVT Creativity).  Judges 
were not provided with definitions of creativity but used their own understanding of what 
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was and was not a creative response when judging the drawings produced in the task 
(Morrison & Wallace, 2001).  Finke and Slayton hadn‟t specified how to judge the 
patterns for creativity, and when Anderson and Helstrup (1993) used the same task they 
also asked their judges to rate the patterns generated by participants as „creative‟ or „non-
creative‟, again, providing no definition or predetermined criteria for classifying an 
image as such. 
 
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences 
The short version of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences, O-
LIFE (Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005) was the measure of schizotypy for the present 
study.  This is a 43-item questionnaire which measures four schizotypal subscales and has 
been designed for use with non-clinical populations.  The four dimensions which are 
measured by this tool are unusual experiences ([UnEx] positive-schizotypy), cognitive 
disorganization ([CogDis] disorganized-schizotypy/social anxiety), impulsive 
nonconformity ([ImpNon] asocial-schizotypy) and introvertive anhedonia ([IntAn] 
negative-schizotypy), all of which have been defined previously in the thesis (Chapter 2, 
and in section 5.1.1 of this chapter).  The tool has been found to be a reliable and valid 
measure for assessing levels of schizotypy (Nelson, Seal, Pantelis, & Phillips, 2013).  The 
symptoms measured by the tool are synonymous with schizophrenia, positive aspects 
including pseudo-hallucinations, delusions, disorganised symptoms, thought disorder and 
bizarre behaviour, with the negative symptoms including alogia (poverty of speech), 
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apathy and amotivation.  Schizotypy is dimensional and its prevalence ranges worldwide 
from 0.8% - 31.4% for those experiencing at least one psychotic symptom, and those 
reporting one symptom were associated with poorer health status.  A linear decrement in 
health was found to depend on the number of schizotypal symptoms reported (World 
Health Organisation [WHO] Survey, n = 256,445, Neuvo, et al., 2012, cited in Nelson, et 
al., 2013).  The O-LIFE is a multiscale tool and negative components (introvertive 
anhedonia) tend not to be related to any of the more positive aspects (unusual 
experiences, cognitive disorganisation and impulsive nonconformity).  Example items 
from each subscale follow: 
 
Unusual experiences 
When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there is nothing there? 
Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them? 
Have you ever thought that you had special, almost magical powers? 
 
Cognitive disorganisation 
Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time? 
Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts? 
Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams? 
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Introvertive anhedonia 
Are there very few things that you have ever enjoyed doing? 
Do you feel very close to your friends? 
Are you much too independent to get involved with other people? 
 
Impulsive nonconformity 
Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average sort of person? 
Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking? 
Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people suggest even though you 
know they are right? 
 
Scoring: Each item was scored 1 for „yes‟ and 2 for „no‟, with 8 items being reversed-
scored (5 on the introvertive anhedonia subscale and 3 on the impulsive nonconformity 
subscale).  A score for each subscale was generated (UnEx Total, CogDis Total, IntAn 
Total and ImpNon Total), higher scores indicating a greater number of schizotypal 
experiences. 
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5.5.3 Procedure 
Participants completed all measures in individual sessions lasting no longer than 1.5 
hours.  They read an introduction sheet and gave their informed consent (Appendices O 
and P).  The atmosphere in these sessions was kept non-test like and the participants were 
encouraged to have fun and to try and enjoy the activities.  The battery of tests was 
administered in testing cubicles which were private and allowed for maximum 
concentration.  The creativity (CVT) and imagery control task (ICRT) were administered 
first due to their more cognitively demanding characteristics and to minimise fatigue.  
Participants always completed the CVT before the ICRT.  This was because it would be 
possible to use images from successful completion of ICRT items as ideas for their image 
generations in the CVT as both tasks utilise largely the same set of shapes and letters.  
The ICRT was completed at a table sitting at a comfortable distance to ensure no 
sketching took place during the task and to ensure the answer booklet was completed 
correctly.  The O-LIFE, VVIQ and TVIC were presented in pen and paper format 
questionnaires and were completed at a table away from the examiner to reduce any 
feelings of discomfort or inhibition resulting from being observed.  Presentation of all 
these measures was randomised.  Participants were verbally debriefed after completing 
the tasks and were given the opportunity to ask any questions.  A debrief sheet (Appendix 
R) was also provided which outlined the full nature of the study and provided contact 
details for further communications if required. 
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Data reduction    
The initial screening process corrected the dataset for errors and missing data.  The VVIQ 
ratings were reversed so that 1 = not vivid at all and 5 = highly vivid in order to anchor it 
in-line with other measures which awarded high scores for „better‟ imagery.  With 
existing response options ranging from 1 = Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
to 5 = No image at all, you only “know” that you‟re thinking of an object, those who 
received high overall scores on the VVIQ were those who reported having poor mental 
imagery vividness, which seemed counterintuitive and this reversal ensured ease of 
interpretation.  The mean ratings for each version (VVIQ-O and VVIQ-C) were strongly 
positively correlated with r(94)= .58, p < .001, and a mean of these two scores was 
therefore taken as an overall measure of self-reported imagery vividness (VVIQ Mean).   
 
Visual binning:  Where median and quartile splits have been calculated, the visual 
binning function (in SPSS version 21
©
) was utilised.  This command makes cut points in 
the data according to how you wish your variable to be computed and displayed, and is a 
common technique when creating „high‟ and „low‟ groups for comparison (Meyers, 
Gamst, & Guarino, 2013). 
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5.6 Results 
None of the variables were skewed or kurtoic.  This was demonstrated by no standard 
error of skew or kurtosis being anywhere close to 2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989) (SE of 
skew = .249 for all variables; SE of kurtosis = .493 for all variables).   
 
Reliability analyses on the O-LIFE subscales 
Four reliability analyses were conducted on the items relating to each of the schizotypy 
subscales and these are reported below. 
 
UNUSUAL EXPERIENCES  
The 12 items measuring unusual experiences (UnEx) had an initial Cronbach‟s α = .68.  
Not all UnEx items correlated with the total scale (lower r = .12, higher r = .47) and the 
removal of 1 item („When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though 
there is nothing there?‟) marginally increased Cronbach‟s α = .69 and so all items were 
retained in the subsequent analyses. 
 
COGNITIVE DISORGANISATION  
The cognitive disorganisation (CogDis) scale is comprised of 11 items and initially 
Cronbach‟s α = .68.  Some items correlated poorly with the total score (lower r = .03, 
higher r = .45) and removal of 1 item („Do you dread going into a room by yourself 
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where other people have already gathered and are talking?‟) increased the value of 
Cronbach‟s alpha to α =.70 and so this item was removed from subsequent analyses. 
 
INTROVERTIVE ANHEDONIA 
Ten items measure the introvertive anhedonia (IntAn) factor.  Initially Cronbach‟s α = .60 
and so an item-by-item analysis was conducted to determine whether alpha could be 
improved.  This analysis found that the removal of 3 items („Do you love having your 
back massaged?‟, „Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed?‟ and „Do 
you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at?‟) improved the reliability of this 
scale (α = .67). 
 
IMPULSIVE NONCONFORMITY 
Impulsive nonconformity (ImpNon) is measured by 10 items.  Initially Cronbach‟s α = 
.63 and an item-by-item analysis was conducted on this scale to determine reliability.  
The removal of 2 items („Would you like other people to be afraid of you?‟ and „Do you 
consider yourself to be pretty much an average sort of person?‟) improved the reliability 
of this scale so that Cronbach‟s α = .68. 
 
Following these scale analyses new total schizotypy subscale scores were computed 
using the items retained.  The four new schizotypy variables were transformed to z scores 
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and screened for outliers.  No cases were removed as there were found to be no 
standardised scores in excess of ± 3.00 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). 
 
Descriptive statistics and tests for linear relationships 
The ICRT Total (M = 9.46, SD = 3.57) and ICRT Recognition (M = 1.72, SD = 1.80) 
scores were associated as was demonstrated by a positive, medium correlation of r(94)= 
.45, p < .001).  The ICRT Total index was found to have equivalent but stronger 
relationships with the self-report imagery tools and the creativity measure when 
compared to ICRT Recognition (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2), so this latter index of mental 
imagery was removed from subsequent analyses in the spirit of reducing the number of 
variables and increasing power.  
 
Table 5.1  
Correlations between imagery and creativity tasks  
Variables 
 
    ICRT  
    Recognition 
          r            p 
TVIC Mean .07 .516 
VVIQ Mean .07 .495 
CVT Creativity .34 < .001 
Note: ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; TVIC = Test of Visual Imagery Control; CVT = 
Creative Visualisation Task.  * r is significant at .001. 
  252 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.2 along with correlations to test for linear 
relationships between the variables. 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between creativity, imagery and schizotypy variables 
     Correlations (r) 
 
Variable 
Min. Max.   Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. ICRT Total 1.00 16.00 9.46 3.57 -       
2. TVIC Mean 1.00 5.00 3.62 0.82 .08 -      
3. VVIQ Mean 2.00 5.00 3.50 0.69 .09 .38** -     
4. CVT Creativity 0.00 31.50 16.68 6.69 .50** .20 .22* -    
5. Unusual Experiences 0.00 9.00 3.92 2.18 -.02 -.17 .07 .12 -   
6. Introvertive Anhedonia 0.00 7.00 1.34 1.59 -.04 .11 -.21* -.10 .01 -  
7. Cognitive Disorganisation 0.00 11.00 5.76 2.60 -.10 -.13 -.06 -.22* .14 .19 - 
8. Impulsive Nonconformity 0.00 0.00 3.54 2.20 .01 -.08 .08 -.02 .31** .19 .42** 
Note.  N = 96.  ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task.  TVIC = Test of Visual Imagery Control.  VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire.  CVT = Creative Visualisation Task.  * p < .05.  **p < .01.  
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The performance-based measure of mental imagery control, ICRT Total, was 
significantly strongly positively correlated with CVT creativity.  No relationship was 
found between ICRT Total scores and either of the self-report mental imagery tools.  The 
VVIQ and TVIC scores, however, did positively correlate moderately but significantly 
with each other. TVIC scores were significantly moderately positively correlated with 
VVIQ scores, and VVIQ scores were weakly but significantly positively correlated with 
CVT creativity and negatively with introvertive anhedonia.  The unusual experiences 
subscale was unrelated to any creativity or mental imagery index in this correlational 
analysis and was positively related to impulsive nonconformity.  Cognitive 
disorganisation scores were significantly negatively related to CVT creativity and 
positively related to impulsive nonconformity.  Dovetailing with previous literature, 
introvertive anhedonia was not found to be related to any of the other schizotypy 
subscales (Nelson et al., 2013).  With the effect of age partialled-out
14
, the only 
significant correlation between any variable and the CVT scores was ICRT Total (pr = 
.52, p < .001), with both the negative correlation between CVT and cognitive 
disorganisation and the positive association between vividness of imagery and CVT 
scores failing to be observed.  This may reflect the self-report nature of the tools involved 
in these analyses, as well as the nature of the participants recruited for this study and this 
outcome will be addressed in the discussion. 
 
                                                 
14
 Further results for other partial correlations which changed only marginally are reported at Appendix S. 
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Following this analysis, a multiple linear regression model was tested in order to 
investigate the predictive power of the imagery and schizotypy variables, and to further 
investigate the possibility of linear relationships between these constructs and creativity. 
 
Predicting creativity on the basis of imagery control aptitudes and schizotypy 
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION 
A multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to determine whether any of the 
imagery or schizotypy subscale variables predicted creativity scores.  The predictors were 
the three imagery indices and the four measures of schizotypy, while the criterion 
variable was the index of creativity (CVT).  Prior to analysis, the data were screened in 
order to assess violation of assumptions.   
 
Normality 
Examination of the histogram of standardised residuals showed that the assumption of 
independent errors was met as this was normally distributed.  The residuals plot also 
indicated there was consistent clustering and little deviation from normality. 
 
Linearity 
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The correlations between the predictor variables and the dependent variable, CVT Total, 
were all small to moderate in this analysis, ranging from r = -.22 (CogDis and CVT Total) 
to r = .50 (ICRT and CVT Total).  This indicated that the subsequent multiple linear 
regression analysis could be reliably employed as the data were suitably correlated with 
the dependent variable.  Scatterplots examining homoscedasticity indicated that there was 
reasonable consistency of spread through the distributions.   
 
Outliers 
Inspection of Mahalanobis‟ distances indicated that there were no outliers (critical χ2 
value for 7 predictors = 24.32; highest value in sample was χ2 = 17.26; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1989).  Analysis of standard residuals showed that there were no outliers greater 
than ±3.29 in the data (Std. Residual Min = -2.72, Std. Residual Max -2.44).  
 
Multicollinearity 
As was shown in Table 5.2, none of the predictor variables were significantly inter-
correlated more than .7, so multicollinearity was therefore not likely to be problematic.  
Examination of Cook‟s distances (TOL) and variation inflation factors (VIF) indicated 
that influential data points were not a concern (UnEx, TOL = .86, VIF = 1.16; CogDis, 
TOL = .79, VIF = 1.26; IntAn, TOL = .84, VIF = 1.19; ImpNon, TOL = .73, VIF = 1.38; 
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ICRT, TOL = .98, VIF = 1.02; VVIQ, TOL = .75, VIF = 1.34; TVIC, TOL = .75, VIF = 
1.32).   
 
The order of entry of the predictor variables was decided following the literature which 
suggests that both mental imagery and schizotypy are related to creative performance.  
Direct method of entry with backward deletion was used, with the imagery variables 
being entered as predictors alongside the schizotypy subscale variables.  The initial 
regression model explained 28% of the variance in CVT scores, F(7, 84) = 6.076, ΔR2adj 
= .281, p < .001 and so this was repeated in order to improve the model.  The results of 
the final multiple linear regression are presented in Table 5.3, with the variables that were 
removed from the model presented in Table 5.4 in order of removal. 
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Table 5.3 
Multiple linear regression of imagery and schizotypy variables on Creative Visualisation Task scores 
Variables CVT  
(DV) 
ICRT  
Total 
UnEx CogDis      B 
(unique) 
SE       sr
2a
 t p 
Constant     4.88 3.36   1.45 .15 
ICRT Total .50    .82 .15 .47 .22 5.39 .001* 
UnEx .12 -.02   .49 .25 .18 .03 1.99 .05** 
CogDis -.22 -.10 .14  -.42 .21 -.18 -.03 -2.02 .05
†
 
TVIC .20 .08 -.17 -.13 .06 .15 .16 .03   
Note.  *
 
p < .001; ** p = .047 (UnEx); 
†
 p = .049 (CogDis); CVT = Creative Visualisation Task; UnEx = Unusual Experiences; CogDis = Cognitive 
Disorganisation; ICRT = Image Transformation and Recognition Task; 
a 
sr
2
 = the squared semipartial correlations indicate the unique variance 
explained by the predictor. 
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Table 5.4 
Predictor variables removed from multiple linear regression on CVT 
Variable removed (in order 
of removal) 
              β t          p 
VVIQ .10 .95 .34 
ImpNon .02 .17 .86 
IntAn -.07 -.76 .45 
Note.  VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire; ImpNon =  
Impulsive Nonconformity; IntAn = Introvertive Anhedonia. 
 
The final regression revealed an R of .57, R
2
 = .32, and adjusted R
2
 of .29 (F(4, 91) = 
10.941, ΔR2adj = .295, p < .001), showing three significant predictors of CVT scores; 
ICRT Total, UnEx and CogDis.  The variables uniquely predicted 25% of the variance 
(.25, sum of the squared semipartial correlation coefficients) and shared 7% explained 
variance (computed by subtracting the uniquely explained variance from the R
2
 value: .32 
- .25 = .07).   The strongest predictor was ICRT total, followed by CogDis, and for UnEx, 
which were both marginally significant. 
 
Tests for non-linear relationships 
Screening of scatterplots indicated the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between 
CVT and unusual experiences scores (Figure 5.4).   
  260 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 
Scatterplot indicating the relationship between creativity (CVT) and unusual experiences (UnEx) 
scores 
  261 
 
In order to investigate non-linear relationships between the variables quartile splits were 
computed on the independent variables, and the „low‟ and „high‟ groups were compared 
on their performance on the CVT.  Descriptive statistics for these data and t tests between 
the groups are presented in Table 5.5 below.
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Table 5.5 
Descriptive statistics and t tests between high and low groups on Creative Visualisation Task (CVT) creativity  
Independent variable Group (n) 
CVT 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
     t p    d Mdiff 
95% CIs 
(Mdiff) 
ICRT Total High (20) 19.68 4.89 5.21  .001* 1.62 -7.70 [-10.69, -4.71] 
 Low (21) 11.98 4.57      
TVIC Mean High (24) 17.90 5.19 1.42 .16 .41 -2.48 [-5.97, 1.02] 
 Low (25) 15.43 6.83      
VVIQ Mean High (23) 18.54 5.79 1.24 .22 .37 -2.26 [-5.92, 1.40] 
 Low (23) 16.27 6.52      
Unusual Experiences High (19) 18.31 6.04 1.31 .20 .35 -2.11 [-5.35, 1.12] 
 Low (45) 16.20 5.87      
Introvertive Anhedonia High (18) 14.52 5.51 1.17 .25 .51 3.03 [-2.23, 8.28] 
 Low (32) 17.55 6.34      
Cognitive Disorganisation High (14) 13.88 5.35 2.54 .01** .84 4.78 [.98, 8.59] 
 Low (31) 18.67 6.05      
Impulsive Nonconformity High (17) 17.18 5.49 .61 .55 .18 1.04 [-2.40, 4.48] 
 Low (34) 18.21 5.90      
 Note:  * t < .001; ** t < .05; Bold figures indicate higher means; ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; TVIC = Test of Visual Imagery Control;  
 VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire; Mdiff = mean difference.  Levene‘s statistics for equality of variances were non-significant for all  
 t tests. 
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Significant differences were found between low and high ICRT imagery groups on the 
CVT, while no such a relationship emerged for the self-report imagery tasks.  Those high 
in cognitive disorganisation had significantly lower creativity scores than their lower 
scoring counterparts.  Examples of CVT responses from high and low image controllers 
are presented in Figure 5.5.  The significant relationship between the VVIQ and the CVT 
was not reflected in this analysis.  
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(a) ‘Face’  ‘Snowman’ 
Stimuli: Triangle, line and number eight 
            
(b) ‘House’  ‘Two boxes’ 
Stimuli: Rectangle, triangle and line  Stimuli: Two squares and a line 
 
Figure 5.5 
Examples of CVT images created by high (a) and low (b) scorers on the ICRT 
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The „high‟ and „low‟ ICRT groups were also compared on TVIC and VVIQ scores using 
independent groups t tests in order to investigate non-linear relationships between 
objective and self-report mental imagery.  No significant differences were found between 
the groups, (t(39) =.565, p = .575, and t(39) =.166, p = .869, respectively).  This 
confirmed that there was neither a linear nor a non-linear relationship between the self-
reported and the performance-based measures of visual mental imagery, though this does 
not discount the possibility of other non-linear relationships which were not tested for. 
 
5.7 Discussion  
5.7.1 Discussion of hypotheses 
The prediction that Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) would not be found to 
be associated with scores on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) or 
the Test of Visual Imagery Control (TVIC) was met, with no relationships being revealed 
between either of the self-report measures and the objective mental imagery control tool.  
This finding dovetails with the literature which suggests that these two types of mental 
imagery assessment do not measure equivalent mental imagery abilities, that is, scores 
obtained using these self-report and objective tools are often found to be unrelated 
(Burton, 2003).  The observed relationship between scores on the ICRT and the CVT is 
also likely to reflect that the stimuli were similar for both tools.  That the ICRT predicted 
CVT scores was expected, however, the similar stimuli means that cautious interpretation 
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of this result is necessary as it may not generalise to performance on other types of 
creative task. 
 
Imagery vividness (VVIQ) failed to predict CVT scores in the regression but was, 
positively correlated to CVT scores.  The other self-report imagery tool, the TVIC, 
showed no relationship with creativity in the analyses.  A body of literature exists 
implicating the use and importance of mental imagery capabilities in creative 
performance (the focus of Chapter 1), and this finding is therefore partly in line with this 
notion.  It is noted, however, that the ICRT scores had a stronger relationship with 
creative performance than both of these self-report tools and that this was the only 
imagery variable to predict scores on the CVT.  The current findings therefore concur 
with previous research showing significant but moderate relationships between self-
reported mental imagery and performance-based creativity (LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003). 
 
Cognitive disorganisation scores shared predictive power with the ICRT and unusual 
experience variables in the regression, however, cognitive disorganisation was the only 
schizotypy variable to correlate with creativity scores and this was a negative 
relationship.  Additionally, the relationship between VVIQ scores and CVT was not 
revealed in the regression, including unusual experiences as a predictor, which indicated 
the possibility of a suppressor variable.  Vividness may have been acting as a suppressor 
variable in that it may be that vividness scores were associated with an element of 
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unusual experiences which was not related to the criterion variable in this study.  There 
may be two parts to a predictor, one which is related to the criterion variable, and an 
element which is unrelated.  The relationship between unusual experiences and creativity 
in the regression may reflect an association between a component of positive schizotypy 
which is unrelated to vividness, possibly the unusual and magial ideation typical of this 
trait, a relationship which was „suppressed‟ in the correlation analyses.  Where the 
possibility of a suppressor exists it may be that unusual experiences is shown to have no 
association with the criterion (creativity) or the suppressor variable (vividness) on its own 
but has predictive power in a regression, as was revealed here.  However, further 
investigation showed suppression to be unlikely as the relationship between CVT and 
VVIQ scores did not change when unusual experiences were controlled for, nor did the 
relationship between CVT and unusual experiences change when VIVQ scores were held 
constant.  No relationship was found between positive schizotypy (unusual experiences) 
and scores on the CVT in the correlational analysis, however, these scores significantly 
predicted CVT creativity in the regression.  That positive schizotypy was able to predict 
just a small amount of variance in creativity scores was in-line with associations reported 
in the literature which suggest a relationship but a only small effect size (Acar & Sen, 
2013, see Chapter 2, section 2.4, and above in section 5.1.1).  The levels of positive 
schizotypy reported by participants in the sample may provide some clues to the reasons 
behind this finding, that is, the lack of ‗extreme‘ scores on this trait may partly account 
for the failure to explain more of the variance in creativity.  Scores on this trait were 
moderate in this sample, with a low mean and a maximum score of 9 out of a possible 12.  
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This may suggest that the traits which reportedly relate to enhanced creativity, and which 
are common for those who are referred to in the literature as ‗high‘ in unusual 
experiences, may have not been pronounced enough for relationships to be revealed in 
this sample of psychology students.  The associations between perceptual anomalies, 
magical ideation, overinclusive and idiosyncratic thought processes and creativity which 
are reported in the literature usually pertain to those who score especially high on positive 
schizotypal measures.  The results mirror the literature in that negative schizotypy 
(introvertive anhedonia) did not show any relationship with creative performance (Nelson 
et al., 2013).  As expected, cognitive disorganisation shared a negative association with 
CVT scores and shared some of the predictive power in the regression.  The finding is in 
line with a body of work which suggests that disorganised schizotypy may be negatively 
related to creative performance (Batey & Furnham, 2008). 
 
 
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS 
Partial correlations holding age constant revealed that the relationship between CVT and 
cognitive disorganisation scores decreased and became non-significant (pr = -.09, p = 
.414, this is a decrease from the significant association of r = -.22).  This suggested that 
age may have had partially accounted for the relationship between creativity scores and 
cognitive disorganisation.  A similar result was found for the relationship of vividness 
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scores to CVT (pr = .19, p = .073, a decrease from r = .22), however, the change in 
coefficient was marginal (.03). 
 
 
LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS 
The correlational analysis revealed that ICRT, VVIQ, cognitive disorganisation scores 
were significantly related to scores on the CVT, while the multiple regression suggested 
that it was ICRT, unusual experiences and cognitive disorganisation which predicted 
creativity scores, though the latter two variables were only marginally significant 
predictors.  An association between imagery vividness (VVIQ) and creativity was not 
observed in the regression analysis, with unusual experiences being one of three 
significant variables to predict CVT scores.  The observation that unusual experiences 
was not directly related to CVT scores but was a significant predictor in the regression 
may be because vividness was acting a as a suppressor variable, as unusual experiences 
was not related to imagery vividness or CVT scores on its own. 
 
When the sample was split and comparisons made between the top and bottom quartiles 
of mental imagery controllers (ICRT Total), significant differences emerged on the CVT 
creativity index, somewhat unsurprising considering the strong correlation found between 
the two.  When the top and bottom 25% on cognitive disorganisation were compared, 
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significant differences were again revealed on creativity scores, with lower cognitive 
disorganisation scoring lower on the CVT task.  The „high‟ ICRT group generated more 
creative images in the CVT than the low imagers, which was in-line with predictions and 
reflects the findings of the regression analysis.  When „high‟ and „low‟ cognitive 
disorganisation groups were compared on the Creative Visualisation Task it was found 
that the „low‟ group was rated as significantly less creative.  This dovetails with literature 
which has found that disorganised schizotypy is associated with reduced creativity (Acar 
& Sen, 2013).  
 
Upon comparison of the analyses investigating linear and non-linear relationships, it is 
apparent that an association between schizotypal thought in the form of unusual 
experiences and creativity emerged during the regression analysis but not when the high 
and lower scorers on this positive schizotypy dimension were compared in terms of their 
creative responding.  This means that the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between 
these variables is unlikely, though other non-linear relationships may exist. 
 
The associations between creativity and cognitive disorganisation were uniform in both 
the regression analysis and the high/low splits, suggesting a linear relationship exists 
between these variables.  In the regression predicting levels of creativity, cognitive 
disorganisation also shared predictive power with mental imagery control and positive 
schizotypy.  This trait was also negatively associated with ICRT scores, hinting towards a 
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certain level of concentration and sustained cognitive focus required for success on these 
imagery tasks. 
 
5.7.2 Discussion of research questions 
As stated above, the fact that the ICRT scores were not found to relate to the self-report 
imagery measures (the VVIQ and the TVIC) is in line with a body of research which 
indicates that these types of task, though often purported to measure „overall mental 
imagery ability‟, actually tap distinct elements of this construct (Chapter 1, section 1.2.3).  
The findings suggest that the types of mental imagery measured by these self-report 
imagery tools are different to the aspects of mental imagery that are tapped by imagery 
control tools which require respondents to utilise mental rotation, image manipulation, 
and image inspection (Kosslyn, 1994; Farah, 1984; Bichsel & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1997; 
Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov & Motes, 2006).   
 
None of the objective or self-report indices of mental imagery were associated with 
unusual experiences.  The possibility that the imagery characteristic of positive 
schizotypy is related to creative thought remains, that is, uncontrolled imagery, despite 
the failure to uncover a direct relationship between these variables.  The shared cognitive 
imaginal and perceptual processes suggest that some relation to creativity may still 
emerge should more delicate tools be used.  The CVT may not be an appopriate task to 
allow this relationship to be found as it is quite constrained.  There are other skills as well 
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as creative ones which are required for high scores on the CVT, such as imagery 
evocation, maintenance and manipulation.  It is not obvious whether the lack of clear 
relationship reflects the necessity for possession of these skills in the CVT, which may 
have served as a rate-limiting factor.  A lack of imagery control would have meant little 
chance of demonstrating any creative skill in the CVT, regardless of creative ability.  The 
question therefore arises of whether the ability to play with imagery is what relates to 
creativity, or whether this is only revealed within certain samples and with certain tools.  
A collection of creativity tasks that reflects a collection of creative abilities would allow 
this to be explored further, as would recruiting participants who may have more varied 
imagery, and indeed creative abilities. 
  
The ability to control mental images (as measured by the ICRT) predicted high scores in 
the CVT.  It seems apparent that mental imagery control, as measured by the objective 
ICRT at least, is important for creative thought and production, however, this result was 
not true for the TVIC.  This supports both anecdotal and empirical accounts where mental 
imagery control, in the form of thought experiments and through the manipulation and 
reconceptualisation of mental images, has lent itself to exceptionally creative and 
innovative thought (LeBoutillier, 1999; Finke, 1996; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003; 
Morrison & Wallace, 2001; Palmiero, Cardi & Belardinelli, 2011). 
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The finding that the CVT and ICRT were correlated suggests that the ability to rotate and 
combine the shapes was not only related to producing something in imagery, indeed, 
most people could do that to some extent, but these imagery controllers created more 
unusual and original pictures with the shapes, that is, rather than just creating images that 
were acceptable and not particularly creative.  This supports the Geneplore model (Finke, 
Ward, & Smith, 1992; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995) which proposes that many cognitive 
processes underlie creativity and that one can study a number of discrete mental 
operations which comprise creative cognition. 
 
 
5.7.3 General Discussion 
When one considers the results of the regression analysis and compares these to those 
which were conducted using the top and bottom quartiles in the sample, it can be seen 
that slightly different associations are uncovered between the imagery, schizotypy and 
creativity variables.  When the strong image controllers were compared to less able 
imagery controllers on the Test of Visual Imagery Control (TVIC) and the Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), no significant differences were revealed, 
providing yet more evidence that self-reported mental imagery scores do not correlate 
with more objective measures of imagery (Burton, 2003).  The TVIC purportedly taps 
imagery control, yet the lack of association with the ICRT, a tool which is designed so 
that it is difficult to score highly unless in possession of controlled imagery, may suggest 
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otherwise.  Despite the modifications which were made to the TVIC, that is, the addition 
of a rating scale in an attempt to assess the „ease of manipulation and control‟ in mental 
imagery, the psychometric properties may still be called into question, and supports the 
findings of LeBoutillier and Marks (2001-2002).  The lack of relationship between the 
VVIQ and the ICRT may result from the fact that the aims of the VVIQ are to measure 
imagery vividness and not control (McKelvie, 1995), however, self-reported vividness 
has been found to correlate with other visual tasks such as visual memory (Marks, 1983) 
and visual perception tasks such as gestalt closure (Wallace, 1990).  Additionally, it has 
been argued that self-report instruments such as the VVIQ do correlate with object 
imagery however fail to show a relationship to spatial imagery (Heuer et al., 1986; 
Kozhevnikov et al., 2005; Reisberg, Culver, Heuer, & Fischman, 1986).  This could be 
supported by the current results because the ICRT requires spatial imagery to solve 
successfully. 
 
The finding that mental imagery control, unusual experiences and cognitive 
disorganisation shared predictive power of a substantial amount of the variability in 
creativity scores is interesting considering that no significant relationship was initially 
found between positive schizotypy and mental imagery (however VVIQ scores were 
negative related to introvertive anhedonia).   
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The mental imagery control scores, as measured by the ICRT, most strongly predicted 
creative performance in the CVT, which was expected and is in line with suggestions that 
mental imagery abilities are important for visual creativity, but may also be resultant of 
the nature of the respective tasks.   
 
The fact that unusual experiences also predicted some of the variability scores in the 
creativity tasks is also in line with expectations outlined at the start of this chapter, and 
also complements other studies that have revealed similar relationships (Nettle, 2006).   
 
The experiences, characteristics, and cognitive styles of those high in positive schizotypy 
appear to influence the ability to make creative images, though the relationship was not 
linear but trended towards a curvilinear one.  The t tests looking at high and low positive 
schizotypy groups did not support this trend, however.   
 
This predictive model emerged only after the impulsive nonconformity and introvertive 
anhedonia subscales were removed from the regression, and cognitive disorganisation 
and unusual experiences were still only marginally significant predictors. 
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5.7.4  Limitations and future directions 
There were a number of limitations to the previous study.  Had a different measure of 
creativity been used then more decisive results may have been found.  For example, an 
alternative version of the creative visualisation task described by Finke (1996) involves 
alternative stimuli and task requirements.  The shapes are 3D, and categories of the types 
of item that should be created may also be provided to participants either prior to the 
image generation phase, or once the image has been created and drawn.  A somewhat 
surprising finding often reported in studies utilising tools of this nature is that the patterns 
which are assigned a title or purpose after they have been generated in visual imagery 
and drawn, are often scored as more creative than those which are invented in imagery 
according to some predefined category (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989; Finke, 1996). 
 
A further limitation related to the creative visualisation task was that participants did not 
complete the post experimental questions which were posed by Finke and Slayton in their 
original 1988 study.  These related to the strategies employed during the image 
manipulation phase of the task and options were as follows:  (1) I tried combining the 
parts by „trial and error‟ in my image until I happened to recognise a familiar shape; (2) 
I first thought of a possible shape, and then tried to combine the part in my image to see 
whether that particular shape could be made out of those parts; (3) I didn‟t form an 
image at all, but just thought about how the parts might be combined in a more abstract 
way, and (4) I used some other strategy.  These questions would have allowed closer 
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inspection of the creative imagery processes employed during this and related tasks.  The 
next study intends to move away from use of the CVT in favour or more varied creativity 
tasks, and so this avenue of research will be explored in the next and final study in this 
thesis.  
 
Only one creativity task was administered to participants, which was possibly too 
constrained and may also have relied too much on mental rotation and other imagery 
abilities.  A verbal divergent thinking task would have allowed exploration of 
associations between other kinds of creativity, schizotypy and imagery (Blajenkova, 
Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006; Blajenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010), and it is possible that 
differential relationships with imagery and schizotypy variables may exist for verbal 
creativity compared to visual creativity. 
 
The curvilinear results may be explained in terms of controlled and uncontrolled imagery 
(schizotypal imagery).  Positive schizotypy scales may indirectly measure uncontrolled 
imagery, and negative relationships were indeed revealed between the two measures of 
imagery control, the ICRT and the TVIC (though these associations were small and non-
significant).   
 
  280 
The imagery-creativity relationship will be further explored in Study 6 using varied and 
dissimilar creativity measures as well as an adapted measure of schizotypy which more 
aims to delicately address the nature of this construct and its relation to creative output.  
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CHAPTER 6 CREAVITY, SCHIZOTYPY AND MENTAL IMAGERY IN VISUAL 
ARTISTS AND NON-ARTISTS 
            
15
 
6.1 Introduction  
Upon reaching the final study and this penultimate chapter in the present investigation 
into the associations between creative thought, mental imagery and schizotypy, it appears 
that elements of all three constructs are associated in a somewhat convoluted manner.    
There appears to be a link between imagined perceptual experiences and enhanced 
                                                 
15
 Image provided by a participant in the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking in the subsequent study.  For 
illustration. 
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creative ability, however, the nature of this relationship is unclear (this was the focus of 
Chapters 1 and 3).  Both controlled and uncontrolled visual imagery have been associated 
with exceptional creativity, the former in the form of deliberate and structured 
imaginings, the latter being demonstrated by sudden flashes of insight or solutions to 
problems which often accompany elaborate imagery but which are rarely controlled.  The 
main tenet of the final study is to therefore investigate this possibility through 
administration of a varied and suitable battery of tasks.   The studies reported in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5 of this thesis have demonstrated the efficacy of the Image Control and 
Recognition Task (ICRT) in the objective measurement of a range of mental imagery 
abilities relevant to creative thought, namely, image evocation, control, transformation, 
and rotation, so the relation of controlled imagery to creative performance will be 
determined with this tool.  The results of Study 4 (Chapter 5) indicated that there was a 
large association between objective mental imagery control and creative visualisation (r = 
.50). 
 
While the results reported in the previous study provided further construct validity for the 
ICRT, it was not clear whether the association with this tool and creativity scores was 
influenced by the nature of the two tasks used to measure these constructs.  As was noted 
in the discussion in Chapter 5, it is likely that the ICRT and the CVT utilise similar 
cognitive skills due to the comparable stimuli within each tool.  The final study in this 
  283 
thesis will therefore administer a spectrum of creativity tools in an attempt to tap a wider 
variety of creative ability. 
 
When considering whether individuals from the same creative domain share similar 
cognitive abilities and personality traits, a body of literature seems to suggest that there 
are indeed characteristics that are common within respective creative groups.  As has 
been mentioned throughout the thesis, specifically in Chapters 2 (section 2.3.2) and 5 
(section 5.7.4), the relationships between schizotypy and creativity appear to vary 
depending on which types of tools are used.  The possibility that indices of unusual 
experiences may indirectly represent a facet of imagery which is uncontrolled will be 
addressed. 
 
Baer (2011) supports a model of creativity which focuses on expertise and one which is 
domain-specific.  He notes that some may have expertise in one, a few or several areas, 
and believes that creativity is much the same.  His argument is that a general test of 
creativity makes as much sense as “a test of all-round, multipurpose, domain-general 
expertise” (p. 311). However, after interviewing individuals who excelled in science and 
the arts, Root-Bernsteins (1999) found that that there were “basic thinking skills that 
underlie creativity, whatever the domain” (cited in Kim, 2011, p. 314).  These are 
observing, imaging, abstracting, recognising patterns, pattern forming, analogising, body 
thinking, empathising, dimensional thinking, modeling, playing, transforming and 
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synthesising (Starko, 2011).  It is clear to see how imagery control may be relevant for 
demonstrating efficacy in these skills and abilities. 
 
There is agreement that divergent thinking is an important part of the creative process 
(Fisher et al., 2004) though it has been suggested that it cannot be equated with creativity 
(though, as has been mentioned, many do).  It is instead better to conceive of divergent 
thinking as predicting creative potential (Runco, 1991).  von Stumm, Chung and 
Furnham (2011) failed to find evidence that any schizotypy subscale was related to 
creativity as indicated by measures of divergent thinking and self-reported creative 
ideation and behaviour, with the creativity tools themselves being only “loosely 
interlinked” (p. 113).  Armstrong (2012) looked at both creative cognition and schizotypal 
symptoms in relation to creative achievement in students and found that creative performance 
scores (as measured by a single task from the TTCT) were positively associated with creative 
problem solving (as measured by the Remote Associates Test) but not creative problem solving, 
however, this latter task required participants to ―develop an advertising campaign for a new 
product‖ (p. 181), a highly dissimilar task to those often used as indicators of creative ability.  
Fink et al. (2013) take a ‗neuroscience perspective‘ of creativity and schizotypy, and suggest that 
during creative cognition the high schizotypy group in their study were more likely to ―gather 
external and internal information‖ (p. 385).  This is akin to previously described overinclusive 
modes of thought which may, according to Eysenck (1995) at least, be common in both 
psychotic-prone and creative individuals.  In Abrahams and Windmann‘s (2008) 
investigation no relationship was revealed between high or low schizotypy on creative 
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imagery (as measured by the CVT).  Individuals with high schizotypy (as measured by 
the SPQ) showed no advantage on the Conceptual Expansion Task (CET, Ward, 1994) 
either. 
 
Though the aforementioned studies recruited students, the results further emphasise the 
complex nature of creativity and its manifestations (Mumford, 2003; Silvia et al., 2008) 
and their results also highlight that the use of a single psychometric test for the 
measurement of creativity is unlikely to operationalise the true scope of creativity.  Study 
5 seeks to investigate domain-specific creativity, by inclusion of visual artists, varied 
creativity performance measures that measure more than one type of creative ability, and 
a validated measure of creative achievement, in addition to looking at tasks which may 
elucidate whether there are creative traits that can be said to be domain-general.  In order 
to put this final study into context, research which has recruited creative individuals and 
has considered levels of schizotypy and relationships with creativity and other relevant 
aspects is presented in the section below.  
 
 
6.1.1 Schizotypy, imagery and different creative domains 
Research carried out by Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley, and Corr (2006a) revealed that it was 
possible to use scores on the unusual experiences and impulsive nonconformity scales to 
distinguish visual artists from the non-artist group in their sample.  They also showed that 
the visual artists scored higher on measures of unusual experiences, impulsive 
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nonconformity (asocial schizotypy), introvertive anhedonia, neuroticism, openness and 
divergent thinking (uniqueness) as measured by the Instances and Uses Test, which 
includes providing alternative uses for household objects (Wallach & Kogan, 1965, cited 
in Burch et al., 2006a).  They reported that the unusual ideas elicited by positive-
schizotypal traits meant that participants were able to generate more creative responses, 
demonstrating both fluency and originality of thought.   
 
The positive and negative dimensions of schizotypy, namely unusual experiences and 
introvertive anhedonia, are associated with creativity but show opposite relationships 
(Nettle, 2005).  That is, unusual experiences correlate positively with creativity while the 
dimension of introvertive anhedonia is typically negatively related (Acar & Sen, 2013).  
Additionally those who are high on scales which measure positive traits but who do not 
score highly on negatives ones perform well on divergent thinking tasks (Green & 
Williams, 1999).  This is purportedly because individuals who are high on unusual 
experiences scales have the tendency to make broad associations and therefore to link 
previously „un-linked‟ ideas.  This appears to be enhanced in artists, as Nettle (2005) 
found that, compared to the control group in his study, the artists (and, incidentally, the 
poets) scored higher on unusual experiences.  Additional research has revealed similar 
relationships.  Unusual experiences scores were shown to be positively associated with 
creativity in writers, and actors (Brod, 1997), though Brod reports less of a clear-cut 
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relationship between positive schizotypy and creativity specifically related to the arts, as 
heightened scores were also found for students and professors.   
 
Poets and visual artists were found to have higher unusual experiences and impulsive 
nonconformity scores when compared to non-poets and non-artists, after controlling for 
age and gender (Nettle, 2006).  In related work, Rawlings and Locarnini (2008) found 
increased positive schizotypy and introvertive anhedonia in the artists in their sample, 
which also included mathematicians and scientists. 
 
In their study with Fine Arts students, Perez- Fabello and Campos (2011) found that 
dissociative experiences, in the form of transient experiences of absorption and enhanced 
imagination, was associated with creative performance in these students, yet more 
evidence that phenomenological experiences influence artistic and creative thought.  
Similarly, in a study which investigated the personalities and characteristics of 157 
artists, Booker, Fearn, and Francis (2002) found increased psychoticism and neuroticism 
in these artists compared to normative data.  Botella, Zenasi, and Lubart (2011) 
conducted a study looking at the similarities and differences between art students and 
‗non-art‘ students in terms of emotion-related traits such as alexithymia and ‗affect 
intensity‘.  Alexithymia is a dimensional personality trait which manifests itself through 
problems processing the emotions of the self and others, while affect intensity, a ―stable 
personal characteristic‖ (Larsen & Diener, 1985, 1987, cited in Botella et al., 2011)  
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refers to the tendency to experience emotions that are extreme when faced with emotional 
situations.  The art students in their study scored higher than the non-arts students in both 
alexithymia and affect intensity, with the authors of this study concluding that ―art 
students presented a higher level of [emotional] negative intensity than the general 
population‖ (p. 5).  This provides further evidence for the inclination that visual artists 
share certain cognitive characteristics and by extrapolation could support claims that 
these specifics somehow enhance, or at least contribute to, creative endeavour.  
Investigations into overinclusive thought processes in especially creative individuals have 
been conducted (Weinstein & Graves, 2002; Eysenck, 1995; Anderson & Powers, 1975) 
which have suggested that highly creative writers have overinclusive thinking styles.  
Glazer (2009) states both that ―overinclusive thought implies an abnormally high access 
to a range of thoughts, as envisaged in other description of creativity‖, and that 
―divergent thought and associative models incorporate this basic idea... the creative 
individual forms novel combinations of otherwise distinct concepts‖ (p. 761).  
 
An area which has received little attention is whether the associated levels of 
incommodiousness which may be experienced by those high in schizotypal traits 
influences the relationships between positive schizotypal traits and creativity.  It may be 
that the levels of distress, intrusion and the frequency of aberrant perceptual experiences 
mean that associations with creative thought and otherwise innocuous unusual ideation 
are prevented.  This may be especially difficult to disentangle as the literature suggests 
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that positive schizotypy has an association with creativity in some areas, such as visual 
art and poetry (Nettle, 2005), however it is unclear specifically which elements of 
positive schizotypal thought underlie this relationship.  It may be the idiosyncratic 
thinking styles exhibited in individuals high in this trait that determine this association, or 
alternatively, perhaps the uncontrolled and aberrant mental imagery which accompanies 
unusual experiences influences the finding that creativity and positive schizotypy are 
linked.   
 
Schizotoypy in visual artists 
In addition to research from the image generation approach, specifically, the Geneplore 
model, which demonstrated that mental imagery was a fundamental aspect of visual 
creativity (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992), there exists recently published research which 
connects visual imagery with creative performance.  In their comprehensive study of the 
visual imagery preferences and qualitative characteristics of visual artists, scientists and 
humanities professionals, a number of interesting findings were revealed by Blajenkova 
et al. (2006).  Building on previous work (Blajenkova et al., 2006) which suggested that 
visual artists have a preference for object imagery that is detailed and bright, while 
scientists more frequently report engaging in spatial imagery that is schematic and 
abstract, Blajenkova and Kozhevnikov (2010) found that visual-object imagery was 
uniquely related to expertise in visual art, with visual artists scoring high on all visual-
object tasks, as well as finding that abstract thought and information processing was 
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supported by abilities in visual-object imagery.  Engagement in visual art was uniquely 
related to object but not spatial imagery, which is contrary to some literature which 
suggests that spatial ability is related to engagement in the visual arts (Eisner, 1985; 
Gardner, 1999; Perkins, 1994, all cited in Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010).  They 
investigated the subjective functional role and the qualitative characteristics of object and 
spatial imagery using protocol analysis and revealed some intriguing results relevant to 
the present thesis.  They looked at Kosslyn‟s (1980, 1994; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 
2001; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2006) four main visual processing components: 
generation, maintenance, inspection and transformation, whilst noting that this theory of 
mental imagery does not look at each stage systematically.  In Kosslyln et al.‟s view, both 
object and spatial imagery are associated with components of visual processing, for 
example, object imagery may be associated with imagery maintenance and inspection, 
whilst spatial imagery is associated with the transformation of images.  Visual artists, 
scientists and humanities/social science professionals were asked specific questions about 
the different stages of imagery processing and covered a variety of characteristics relating 
to these processes.  In relation to image generation, participants were asked whether they 
experienced visual-object or visual-spatial, holistic or sequential and controlled or 
uncontrolled imagery.  The responses were coded as object imagers if they described 
pictorial, vivid, colourful and detailed images and most of the visual artists were coded as 
such.  However some were classified as „mixed‟, meaning that they utilised both object 
and spatial imagery, while a smaller percentage of visual artists described images that 
were classified as spatial in nature.  Holistic imagery was suggested by most visual artists 
  291 
who reported they experienced their visual images as single units with colour and 
structure.  When asked questions about whether visual images were controlled or 
uncontrolled it was revealed that visual artists tended to overwhelmingly experience 
imagery that was uncontrolled and experienced as spontaneous and accompanied by a 
feeling of inspiration.  Triggers of visual images reportedly included life events and 
emotional experiences and often occurred outside of the artists‟ volition.  This is relevant 
because a similar claim could be made for the type of imagery that is encountered in 
persons high in positive schizotypy which may be uncontrolled, frequent, distracting, 
even unpleasant.  Participants were then asked questions about their ability to inspect 
visual images.  Visual artists reported that they could intentionally do this and that it was 
important for their visual processing as further detail and understanding could be gained 
from this, as well as some stating that image inspection allowed them to understand the 
art which could be created from the images.  In terms of image maintenance, whether 
maintaining images required effort and whether they were persistent was also 
investigated, with visual artists reporting that to maintain visual images required little 
effort and that these images persisted without being “consciously maintained” 
(Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010, p. 294).  Questions relating to the ability to 
transform visual images were asked.  These focused on visual-object or visual-spatial 
imagery and the intentionality of image transformation.  The visual artists reported both 
object and mixed imagery (comprising both visual-object and visual-spatial imagery), 
with only a small proportion reporting visual-spatial imagery.  The artists used spatial 
transformation when manipulating and rearranging the composition of mental images 
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which are to be “translated to physical form” (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010, p. 
295), with object transformations being associated with colour, texture and shape of 
images.  
 
The results of the previously outlined protocol analyses revealed a number of visual 
artists who said that transforming and manipulating their images was not always possible 
and that sometimes it was easier to create an altogether new visual image.  This study 
found that visual artists varied in the intentionality of their image transformations, with 
most being categorised as unintentional, but similar proportions being classified as 
„mixed‟, that is, image transformations being performed both intentionally and 
unintentionally, with some visual artists reporting that they do not transform their visual 
images at all.  The functional role of visual imagery was investigated, specifically, 
whether it hindered or facilitated completion of “professional tasks” (Blazhenkova & 
Kozhevnikov, 2010, p. 295).  This study found that visual artists regarded their visual 
imagery as crucial at all stages of their work and reported a substantially emotional 
content to their visual images, either through emotional motivation, when emotional 
experiences influenced their images, or when emotion was intended in these images.  
Many of the imagery-related statements by visual artists pertaining to each of the 
components of imagery which were provided by Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov (2010) 
are also worthy of mention, for although these are individual, qualitative accounts of 
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visual imagery processes, they were chosen as they were representative of the sample of 
visual artists‟ imagery experiences.  A selection of these is presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 
Examples of imagery-related statements from visual artists 
Category Statements by visual art professionals 
Image generation Images come in flash, it‘s almost a little muse, so real you 
just have to grab the idea and visualize it 
 
There are images that come from nowhere... 
 
Image inspection I have these weird colours and creepy images, but I don‘t 
know what they are...but I can translate them into paintings 
 
Image maintenance I never really forget about my first idea.  So...I always have 
this image in my head of what I want to do, or this feeling 
that I want to express.  I always have a visual image in my 
head, no matter what like...it‘s just, it‘s always there 
 
Sometimes the image is so persistent, it‘s just standing in my 
eyes 
 
Image transformation Sometimes it is hard to control my images; they just change 
their colour and shape themselves 
 
Functional role of 
visual-object vs. 
visual-spatial imagery 
I see images in my head and then I just transfer them onto 
paper.  I draw what I imagine, so it‘s critical for me to have 
imagery.  Usually, I see an image, and the next task is to find 
the material and technique to draw it 
 
Role of emotion in 
visual-object vs. 
visual-spatial imagery 
Instead of throwing a glass at the wall to break it, when I 
really want to, I can just imagine it – imagine how it will 
break into tiny pieces, and how they will scatter.  Then, I can 
collect them back together in my imagery.  This calms me 
down 
Note.  From Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov (2010). 
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Some recent research has demonstrated that some objective and self-report measures of 
imagery ability correlate (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Dean & Morris, 2003; Blazhenkova & 
Kozhevnikov, 2009) and that tools which are used to measure the same visual dimension, 
that is, object or spatial imagery, load onto the same factor regardless of whether they are 
self-report or objective performance tools.  
 
Morrison and Wallace‟s (2001) investigation into imagery in visual artists which found 
that participation in art was a better predictor of imagery ability than was creative 
achievement is of particular interest. 
 
Some of the literature surrounding the creativity-schizotypy debate appears to make an 
assumption that the positive relationship of certain schizotypal traits with creativity, for 
example, unusual, magical and fantastical ideation, perceptual experiences that may be 
considered to be „out of the ordinary‟, loose-associations and remote connections in 
cognition, and the ability to generate and the willingness to express a large number of 
ideas, are just that: positive, or at least „not negative‟.  The notion that the creative 
benefits of schizotypal thought arise due to the lack of debilitating symptomology is 
frequently reported, implying by stating this, perhaps, that schizotypal traits are never 
experienced as debilitating, distressing or distracting.  Put differently, there is an implicit 
message which suggests that people who experience these phenomena benefit from them 
and that this is demonstrated through heightened creative performance and endeavour.  
  296 
To express this yet another way, the overwhelming tone of many of these papers is that 
„unusual experiences are good‟, for creativity at least.  The inclusion of the CAPS rating 
scale with the items in the O-LIFE, which assesses these possible negative aspects of the 
experiences, will allow the issue of whether there is evidence for a debilitating effect of 
schizotypy on creative performance as measured by divergent thinking tasks, creative 
drawings and self-report measures.  
 
Pérez-Fabello and Campos (2007) found an association between visual imagery and 
creativity that fifth-year visual arts students reported higher imagery vividness and visual 
elaboration than less experienced arts students.  There are however different types of 
creativity and imagery, as has been outlined.  Researchers have often failed to select 
appropriate measurement tools to reflect this, which may explain why many fail to find 
consistent relationships between vividness of imagery and creative performance 
(Palmiero, Nakatani, Raver, Olivetti Belardinelli, & van Leeuwen, 2010), with only some 
subcomponents of creativity being associated with vividness, for example „practicality‟ 
of objects (Palmiero, Cardi, & Belardinelli, 2011) but not „originality‟.  Unusual 
perceptual experiences, dissociative experiences and „depersonalisation‟ have also been 
associated with creativity and artistic production (Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001; Pérez & 
Campos, 2011). 
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The evidence cited heretofore appears to suggest that progress has been made in the field 
of research into creativity and mental imagery, with advances in the tools and protocols 
employed when investigating this relationship (LeBoutillier & Irving, 2014). 
 
6.2 Rationale  
This study seeks to uncover further layers of the relationships between mental imagery, 
creativity and schizotypal traits.  The studies conducted thus far have recruited university 
students and subsequently there may be limitations to the conclusions drawn from the 
results in terms of individual levels of creative imagery. That is, had „professionally‟ 
creative individuals been recruited it may have revealed more of a range of both mental 
imagery and creative abilities.  Eminent creative individuals have reported to use mental 
imagery (LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003) and this „special imagery‟ explanation of 
creativity suggests that recruiting samples of „ordinary‟ individuals to participate in 
creativity-imagery research may not allow relationships to be unearthed.  Additionally, 
while Study 4 revealed some interesting findings about the use of mental imagery in 
creative tasks, the creativity task itself was too constrained and participants may not have 
been given the chance to fully demonstrate their creative capabilities, with participants 
gifted in other „creative areas‟, such as verbal creativity, possibly finding it difficult to 
demonstrate abilities such as storytelling, humour, and satire, for example.  Therefore this 
final study intends to increase the likelihood of finding pronounced differences in 
imagery control capabilities and will allow a more thorough investigation of the 
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relationships between mental imagery and creativity by using a variety creativity tasks 
and by also recruiting a sample of especially creative individuals.  This will also allow for 
the investigation of schizotypal thought in both visual artists and non-artists.   
 
A clearer operationalisation of creativity as a dependent variable will mean that 
relationships between creative performance and the nuances of schizotypal traits may be 
explored, while the inclusion of a tool that provides an accurate indication of imagery 
ability will mean that elements of creative cognition and potential further relationships 
with schizotypy may be examined.  As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as in 
other sections of this thesis (Chapter 1, section 1.2.1), discussions and disagreements 
about whether creativity should be treated as a generalised ability or whether it is 
domain-specific are ongoing (Kim, 2011).  An assumption of domain-generality is made 
when divergent thinking tests are used as the sole measures of creative responding, that 
is, scores on these tasks are taken to represent a general „creative ability‟.  However 
researchers also contend that a domain-specific view should be adopted in creativity 
research whereby specific measures are employed in order to measure specific aptitudes 
(Kaufman & Baer, 2004).  This view is reflected in the creativity measures chosen for the 
present study which are not only measures of divergent thinking but also of conceptual 
expansion, strengths in creative thought and creative achievement.  Kim (2011) also notes 
that it is preferable when administering tasks measuring creativity to encourage a non-test 
like atmosphere, so participant instructions incorporated language to establish this and as 
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has been the case for all previous studies, care was again taken to ensure this standard for 
every testing session. 
 
6.3 Justification for inclusion of all measures 
The large number of tasks meant that keeping the battery as short as possible was 
important, so short versions of measures and subsets of tasks were selected where 
possible.  The creativity tools selected for Study 5 were chosen so that a more diverse 
range of creative abilities could be analysed.  Rather than including just one measure of 
creativity, as was the case in Study 4, a selection of tasks tapping creative imagery, 
concept expansion and divergent thinking were chosen, alongside a self-report measure 
of creative achievement.  This also reflects recent claims that differential cognitive 
processes are triggered by verbal and figural creativity tests (Acar & Sen, 2013), 
therefore both were included in order to further investigate this.   
 
Creativity measures 
By usilising four different types of measure, including a divergent thinking task, a self-
report creativity measure, and incorporating both figural and verbal creativity, it is hoped 
that the many nuances in creative ability may be investigated. 
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A subset of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance, 1974) was chosen 
which taps into divergent thinking, originality, fluency, and Torrance‟s „creative 
strengths‟.  It has been suggested that if only a subset of activities from the TTCT battery 
are selected for use then one should choose the tasks which will be likely to give the most 
accurate measurement of creativity (Cramond, 1999, cited in Cramond, Matthews-
Morgan, Bandalos, & Zuo, 2005).  The present study recruited visual artists to take part 
and so tasks from the figural section of the TTCT only were selected for administration.  
A common practice is to use a total of all TTCT subscale scores as an overall indication 
of creative thought however this is not intended for Study 5.  Kim, Cramond, and 
Bandalos (2006) support the use of individual subscale indices and indeed Torrance has 
discouraged the use of composite scores for the TTCT.  He warned that using a single 
score such as a composite score may be misleading because each subscale score has an 
independent meaning (Torrance, 1974). 
 
Composite scores are used frequently and the practice appears to undermine the many 
nuances of creativity that exist and that can be tapped by the TTCT.  For example, the 
„Checklist of Creative Strengths‟, which awards points for a series of creative qualities 
which are shown in the responses, gives an indication of creative ability which is quite 
different to, say, the measure of fluency, or that of resistance to premature closure, 
however these differences are lost when composite scores are computed.  Therefore it 
may arguably be unwise to use composite scores made up of the subscales of the TTCT 
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when the aim is to comprehensively study creativity and its many manifestations.  Using 
a selection of Torrance‟s activities, however, is more common and is consistent with 
Armstrong (2012), who states that using a subset of the tests can be justified in situations 
where psychometric „profiling‟ for classification purposes (Torrance‟s initial objective) is 
not intended on the basis of the tests, as neglecting to use Torrance‟s norms may result in 
a reduction in reliability.  The subscales can be used to create individual „profiles‟ with 
information from several scores.  Where this is done, lower reliabilities can be tolerated 
in exchange for the increase in detail about creative functioning that these scores can 
provide.  Using selected activities can thus give an idea of creative potential.  Cramond 
(1999) does offer some words of caution when using the five main subscales of the TTCT 
in this way.  As with any psychometric tool, the reliability diminishes when using 
selected parts of a test and Cramond states that this is especially a problem for the index 
of elaboration because such a broad range of quantities of responses are possible when 
scoring for this, that is, there are an infinite number of ways to elaborate on something.   
 
Guilford‟s (1967) Alternative Uses Task (AUT) is a measure of originality and divergent 
thinking in which alternative uses for common household objects are generated.  This is a 
verbal creativity task which will complement the other creativity tasks in the battery.  The 
AUT taps the ability to generate a large number (fluency) of responses which are then 
scored for their statistical originality.   
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Ward‟s (1994) Conceptual Expansion Task (CET) requires participants to imagine 
creatures from another galaxy.  These are scored according to how conceptually different 
these are to those found on earth.  The ability of individuals to go beyond the more 
common category exemplars may tell us something about that person‟s creative thinking, 
as the majority of people tend to follow these trends and cognitive shortcuts and generally 
draw „aliens‟ that resemble earth creatures.  A surprising finding related to the CET is 
that even people who one may assume would be excellent at this task, science fiction 
writers, for example, often fall into the trap of basing their creature on those on earth 
(Kozbelt & Durmysheva, 2007; Ward, Patterson, & Sifonis, 2004).  These aliens 
typically have sensory organs and appendages which have evolved for the purposes of 
living on earth, and people make these shortcuts even when they are told that the planet 
they are „on‟ is very different from earth.  The creativity index for this task is obtained by 
scoring drawings for a number of characteristics which are conceptually unusual and 
dissimilar to earth-animals. 
 
The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ, Carson, Higgins, & Petterson, 2005) is 
a self-report tool which provides an indication of creative accomplishments and 
attainment in a number of creative domains.  The use of a self-report creative 
achievement questionnaire was in place for a number of reasons.  It would be interesting 
to see whether the self-report creativity scores of professional artists, whose creative 
achievement will most likely be higher than the non-artists in the sample, correlate with 
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the more objective measures of creative thinking.  It has been found that students in 
particular are not very good at rating their own creativity, and while this tool does not 
require participants to rate their own creativity, there may be a risk of over-stating of 
creative achievement.  Kaufman, Evans, and Baer (2010) conducted a study investigating 
whether students were good at judging their own creativity.  To describe the finding that 
in general students were not good at it, Kaufman and his colleagues conceived of „The 
American Idol Effect‟, another name for the Dunning-Kruger effect (Dunning & Kruger, 
1999) and a humorous reference toward mainstream reality television where positive self-
assessments, that is, occasions where a self-judgement is made and is found, one must 
assume, to be „good‟, do not always appear to match „objective talent levels‟, so to speak.  
Put differently, these subjective and objective-talent ratings are at odds.  This is similar to 
the finding that self-ratings of participants‟ own creativity may bear no relation to the 
ratings of expert judges on the creative responses and so relying solely on self-report 
measures of creativity would be limited in terms of validity.  A similar finding to this 
latter one has also been found in studies utilising self-report imagery tools, as was 
outlined in Chapters 1, 3 and 4.  When people are asked to rate their imagery abilities 
using self-report scales these ratings rarely correlate with scores on objective and 
performance-based measures of imagery ability (for an example, see McKelvie, 1995). 
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Schizotypy measures 
The measure of schizotypy, the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences 
(O-LIFE, Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005) has been amended for this study.  Previously 
answers to the items in this tool were simply „yes‟ or „no‟ which provided an overall 
index of schizotypy, as well as scores on the four subscales (unusual experiences, 
introvertive anhedonia, cognitive disorganisation, and impulsive nonconformity).  While 
this gives a clean set of scores relating to overall schizotypal traits it does not tell us 
anything about the nature of these experiences and characteristics of thought for the 
individual.  A tool which was briefly described earlier looks specifically at anomalous 
perceptions, the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS, Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 
2006), asks participants to rate their experiences in terms of their distress, intrusiveness 
and frequency, thereby giving an indication of how incommodious these experiences are 
for the experient.  Bell et al. (2006) looked at anomalous perceptions in „general 
population‟ samples as well as psychotic inpatients and found a positive relationship 
between these dimensional ratings and unusual experiences.  These ratings were not 
found to be significantly different from each other, suggesting that they may be highly 
linked factors, and the authors concluded that anomalous perceptual experience is not a 
unitary dimension.  The CAPS rating scale has been added to the items in the O-LIFE so 
that, in addition to overall and subscale levels, it will be possible to examine how 
incommodious these schizotypal traits may or may not be.  This change was made 
because it is suggested that these differences may be associated with differences in 
creative imagery, creative thought and creative achievement.  
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Imagery measure 
The imagery tool to be employed in this study is the Image Control and Recognition Task 
(ICRT; Irving et al., 2011) which objectively measures imagery control and the ability to 
recognise images that have been constructed in mental imagery.  The lack of inclusion of 
a self-report imagery ability measure reflects the findings of Study 4, which did not find 
any strong relationships between self-report measures and either creativity or any 
schizotypy factor.  Although a weak correlation was revealed between VVIQ and CVT, 
vividness scores were not significant predictors of creative performance in a regression 
analysis.  Additionally the decision not to include self-report measures was to limit the 
length of the battery and number of variables in Study 5. 
 
6.4 Aims and expectations 
The aims of Study 5 are to address the limitations found with the creativity measure 
employed in the previous study and to administer more appropriate measures reflecting a 
number of creative abilities.  Another aim is to examine whether differences exist 
between visual artists and non-artists in both their mental imagery abilities and their 
schizotypal tendencies.  One final overarching aim is to explore whether the two groups 
of participants who were recruited, that is, visual artists and non-artists, differ in their 
mental imagery abilities, their levels of schizotypal thought, and their creative responses. 
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The visual artist group are expected to achieve higher scores on the tasks in the creativity 
battery than the non-artist group, and it is expected that this will be associated with 
utilisation of enhanced mental imagery abilities demonstrated by this group.  Based on 
previously research described in the introduction, is also expected that the artists will 
have higher scores than the non-artists on the unusual experiences and introvertive 
anhedonia schizotypy subscales and that unusual experiences and impulsive 
nonconformity will explain some of the variance in creativity scores.   
 
The modification of the schizotypy measure may help to differentiate between 
participants who find their schizotypal traits to be particularly troublesome and those who 
do not.  This will allow the question of whether varying levels of schizotypal 
characteristics are associated with varying levels of creative output and achievement.  
Importantly, this modification also means that it will be possible to investigate the 
phenomenology of all types of schizotypal experience, that is, not just perceptual 
anomalies (as is the case with the CAPS scale by Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006). An 
understanding of what these traits feel like to both the creative and the less-creative 
experient would be a valuable contribution to the field.  Whether the levels of distress 
caused by schizotypal traits, the amount of distraction they induce, and how often they 
occur bears any influence on levels of creative aptitude is a worthwhile avenue of 
exploration. 
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6.4.1 Research Aims 
1. To understand whether differential relationships exist between four indices of 
creativity, levels of schizotypy which take into account accompanying levels of 
incommodiousness, and mental imagery control. 
 
2. To investigate the predictive power of imagery control and schizotypy scores in 
three creativity tasks and to ascertain whether levels of control and schizotypy 
predict creative achievement.   
 
3. To conduct analyses to study whether relationships between creativity and 
imagery control vary dependant on the measure of creativity. 
 
4. To look at whether visual artists exhibit superior mental imagery control and 
higher scores on measures of schizotypy when compared to the non-artist group, 
and whether relationships between these variables depend on the types of tasks 
considered. 
 
5. To ascertain whether relationships between creativity, positive schizotypy and 
visual imagery may be explained in terms of controlled and uncontrolled imagery. 
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6. To investigate whether participants can be classified as an artist or a non-artist 
according to their scores on the imagery, creativity and schizotypy variables. 
  
6.4.2 Hypotheses 
1. Mental imagery control as measured by the ICRT will show relationships with all 
four indices of creativity.  
 
2. Differential results are expected to emerge with ICRT and schizotypy scores as 
predictor variables dependant on the type of creativity used as the criterion 
variable. 
 
3. Unusual experiences will be associated with increased creativity on all four 
indices and will be more pronounced in visual artists. 
  
4. Cognitive disorganisation will be negatively associated with mental imagery 
control, though no predictions are made about the relationships cognitive 
disorganisation will have with creativity variables. 
 
5. Introvertive anhedonic schizotypal traits are expected to be negatively associated 
with creative achievement. 
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6. Impulsive nonconformity is tentatively expected to be associated with increased 
scores on the Alternative Uses Task. 
 
7. Artists‘ and non-artists‘ scores will reveal similarities in the cognitive styles of 
these distinct groups, and their scores on the measures of creativity, imagery and 
schizotypy will accurately discriminate between the groups. 
 
6.5 Method  
6.5.1 Participants 
Ninety six participants took part and this sample consisted of „non-artists‟ and visual 
artists.  The „non-artist‟ group (n = 56, 41 females, M age = 24.06; SD = 6.04) was an 
opportunity sample of psychology undergraduates in the first year of an undergraduate 
course who took part in exchange for course credits.  The „creative‟ group (n = 40, 27 
females, M age = 44.90; SD = 15.55) was comprised of professional artists and these 
participants were recruited in a number of ways.  Advertisements, or „flyers‟, (Appendix 
S) were displayed on notice boards at artists‟ studios in London (Bow Arts Trust), Kent 
(Creative Foundation), and Sussex (The School Creative Centre, Rye), and a number of 
organisations who provide studio space for artists were contacted and requested to 
display advertisements and contact details.  Additionally, artists who had their profile 
displayed on the websites for the following organisations were invited to take part: South 
East London Artists; Folkestone Arts Collective; The Creative Quarter Folkestone; 
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Folkestone Art Society; AXIS – The Online Resource for Contemporary Art; 
ArtworkLondon.com and E17 Designers.  These individuals were contacted directly via 
the email that was displayed on their public profile.  The invitation to participate was also 
included in newsletters sent out by the following organisations:  South East Open 
Studios; the Enterprise Collective at the University of the Arts (UAL) and Début Art & 
The Coningsby Gallery.  „Snowballing‟ was also employed as a method of recruitment, 
with a number of artists forwarding details to interested friends and artist groups that they 
were affiliated with.  An incentive of a £150 Amazon gift voucher „prize-draw‟ was 
offered for artists who agreed to participate and they were also offered a „profile‟ 
containing details of their results should they wish to receive it.  There were two reasons 
for taking this latter decision.  Firstly, having given up such large amounts of their time it 
was felt that this would be a nice gesture.  Secondly, the fact they knew they would 
potentially be learning something about their „cognitive characteristics and thinking 
styles‟, (as was described on the flyer), meant they may have been less likely to provide 
dishonest responses or to respond in ways which may have an impact on their results.  
 
Participant demographics 
Table 6.2 displays the artists‟ and non-artists‟ education levels.  The artists overall are 
educated to a higher degree than the non-artist group. 
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Table 6.2 
Information about participants‟ levels of education in Study 5 
Highest level of education Non-artists Artists 
GCSE/GSE 2% 0 
A/AS Levels 64% 0 
1 + years of college 17% 12% 
Bachelor‘s/Associate degree 9% 50% 
Master‘s degree 4% 20% 
Declined to say/missing 4% 17% 
 
 
6.5.2 Materials.  
A total of six measures were utilised in the present study.  Each of these is described in 
turn below. 
 
Image Control and Recognition Task 
The Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT; Irving et al., 2011) measures 
components of mental imagery control.  The eight imagery tasks which make up the 
refined tool require participants to manipulate shapes and letters in their mental imagery 
according to verbally presented instructions (Table 6.3).  These manipulations include 
rotations, changes in size or shape, and the addition of extra lines, shapes or capital 
letters.  If these manipulations are followed correctly, the shapes will combine to make 
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recognisable objects (Figure 6.1).  These tasks are fully described in Chapters 3 and 4 
(and Appendix E), however, an example follows: 
 
Table 6.3 
Example of a five-stage Image Control and Recognition Task 
Five-stage Image Control and Recognition Task 
 
1. Imagine a long thin triangle pointing left 
2. Add a plus sign to the right of the shape so that it is touching 
3. Move the vertical line of the plus sign right, to the end of the shape 
4. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right/clockwise 
5. Elongate the bottom horizontal line in both directions 
 
 
Figure 6.1 
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Intended image from the Image Control and Recognition Task ‘Tree’ 
 
Scoring: Participants received one point for each intended image they correctly 
recognised and named from their imagery (recognition score) and one point for each item 
they correctly drew after all instructions were presented (imagery control score).   
 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
Two tasks from the Figural form (Form B) of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
(TTCT), Thinking Creatively with Pictures Form B (Torrance, 1974) were selected.  A 
set of ten incomplete figures and two pages of circles (36 circles in total) were provided 
to the participants who were required to use these to create interesting pictures and 
stories.   
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Scoring: In the absence of newly published norms for this tool, an adapted scoring 
procedure was adopted which utilised a combination of Torrance‟s later scoring 
adaptations as well as Guilford‟s (1967) methods.  The 1974 version of the TTCT 
assesses five indices of creative thought: fluency, elaboration, originality, resistance to 
premature closure and abstractness of titles.  Torrance‟s scoring conventions are 
described below and these ratings were made by two judges who were unaware whether 
the responses were from artists or non-artists. 
 
Fluency  
Fluency was a count of the number of relevant ideas, that is, how many images the 
participant „produced‟.  Exact repetitions were not counted, so if participants drew the 
same thing twice but in a different way (for example, multiple different planets; lots of 
different faces) they only received a score of one for the idea of „planets‟ or „faces‟.  
Scribbles or completely unrecognizable responses were not counted. 
 
Elaboration 
Elaboration was a count of the number of ideas that were added to each drawing beyond 
the minimum details that would be necessary for the basic response (as intended by the 
title).  The index looked at the ability to develop, embellish and carry out elaborate ideas.  
Participants were awarded one point for each additional idea they added to the basic 
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response and in the surrounding space, with examples of additional ideas 
including decoration, details, shading, body position and mood. 
 
Originality 
This was a count of the number of statistically infrequent ideas.  The titles for each 
response were transcribed, coded and compared to all other responses given by the 
sample.  Responses that were given by 1% of participants or less were considered 
„unique‟ and were awarded two points.  Any responses which were given by 5% of 
participants or less were classified as „unusual‟ and were awarded one point, and any 
responses that were given by more than 5% of respondents received zero.  A corrective 
calculation was applied to prevent contamination from increased fluency scores 
(Guilford, 1967) and so originality scores were calculated using the formula Originality = 
Originality / Fluency.  High scores on this index therefore demonstrate an ability to 
produce uncommon or unique responses.   
 
Resistance to premature closure  
This score refers to the degree of „psychological openness‟ that participants were able to 
demonstrate in their responding.  Obtaining a high score on this index supposedly 
requires the ability to keep an „open mind‟ and tolerate ambiguity for long enough to be 
able to consider wide ranging options, as well as the resistance to go with any initial 
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inclinations to draw the image which was most obviously suggested by the shape.  This is 
indexed by the degree to which participants complete the figures using straight or curved 
lines and how much they resist the most obvious drawings.  Those who lacked the ability 
to resist premature closure received 0, while those who demonstrated they could do this 
received 1 each time.  Overall this index this looked at the ability to stay open and 
tolerate ambiguity long enough to come up with a creative response.   
 
Abstractness of titles 
This index measured the degree a title went beyond concrete labeling of the pictures and 
is illustrated in Figure 6.2.   
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Figure 6.2 
Response by a participant in the TTCT Incomplete Figures task  
 
Example titles for the image in Figure 6.2 may be; 0 = simple class title “boat”, 1 = class 
title with descriptor(s) “boat on the sea”, 2 = imaginative title that goes a little beyond the 
picture “Setting sail” and 3 = abstract but appropriate title “The S.S. Montana”.  The 
ratings for the five indices are typically summed to create a single Profile of Creative 
Thinking score, however, due to a number of challenges faced when scoring TTCT 
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responses (outlined and discussed fully in Appendix U), each participant was given an 
overall score on the 13 criterion-referenced indicators, or Creative Strengths.  The TTCT 
Checklist of Creative Strengths (TTCT-CS) appears to be a valuable addition to the 
TTCT as it attempts to more accurately capture the quality and „essence‟ of the drawings 
produced during completion of this tool.  The TTCT-CS were added as Torrance was 
concerned that the TTCT failed to adequately measure the “breadth of creative 
manifestations” he had seen (Hébert, et al., 2002; Torrance, 1979, in Kim, 2011).  It was 
reported by Kim (2011) that the new tests “predicted creative achievement and increased 
validity” and made them “true creativity tests, not just tests of divergent thinking” (p. 
304, Kim 2011).  The creative strengths are described below:  
 
Emotional expressiveness: how much expression the participants used in their drawings 
Internal visualization: showed something in cross-section or „inside‟ something else 
Storytelling articulateness: implied story or relationship between objects drawn 
Extending or breaking boundaries: could be demonstrated as depth perception or using 
shapes in unusual ways  
Movement or action: motion lines or images which imply action or movement of the 
body 
Humour:  this was for intentional humour and responses were rated for examples of word 
play, satire, silliness and absurdities 
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Expressiveness of titles: going beyond the obvious and expressing emotion and feeling 
Fantasy: this could be original fantasy or fantasy from literature 
Unusual visualization: scored when views are presented which are drawn from below or 
above, or from an unusual angle 
Colourfulness of imagery: rated on how appealing the image was and whether it included 
fantasy figures, or nudes 
Richness of imagery: lively, vivid, intense, varied and memorable imagery.  Five 
examples of such images received 1, six or more received 2 
Synthesis of incomplete figures: combinations of shapes received 1, two or more 
combinations received 2 
Synthesis of circles: 1 point for each occurrence of synthesis of circles, however if all 
stimuli on a page were included in one image then 2 points were awarded 
 
Apart from the final three cases listed above, participants received 2 points where three or 
more instances of each strength was demonstrated, 1 point for one or two instances and 
zero if they failed to show evidence of that strength. 
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Alternative Uses Task 
The Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford, 1967) requires the generation of novel uses 
for common household objects.  Measuring creativity using the AUT is considered to be 
an acceptable method as it is a divergent thinking task which requires flexibility in 
thought and originality in responding (Cox & Leon, 1999; Silvia, Martin, & Nusbaum, 
2009).  Two stimuli were selected for the present study; Brick and Newspaper. 
 
Scoring: The scoring method was consistent with Guilford‟s conventions (1967).  A 
trained judge who was blind to whether the respondents were artists or non-artists 
computed the alternate uses which were generated.  In order to achieve a high score 
participants needed to provide statistically infrequent alternate uses for the objects (see 
Data Reduction section below).  Alternative uses that were given by less than 1% of other 
participants were considered „unique‟ and were awarded two points.  Uses given by less 
than 5% of participants were classified as „unusual‟ and awarded one point, and 
alternative uses that were given by more than 5% of respondents received zero.  These 
responses were then summed to provide overall „unusualness‟ scores.  A corrective 
calculation was applied to prevent contamination from increased fluency scores, fluency 
being the total number of responses provided, so originality scores were calculated using 
the formula unusualness / fluency.  Examples of alternate uses provided by participants 
are presented in Table 6.4:  
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Table 6.4 
Examples from the Alternative Uses Task 
Score Brick Newspaper 
Zero points Door stop 
Paperweight  
Weapon 
 
Papier-mâché 
Animal bedding 
Wrapping paper 
One point To stand on 
As a bookend 
To prop up a car with a missing tyre 
 
To make a palm tree 
For pass-the-parcel 
To use as wallpaper 
Two points To support a skateboarding ramp 
To open a water melon 
To use as a pivot in a see-saw for 
small creatures 
To scare birds (by tearing) 
To stop frost on a car windscreen 
For laminating interesting articles 
and putting them under a glass-
topped table 
 
 
Conceptual Expansion Task 
The Conceptual Expansion Task (CET; Ward, 1994) involves imagining a visit to a 
planet in a distant galaxy and considering an encounter with two different species from 
that planet.  The fact that the planet to be imagined was to be very different from Earth 
was strongly emphasised. This creative cognitive ability task addresses the capacity for 
participants to broaden common parameters of concepts.  Most studies utilising this 
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measure use the word „animal‟ when instructing participants on the conceptual expansion 
task.  However an adapted version of this tool was used in the present study.  This 
explicitly replaced the word animal with the word „creature‟.  This was to investigate 
whether participants were still prone to drawing earth-like creatures despite not reading 
the word „animal‟.  Both terms were entered into the online version of the Edinburgh 
Associate Thesaurus (Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973) and the most common 
word associations for each are presented in Table 6.5 below.   
 
Table 6.5 
Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus word associations for „animal‟ and „creature‟ 
Animal 
Proportion of 
occurrence 
Creature  
Proportion of 
occurrence 
Dog  
Cat 
Vegetable 
Magic 
Man 
Bird  
Farm 
Bear 
Behaviour  
Cow  
Fox  
Horse 
Instinct 
Rat  
Zoo 
12% 
11% 
7% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Animal  
Thing  
Dog  
God 
Man 
Beast 
Being 
Monster 
Animals 
Ant 
Comforts 
Creator 
Small 
Spider  
24% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Note.  A sample of 98 participants provided responses to these words.  Only  
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responses which were given by > 2% of people are reported here. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.5 above, the most common associations for the word 
„animal‟ include, unsurprisingly, names of animals and concrete examples relating to 
places in which animals may be seen, as well as some examples which appear to link the 
word animal to common sayings such as „animal magic‟, „animal instinct‟ and the idea of 
behaving „like an animal‟.  Considering the CET is a measure of concept expansion, it 
would be preferable if these commonly associated concepts were not triggered by the 
instructions. Word associations for „creature‟ on the other hand are more abstract.  
Although nearly a quarter respond with “animal”, the remaining associations are diverse 
and relate to concepts, instead of primarily being associated with specific articles and 
entities as is seen with „animal‟. 
 
The full instructions provided to participants for the CET are below: 
 
Imagine you travel to a distant galaxy and visit a planet that is wholly unlike 
Earth.  While exploring, you encounter two creatures of different species.  
Consider what each of these creatures looks like. 
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Please use the space below to draw these creatures and provide a title or 
description if you would like.  Remember that the planet is very different from 
Earth.   
 
Participants were provided with an answer sheet with the space to draw each of these 
creatures and were given five minutes to consider each one.   
 
Scoring: The scoring procedure was adapted from Ward‟s (1994) method.  Two scorers 
noted the presence of absence of the following atypicalities: lack of appendages; lack of 
sense organs; bilateral asymmetry; unusual appearance and unusual sense organs.  
Presence or absence of one of these elements gave rise to a score of one or zero 
(respectively) and these were tallied, resulting in a total expansion score for each picture 
ranging from 0 - 5.  The judges knew the instructions which participants had been given 
and they were aware that the task was about measuring concept expansion.  The 
responses depicted in Figure 6.3 (a - c) illustrate examples of high scoring creatures on 
this task. 
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 (a) Description: Because of their giant brains they developed the technology to exist simply and 
without need for anything except their minds and hands 
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(b) Description:  This one developed so much that it doesn’t require anything at all and is merely 
a figment of its own imagination 
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(c) Description:  Provided with image 
  328 
Figure 6.3 
Examples of high scoring creatures from the Conceptual Expansion Task 
 
 
Figure 6.4 (a-c) below includes some low scoring creatures provided by participants in 
the CET. 
 
(a) Description:  Giant man with 6 legs and scary skin 
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(b) Description: All hearing kind 
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(c) Description:  All seeing kind 
Figure 6.4 
Examples of low scoring creatures from the Conceptual Expansion Task 
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Scores for each participant were computed by averaging the points obtained on both of 
the drawings.  The reliability between raters for these scores was acceptable (r = .73, p = 
.003). 
 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire  
The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) is a self-report 
measure looking at creative achievement in 10 different domains: Visual Arts, Music, 
Dance, Architectural Design, Creative Writing, Humour, Inventions, Scientific 
Discovery, Theatre and Film, and Culinary Arts, and is a valid and extensively used tool 
(Silvia, Wigert, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2012).  The questionnaire is in three parts.  
Part One includes 13 areas of talent comprising the 10 described above as well as 
individual sports, team sports, and entrepreneurial ventures.  Areas in which the 
participant feels he or she has above-average talent or ability are endorsed.  For Part Two 
participants must endorse items from a range of concrete achievements in each of the 10 
standard domains (listed above).  Part Three allows participants to indicate how they feel 
others perceive their creative characteristics. 
 
Scoring: For Part One, the number of endorsed items is summed.  For Part Two the eight 
ranked questions within each domain are weighted and range from zero to seven.  These 
ratings correspond to a „no achievement‟ item with a weight of zero points (“I have no 
training or recognized talent in this area”), a „training‟ item with a weight of one point (“I 
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have taken lessons in this area”) and six additional items of ascending achievement (“I 
have won a national prize in the fields of science or medicine”, from Carson et al., 2005).  
Participants also indicate how many times each achievement has been earned.  Each of 
the ten domains provided a Domain Score and participants also received a Total Creative 
Achievement score.  
 
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings & Experiences (O-LIFE) 
The short version of Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE, 
short version, Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005) was administered to participants.  This 
tool was described in the Materials section of Chapter 5, however, a modification was 
made to this tool for the present study.  The 43-items of this questionnaire do not address 
how much distress and distraction accompanies schizotypal traits, nor how frequently 
they occur.  However, the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale ([CAPS], Bell, Halligan, 
& Ellis, 2006), is theoretically linked to positive schizotypal symptoms (i.e. unusual 
experiences) and directly assesses these aspects.  The rating scale used in the CAPS was 
added to the items in the O-LIFE in order to investigate these additional aspects of 
schizotypy.  This modification has been made to ascertain whether the same applies to 
cognitive disorganisation, impulsive nonconformity and introvertive anhedonia.  Upon 
endorsement of items measuring each of the four schizotypy subscales, that is, when 
participants replied „yes‟ to the question, they were also required to rate this response on 
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a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 „not at all distressing‟/„not at all distracting‟/„happens 
hardly at all‟, to 5 „very distressing‟/ „completely intrusive‟/„happens all the time‟. 
 
Scoring: For each of the O-LIFE subscales (unusual experiences = 12 items, cognitive 
disorganisation = 11 items, introvertive anhedonia = 10 items and impulsive 
nonconformity = 10 items) participants receive one point each time “yes” is indicated and 
zero for all “no” responses.  Subscale scores were obtained by summing each of the “yes” 
items, taking into account the reverse-scored items (Oliver, Linney, & Claridge, 2005).  
To obtain scores for levels of distress, intrusion and frequency of schizotypy symptoms, 
ratings for items within each of these dimensions were summed.  This resulted in discrete 
distress, intrusion and frequency CAPS ratings for each subscale.   
 
 
6.5.3 Procedure 
All participants read the same information sheet and provided informed consent 
(Appendix V).  They were informed of their right to withdraw at any time and were told 
that their results would be kept confidential from other participants.  The student group 
completed the first battery of tasks in testing cubicles at Middlesex University in 
individual sessions.  Participants in the artist group completed the tools in individual 
sessions at their studios with two exceptions; two groups of four were tested in a group 
session at an art studio, and one pair of participants was tested together at their home.   
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During the experimental sessions, pens, pencils and erasers were available (they could 
choose which they used) and it was ensured that participants had a light and comfortable 
space in which to work.  For the creativity battery they sat at a separate table so that they 
did not feel they were being observed as they contemplated their drawings.  For 
completion of the ICRT, participants sat at the same table with the researcher at a 
comfortable distance
16
.  A relaxed and fun atmosphere was maintained.  The fact that 
there were no right or wrong answers in the creativity battery was emphasised, as was the 
fact this was not an investigation of drawing ability.   
 
Participants were given the creativity tools along with two separate response booklets, 
each containing one TTCT figural task.  The CET was presented on a single sheet with 
the vignette at the top and space to depict two space creatures provided below it.  
Participants were told that they had around 40 minutes (longest time ≈ 42 minutes)17 to 
complete the battery of tasks.  They were told that 20 minutes had been allotted for the 
TTCT tasks and 10 minutes for the CET.  Upon completion of each task participants 
                                                 
16
 For the group session, participants completed the ICRT individually in a separate room.  
17
 This simply meant that if the participant had not quite finished drawing when the time elapsed it was not 
in the interests of the study to stop them for the sake of one or two minutes.  Participants were alerted 
when allotted time slots had elapsed and in cases where participants were still drawing as the end of the 
40 minutes approached they were informed that time was nearly over and were requested to complete the 
drawing they were currently working as soon as was possible.  This was preferable to receiving a sample 
containing unfinished drawings. 
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indicated that they were moving on to the next one if it was before the allotted time had 
elapsed. 
 
Prior to commencement of the creativity tasks the following information was provided: 
You are going to do three activities that look at how good you are at thinking up 
new ideas and solving problems.  They will call for you to use your imagination 
in interesting ways, so don‘t hold back or worry about any answers that may be 
shocking or ‗taboo‘, this is fine.  It‘s likely that you will enjoy the tasks; think of 
them as a game. 
 
The tasks will give you a chance to use your imagination to think of ideas and to 
put them together in various ways.  In each activity, I would like you to think of 
the most interesting and unusual ideas you can – ideas that no one else would 
think of.   
 
You will be given a time limit on each activity (around 10-15 minutes), so make 
good use of your time.  Work fast but don‘t rush.  Try to keep thinking of ideas, 
but if you run out of ideas it is fine to go onto the next task.  
Please ask now if you have any questions otherwise you may start the first task. 
 
For the TTCT tasks the following instructions were provided: 
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Picture completion 
By adding lines to the incomplete figures on this and the next page, you can 
sketch some interesting object or pictures.  Try to think of some picture or object 
that no one else will think of.  Try to make it tell as complete and as interesting a 
story as you can by adding to and building up your first idea.  Make up an 
interesting title for each of your drawings and write it down at the bottom of each 
block next to the number of the figure. 
 
Circles 
In ten minutes see how many objects or pictures you can make from the circles 
below and on the next page.  The circles should be the main part of whatever you 
make.  Add lines to the circles to complete your picture.  You can place marks 
inside the circles, outside the circles, or both inside and outside the circles – 
wherever you want in order make your picture.  Try to think of things that no one 
else will think of.  Make as many different pictures as you can and put as many 
ideas as you can in each one.  Make them tell as complete and as interesting a 
story as you can.  Add names or titles below the objects. 
 
Once the creativity tasks had been completed the ICRT was then administered in which 
participants completed a series of verbal instructions related to the manipulation of 
shapes and forms in imagery.  The responses generated during the ICRT were recorded 
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by the participants in a separate four page answer booklet (Appendix F), each page 
containing four sections in which to provide titles and the accompanying drawings.  
Instructions for completing the ICRT were read aloud followed by three practice trials 
(two three-stage and one four-stage).  Participants were given an opportunity to ask 
questions prior to the beginning the ICRT.  The presentation of the imagery control tasks 
was randomised in terms of the number of stages, that is, these were not presented in 
order of difficulty, so participants could receive a three, four, five, or six-stage task to 
start with. 
 
Following completion of the first battery of tests (the ICRT, CET and TTCT) participants 
were verbally debriefed for that session and any questions about the three tasks were 
answered, taking care not to reveal anything about the intentions and aims of the study.  
Participants were then sent an email containing a unique participant code and a link to an 
online survey (hosted on www.SurveyGizmo.com) in order to complete the remaining 
measures (O-LIFE, AUT and CAQ).  The use of online methods of participant 
recruitment and data collection is a relatively new way of conducting research with its 
own fresh set of ethical issues (BPS, 2013).  An example surrounds participant autonomy 
and the issue of privacy of collected data.  Previous BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct 
definitions for the treatment of and the distinctions between „private‟ and „public‟ 
information do not fit with internet-mediated research because the lines between them are 
more difficult to delineate.  People communicate online both in private and in public, that 
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is, individuals use their computers and devices in their own private spaces whilst at the 
same time communicating in public forums and social networks.  The online component 
of Study 5 was done in accordance with the guidelines provided by Hewson (2003) and 
involved the following: participants were not required to provide their name online, only 
their unique participant code; clear and explicit instructions were ensured at all stages; 
the time taken for completion of the items was inspected in order to check for 
suspiciously out of range responses which may indicate cheating (in the case of the 
AUT); gathering appropriate details in order to identify multiple and erroneous 
submissions, such as date, time and regional location; simple item presentation to avoid 
possible problems displaying the page on older web browsers and those with slower 
internet connections with the intention that the „view‟ was the same for all no matter how 
they accessed the page and, finally, a small pilot study (n = 5) was done in which the 
online component was tested by friends of the researcher in order to detect and rectify 
any issues prior to commencement of the study proper.  Participants were asked to 
complete the online questionnaires as soon as was convenient, ideally on the same day as 
they participated in the one-to-one session.  They were told to be in a quiet room free 
from distraction when they accessed the website and were given an accurate estimation of 
how long it was likely to take (around 30-45 minutes).  Once they had completed the 
online questionnaires they were debriefed in an email (Appendix W) which fully 
explained the nature of the study.  They were invited to ask any questions, were offered 
further debriefing in person or by phone and the artist group were told they would be 
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receiving their profiles once the results had been analysed
18
.  The online component was 
presented in the following order: O-LIFE, AUT then CAQ. 
 
6.6 Results  
Analyses were carried out in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of similarities and 
differences between artists and non-artists.  After data screening satisfied that the data 
were appropriate for parametric analysis, a series of correlational analyses were 
conducted to guide further exploration. 
 
DATA REDUCTION 
Errors and missing data 
Of the 96 participants who initially took part, three non-artists were removed at the outset 
as they did not fully complete the online battery of questionnaires (O-LIFE including 
CAPS ratings, AUT and CAQ).  Prior to computing total O-LIFE subscale scores 
reversed items were re-coded.  Initially all data were screened for univariate outliers.  
One out-of-range value which was an input error was identified and recoded, and missing 
demographic data were coded as such.  Any spelling errors in responses generated in the 
AUT were corrected to streamline the scoring for originality and fluency.  AUT 
responses were then categorised and sorted so that the frequency of common responses 
                                                 
18
 A number of particularly inquisitive psychology students expressed an interest in the findings of the 
study as well as a wish to receive their results and this was agreed. 
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could be calculated, for example, as alternative uses for a brick, both “to hit someone” 
and “to protect myself” were categorised as „Weapon‟.  Each use was compared to the 
total number of uses provided by the sample.  The same process of transcribing and 
sorting for the purposes of calculating originality and fluency was observed for TTCT 
titles. 
 
ICRT, O-LIFE, CAPS subscales, CAQ, CET, TTCT-CS and AUT scores were converted 
to standardised z scores and any which were in excess of ±3.00 were removed from 
further analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).  Just one participant (a student) was 
removed at this stage as their CAQ score was an outlier (non-artist group n = 52; artist 
group n = 40).   
 
Reliability analyses 
A series of reliability analyses were conducted on the four schizotypy subscales followed 
by the „Distress‟, „Distraction‟ and „Frequency‟ variables in order to assess the 
underlying constructs.  This resulted in a total of 20 reliability analyses which are 
reported below. 
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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE O-LIFE SUBSCALES 
Unusual Experiences  
The 12 items which measure Unusual Experiences were found to be reliable (Cronbach‟s 
α = .66).  Not all Unusual Experiences items correlated with the total scale (lower r = .21, 
higher r = .42), however, since alpha would not have increased with the removal of any 
item, all were retained.  The items are as follows: 
1. When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there is nothing 
there? 
2. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them? 
3. Have you ever thought that you had special, almost magical powers? 
4. Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even though you could 
not see it? 
5. Do you think that you could learn to read other‘s minds if you wanted to? 
6. When you look in the mirror does your face sometimes seem quite different from 
usual? 
7. Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express 
them all? 
8. Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking about you? 
9. Does a passing thought ever seem so real it frightens you? 
10. Do you feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces? 
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11. Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you do 
not understand? 
12. Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong? 
 
Cognitive Disorganisation  
Eleven items measured Cognitive Disorganisation and initially Cronbach‟s α = .66.  
Items on this scale correlated with the total scale moderately (lower r = .27, higher r = 
.47) and removal of items would not have increased the value of Cronbach‟s alpha.  The 
following items comprise the Cognitive Disorganisation subscale: 
1. Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time? 
2. Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things? 
3. Are you a person whose mood goes up and down easily? 
4. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already 
gathered and are talking? 
5. Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time? 
6. Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts? 
7. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams? 
8. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are 
all mixed up and don‘t make sense? 
9. Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone? 
10. Is it hard for you to make decisions? 
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11. When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in following a 
conversation? 
 
Introvertive Anhedonia 
Introvertive Anhedonia was measured by 10 items.  Initially Cronbach‟s α = .46 and so 
an item-by-item analysis was conducted to determine whether alpha could be improved.  
This analysis found that it was necessary to remove 7 items in order to improve the 
reliability of this scale and even then the level of alpha was still unacceptable (α = .55).  
The three remaining items measuring introvertive anhedonia were as follows: 
1. Do you love having your back massaged? 
2. Do you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at? 
3. Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed? 
 
As a result of this it was decided to that no further analysis could reliably be conducted on this 
subscale. 
 
Impulsive Nonconformity 
Impulsive Nonconformity was measured by 10 items.  Cronbach‟s α = .51 at the start of 
the analysis.  An item-by-item analysis was conducted on this scale to determine 
reliability.  The removal of 7 items improved the reliability of this scale so that α = .71.  
The items that were retained were as follows: 
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1. Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking? 
2. Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things? 
3. Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself? 
 
Following these scale analyses new schizotypy subscale scores were computed using the 
items retained.  The four new schizotypy variables were transformed to z scores and 
screened for outliers that were in excess of ± 3.00 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).  There 
were no outliers on these new variables.   
 
The CAPS subscale ratings were transformed to z scores and 10 cases were found to 
contain outliers, nine of which were mild, one of which was extreme as it fell more than 3 
interquartile ranges (IQR) above the mean for Introvertive Anhedonia frequency ratings, 
while the others were less than 1.5 IQR above the mean (IBM Corp., 2012).  This same 
case was also a mild outlier on Introvertive Anhedonia distraction.  In the interests of 
power and in consideration of the planned analyses, it was decided to remove only the 
extreme outlier leaving an overall final sample size of 92 (non-artist group n = 52; artist 
group n = 40). 
 
New composite scores were created by summing ratings for all four schizotypy subscale 
scores and the Distress, Distraction and Frequency ratings for each of these subscales.  
These were included in subsequent analyses as overall measures of dimensional 
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schizotypal traits which included the levels of incommodiousness for each subscale.  
These were titled Unusual Experiences-C, Cognitive Disorganisation-C, Impulsive and 
Nonconformity-C to reflect the fact they included the CAPS ratings of elements of 
incommodiousness that were experienced as a result of the related schizotypal 
characteristics, traits and experiences.  
 
No standard error of skew or kurtosis was anywhere close to 2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1989) (SE of skew = .251 for all variables; SE of kurtosis = .498 for all variables). 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
For the following analyses involving the schizotypy and creativity variables, ICRT Total 
was used as the indicator of mental imagery.  The ICRT Total and ICRT Recognition 
variables shared similar relationships with the schizotypy variables and were themselves 
highly correlated, r(90) = .66, p < .001 and so only ICRT Total scores were selected for 
subsequent analyses.  Table 6.6 on the next page displays descriptive statistics and 
correlations between the creativity, imagery and new composite schizotypy variables. 
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Table 6.6 
Correlations between the new schizotypy scores, creativity and imagery 
Variables Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Unusual Experiences-C .00 105.00 45.56 23.76 -       
2. Cognitive Disorganisation-C .00 142.00 51.59 32.58 .41** -      
3. Impulsive Nonconformity-C .00 68.00 21.06 16.95 .25* .42** -     
4. ICRT Total .00 8.00 3.97 2.14 .06 .03 .22* -    
5. TTCT Creative Strengths .00 12.00 4.47 2.56 -.03 .04 .03 .23* -   
6. Alternative Uses  .00 1.95 .79 .47 -.03 -.06 .10 .36** .16 -  
7. Conceptual Expansion .00 10.00 4.82 2.34 .19 .02 -.03 .25* .44** .30** - 
8. Creative Achievement 2.00 112.00 21.65 17.97 .26* .03 .06 .27* .22* .16 .38** 
Note.    N = 92.  * p < .05.  **p < .01.  ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; TTCT = Torrance Tests of Creative Strengths.  With age partialled-
out the significant correlation between ICRT and TTCT-CS was not found, while a significant correlation emerged between ICRT and AUT scores.  
These results are presented in Appendix X and this issue is addressed in the Discussion. 
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The Unusual Experiences-C index of schizotypy was significantly but weakly positively 
correlated with Creative Achievement, as were ICRT scores.  None of the other indices of 
schizotypal thought and discomfort, correlated with any index of creativity.  The ICRT 
scores were however correlated positively with all four creative indices and the strongest 
relationship was between ICRT and AUT scores.  The creativity measures were 
themselves moderately inter-correlated. 
 
Multiple Linear Regression analyses  
A series of multiple linear regression analyses was conducted in an attempt to tease apart 
these associations.  Each creativity measure was used as the criterion in four regressions 
which included the ICRT and reliable schizotypy variables as predictors.  The data were 
screened for multivariate outliers and an analysis was conducted concerning whether the 
assumptions for multiple regression analyses had been met and is reported below, 
followed by the results of the regression analyses. 
 
Normality 
Examination of the histogram of standardised residuals showed that the assumption of 
independent errors was met as this was normally distributed for all regression analyses.  
The residuals plots also indicated there was adequate and consistent clustering and little 
deviation from normality in all models. 
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Linearity 
The correlations between the predictor variables and the four criterion variables in the 
respective analyses were all small, ranging from r = -.01 (CogDis-C and AUT) to r = .36 
(ICRT Total and AUT).  This indicated that the subsequent multiple regression analyses 
could be reliably employed as the data were suitably correlated with the dependent 
variables.  Scatterplots examining homoscedasticity indicated that there was reasonable 
consistency of spread throughout the distributions. 
 
Outliers 
There was one outlier which was indicated by a Mahalanobis‟ distance above the critical 
value for 5 predictors of χ2 = 18.47 (this figure was 18.52) and so this case was removed 
from the multivariate analyses.  Analysis of standardised residuals showed that there 
were no outliers greater than ±3.29 in the data (Std. Residual Min = -2.17, Std. Residual 
Max 2.63). 
 
Multicollinearity 
None of the predictor variables were significantly inter-correlated more than .7, so 
multicollinearity was therefore not likely to be problematic.  Examination of Cook‟s 
distances (TOL) and variation inflation factors (VIF) for all variables indicated that 
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influential data points were not a concern (UnEx-C, TOL = .83, VIF = 1.21; CogDis-C, 
TOL = .72, VIF = 1.39; ImpNon-C, TOL = .77, VIF = 1.30; ICRT Total, TOL = .95, VIF 
= 1.06, highest figures reported for each).   
 
Non-linear relationships 
Scatterplots indicated no clear-cut relationships between variables, and so quartile splits 
were conducted on the independent variables to identify the top and bottom quartiles of 
scorers and compared on all indices of creativity.  Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 show the 
results of these analyses. 
 
Table 6.7   
Comparison of top and bottom quartiles on TTCT Creative Strengths (TTCT-CS) 
Variable Quartile (n) 
TTCT-CS 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
     t p 
ICRT Total Top (23) 4.61 2.67 1.77 .08 
 Bottom (27) 3.37 2.27   
Unusual Experiences-C Top (23) 4.09 1.86 .87 .39 
 Bottom (24) 4.75 3.16   
Introvertive Anhedonia-C Top (21) 4.95 2.27 1.15 .26 
 Bottom (26) 4.08 2.83   
Cognitive Disorganisation-C Top (23) 4.48 2.06 1.20 .24 
 Bottom (23) 3.69 2.34   
Impulsive Nonconformity-C Top (22) 4.68 2.83 1.06 .29 
 Bottom (23) 3.87 2.26   
Note.    ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; TTCT-CS = Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
Creative Strengths.   
  350 
 
 
No significant differences were found between high and low scorers (top and bottom 
25%) on any of the schizotypy or imagery variables. 
 
Table 6.8 
Comparison of top and bottom quartiles on the Alternative Uses Task (AUT) 
Variable Quartile (n) 
AUT  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t p 
ICRT Total Top (23) 1.07 .50 4.03 < .001 
 Bottom (27) .59 .36   
Unusual Experiences-C Top (23) .75 .47 1.17 .25 
 Bottom (24) .92 .49   
Introvertive Anhedonia-C Top (21) .87 .47 .90 .37 
 Bottom (26) .74 .53   
Cognitive Disorganisation-C Top (23) .68 .50 .51 .61 
 Bottom (23) .75 .44   
Impulsive Nonconformity-C Top (22) .83 .54 .54 .59 
 Bottom (23) .74 .51   
Note.    ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; AUT = Alternative Uses Task; significantly higher 
figure is in bold.  
 
 
When participants were split into top and bottom 25% by their ICRT Total scores and 
compared using an independent groups t-test a significant difference was found in 
Alternative Uses creativity scores, with the high scorers on ICRT producing more 
original alternate uses for the common household objects.  
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Table 6.9 
Comparison of top and bottom quartiles on the Conceptual Expansion Task (CET) 
      
Variable Quartile (n) 
CET 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
     t p 
ICRT Total Top (23) 5.85 2.11 2.40 .02 
 Bottom (27) 4.31 2.36   
Unusual Experiences-C Top (23) 5.17 2.04 1.01 .32 
 Bottom (24) 4.54 2.25   
Introvertive Anhedonia-C Top (21) 5.69 2.40 1.84 .07 
 Bottom (26) 4.36 2.49   
Cognitive Disorganisation-C Top (23) 4.56 2.04 .15 .88 
 Bottom (23) 4.67 2.66   
Impulsive Nonconformity-C Top (22) 4.79 2.32 .39 .70 
 Bottom (23) 4.25 2.42   
Note.    ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; CET = Conceptual Expansion Task; significantly 
higher figure is in bold. 
 
 
Top and bottom ICRT scorers (top and bottom 25%) were the only significantly different 
group on the Conceptual Expansion Task scores, the better imagery controllers created 
more unusual creatures. 
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Table 6.10 
Comparison of top and bottom quartiles on the Creative Achievement Questionnaire 
(CAQ) 
Variable Quartile (n) 
CAQ 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
     t     p 
ICRT Total Top (23) 26.78 24.79 2.16 .04 
 Bottom (27) 15.30 11.45   
Unusual Experiences Top (23) 26.74 24.90 1.50 .14 
 Bottom (24) 17.54 16.48   
Introvertive Anhedonia Top (21) 26.00 25.76 1.00 .32 
 Bottom (26) 19.92 15.63   
Cognitive Disorganisation Top (23) 21.61 21.82 .01 .99 
 Bottom (23) 21.52 15.36   
Impulsive Nonconformity Top (22) 21.55 23.58 .88 .38 
 Bottom (23) 16.61 12.63   
 Note:  ICRT = Image Control and Recognition Task; significantly higher figure in bold. 
 
 
The same pattern emerges when comparing Creative Achievement scores between top 
and bottom 25% of ICRT imagers, the stronger imagery controllers being awarded 
significantly higher creativity scores. 
 
A comparison between artists and non-artists on the four measures of creativity was 
conducted using independent groups t tests in order to demonstrate the validity of the 
creativity measures.  The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 
Comparison of artists and non-artists on indices of creativity 
Artist or non-
artist (n) 
Creativity Index 
Std. 
Deviation 
    t  p 
 
Torrance Creative Strengths 
Mean 
   
Artist (40) 5.80 2.59 4.91 < .001 
Non-artist (52) 3.44 2.01   
     
 
Alternative Uses Task 
Mean 
   
Artist (40) .94 .47 2.72 .008 
Non-artist (52) .68 .45   
     
 
Conceptual Expansion Task 
Mean 
   
Artist (40) 6.09 2.21 5.16 < .001 
Non-artist (52) 3.85 1.95   
     
 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire 
Mean 
   
Artist (40) 21.07 19.43 5.65 < .001 
Non-artist (52) 13.63 11.70   
     
 Note:  Significantly higher figures in bold. 
 
Inspection of the results of this collection of t tests indicates that a clear relationship 
exists between two of the three main constructs of interest, namely, imagery and 
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creativity.  When the top and bottom quartiles on the ICRT variable are selected and 
compared on the creativity tasks, significant differences are revealed between these 
groups on three of the four indices; AUT, CET, and CAQ.  There are no differences on 
any of the creativity tasks when the participants are split into quartiles all schizotypy 
measures and the top and bottom 25% are compared on each measure of creativity.  
However, when the artists were compared with the non-artist group, significant 
differences are found on all four creativity measures.  There were no significant 
differences between the artists and non-artists on any of the newly computed schizotypy 
measures, which included an indication of the accompanying levels of distress, 
distraction and frequency for each subscale. 
 
CONCEPTUAL EXPANSION 
The order of entry of the predictor variables was consistent with the previous study also 
reflected the finding that suppressor variables may influence the relationships between 
the variables entered into the regression.  Direct method of entry with backward deletion 
was used, with the ICRT being entered as a predictor alongside the three reliable 
schizotypy subscale variables which include the CAPS ratings.  The initial regression 
model explained just 7% of the variance in CET scores, F(4, 86) = 2.830, ΔR2adj = .074, p 
= .029 and so this was repeated in iterations, each time removing the predictor with the 
lowest non-significant regression coefficient in an attempt to improve the model.  The 
results of the final multiple linear regression analysis are presented in Table 6.12, with 
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the variables that were removed from the model presented in Table 6.13 in order of 
removal. 
 
 
Table 6.12 
Multiple linear regression of imagery and schizotypy variables on Conceptual Expansion 
Task scores 
Variables CET 
(r) 
ICRT 
Total (r) 
     B 
(unique) 
SE    sr
2a
      t    p 
Constant   2.94 .65   4.50 .001* 
ICRT Total .25  .23 .12 .23 .05 2.25 .03** 
Unusual Experiences-C .22 .11 .19 .01 .19 .05 1.10 .06 
Note.  
* 
p < .001; ** p < 05; ICRT = Image Transformation and Recognition Task; 
a 
sr
2
 = the squared 
semipartial correlations indicate the unique variance explained by the predictor. 
 
Table 6.13 
Predictor variables removed from multiple linear regression on CET 
Variable removed (in order of removal)               β          t p 
Cognitive Disorganisation-C -.01 -.13 .90 
Impulsive Nonconformity-C -.16 -1.48 .14 
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The final regression revealed an R of .32, R
2
 = .10, and adjusted R
2
 of .08 (F(2, 88) = 
4.866, ΔR2adj = .079, p = .010), explaining 8% of variance in concept expansion.  The 
only clearly significant predictor of CET scores was ICRT Total, although Unusual 
Experiences-C scores were only marginally insignificant.  The variables uniquely 
predicted 10% of the variance (.10, sum of the squared semipartial correlation 
coefficients) and shared no explained variance (calculated by subtracting the uniquely 
explained variance from the R
2
 value: .10 - .10 = 0). 
 
ALTERNATIVE USES 
The four predictors were entered into the model with AUT as the criterion variable.  This 
model explained 8% of the variance in AUT scores, F(4, 86) = 3.044, ΔR2adj = .083, p = 
.021.  The same process of removing poor predictors was repeated as before.  The results 
of the final model are presented in Table 6.14, with the variables that were removed from 
the model presented in Table 6.15. 
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Table 6.14 
Multiple linear regression of imagery and schizotypy variables on the Alternative Uses 
Task (AUT) 
Variables AUT 
(r) 
ICRT 
Total (r) 
     B 
(unique) 
SE    sr
2a
      t    P 
Constant   .49 .11   4.59 < .001* 
ICRT Total .35  .08 .02 .35 .11 3.39 .001* 
Impulsive Nonconformity-C .08 .21 .00 .00 .01 .00 .09 .92 
Note.  
* 
p < 05; ICRT = Image Transformation and Recognition Task; 
a 
sr
2
 = the squared semipartial 
correlations indicate the unique variance explained by the predictor. 
 
Table 6.15 
Predictor variables removed from multiple linear regression on AUT scores 
Variable removed (in order of removal)               β          t p 
Unusual Experiences-C  -.02 -1.44 .88 
Cognitive Disorganisation-C -.05 -.48 .63 
 
The final regression revealed an R of .35, R
2
 = .12, and adjusted R
2
 of .10 (F(2, 88) = 
6.09, ΔR2adj = .102, p = .003), and ICRT Total was the single significant predictor.  This 
variable uniquely predicted 11% of the variance in alternative uses provided. 
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CREATIVE STRENGTHS 
With TTCT-CS as the criterion variable, the same four predictors were entered into the 
model.  This explained just 1% of variance and was found to be non-significant (F(4, 86) 
= 1.357, ΔR2adj = .015, p = .259) and so no further regressions were conducted. 
 
CREATIVE ACHIEVEMENT  
With CAQ as the criterion variable, the ICRT was entered as a predictor alongside the 
three reliable schizotypy subscale variables which include the CAP ratings.  The initial 
regression model explained 11% of the variance in creative achievement, F(4, 86) = 
3.698, ΔR2adj = .107, p = .008 and so this was repeated in iterations as before.  The results 
of the final model are presented in Table 6.16, with the variables that were removed from 
the model presented in Table 6.17 in order of removal. 
 
Table 6.16 
Multiple linear regression of imagery and schizotypy variables on Creative Achievement 
(CAQ) 
Variables CAQ 
(r) 
ICRT 
Total (r) 
     B 
(unique) 
SE    sr
2a
      t    p 
Constant   5.34 4.95   1.08 .284 
ICRT Total .25  2.02 .85 .24 .05 2.37 .02* 
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Unusual Experiences-C .30 .11 .23 .08 .30 .08 2.89 .00* 
Note.  
* 
p < 05; ICRT = Image Transformation and Recognition Task; 
a 
sr
2
 = the squared semipartial 
correlations indicate the unique variance explained by the predictor. 
 
Table 6.17 
Predictor variables removed from multiple linear regression on creative achievement 
Variable removed (in order of removal)               β          t p 
Cognitive Disorganisation-C -.02 -.23 .82 
Impulsive Nonconformity-C 
-.09 -.87 .39 
 
These analyses reveal that the creativity measures selected for this study each have 
unique relationships with mental imagery and schizotypy.  The predictive power of the 
imagery and schizotypy variables varies depending how creativity is measured.   
 
In order to build a more comprehensive understanding of these interrelationships, all 92 
cases were entered into a discriminant function analysis to investigate whether the 
variables could be used to predict whether a participant was a visual artist or not. 
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Discriminant Function Analysis 
A discriminant analysis was conducted to ascertain whether it was possible to predict 
membership of the groups „visual artist‟ and „non-artist‟ based on schizotypy, mental 
imagery and creativity scores.  Predictor variables were ICRT Total, Unusual 
Experiences-C scores, (which included the CAPS ratings of how distressing, distracting, 
and frequent their positive schizotypal experiences were), and creativity scores (TTCT-
CS, AUT, CET, and CAQ).  Significant mean differences were observed for five of the 
predictors on the dependent variable.  Box‟s M was greater than .001 which indicated that 
the assumption of equality of covariance matrices was met (Box‟s M(21, 25838245)= 
36.239, p = .040).   
 
The discriminate function revealed a significant association between groups and the 
variables, accounting for 51.41% of between group variability, i.e. whether someone is an 
artist or not (canonical correlation = .717).  Each group has a normal distribution of 
discriminant scores (Figures 6.11 and 6.12).  Wilks‟ Lambda indicated a highly 
significant discriminant function (Wilks‟ Λ (6) = .486, χ2 = 62.73, p < .001) and showed 
that 48.6% of variability remained unexplained.   
 
Closer analysis of the structure matrix revealed four significant predictors, namely (in 
order of magnitude) CAQ score (.579), CET score (.529), TTCT-CS score (.504) and 
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ICRT score (.391).  The AUT coefficient was .279 so just fell short of meeting the 
selection criterion (greater than .3).  Unusual Experiences scores were not found to be a 
significant predictor of group membership (-.112).  The cross validated classification 
showed that overall 84% of participants were correctly classified.  Table 6.18 contains 
details of predicted group membership and proportions resulting from this analysis. 
 
Table 6.18 
Classification table for discriminant function analysis 
 
  
Predicted Group 
Membership  
   Non-artist Artist Total 
Original Count (%) Non-artist 
Artist 
47 (90.4) 
10 (25) 
5 (9.6) 
30 (75) 
52 (100) 
40 (100) 
Cross-validated Count (%) Non-artist 
Artist 
47 (90.4) 
10 (25) 
5 (9.6) 
30 (75) 
52 (100) 
40 (100) 
Note.  n = 92. 
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Figure 6.6 
Non-artist group cluster scores. Note:  n = 52, M = -0.84, SD = 0.76. 
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Figure 6.7 
Artist group cluster scores. Note:  n = 40, M = 1.10, SD = 1.24. 
 
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 indicate that there is some overlap between these two group 
distributions and so there is a possibility that some misclassifications of cases may have 
occurred. 
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6.7 Discussion 
Study 5 sought to investigate a number of potential relationships between mental imagery 
control, schizotypal symptomology and creative thought.  Strong associations were found 
between mental imagery control and all of the creativity measures, supporting the 
supposition that mental imagery control may be important for many types of creativity.  
The relationships between creativity and mental imagery abilities were found to differ 
depending on the creative task, with imagery control predicting performance on some 
creative tasks but not others.  However, mental imagery was implicated in all creative 
tasks, and especially controlled mental imagery was found amongst the visual artists, 
further buttressing claims that creativity and imagery are linked (LeBoutillier, 1999; 
Glazek, 2012).   
 
The best model was for predicting AUT scores, with 10% of variance being explained by 
both ICRT and impulsive nonconformity scores.  This suggests that participants may 
have used their mental imagery control aptitudes to imagine the stimulus items (a brick 
and a newspaper) in a variety of ways, possibly mentally rotating and „playing with‟ their 
mental image in order to see it from alternate angles and subsequently think of new 
alternative uses and circumstances in which these items could appear, while their 
tendency to „go against 'the norm‟ may have fostered more unusual suggestions, which, 
when compared to the others in the sample who were lower in this schizotypal trait, 
would have received higher scores for originality. 
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The association between mental imagery control and conceptual expansion scores, with 
ICRT explaining 8% of variance, hints towards the use of mental imagery when creating 
images of „alien‟ creatures.  Although there were no rules against sketching in this task, 
few did, and this supports the notion that it is likely that many participants conceived of 
their creatures using their mental imagery before drawing them, as opposed to using the 
time to sketch in order to generate responses in this task.  Additionally, unusual 
experiences was just marginally insignificant as a predictor for CET scores, which may 
suggest that a more unusual conceptual style and approach was implicated for this task.  
The findings of this study are related to Blajenkova and Kozhevnikov (2010) who found 
that visual-spatial ability did not predict specialisation in visual art.  This study found that 
imagery control did predict some of the variability in CAQ scores, however, it was 
unusual experiences which predicted most of the variance on this scale.   
 
Creative achievement scores were most strongly predicted by unusual experiences, which 
shared predictive power with imagery control scores.  This is an interesting result.  The 
fact that this pair of traits was implicated in the ability to achieve creative stature 
provides evidence that positive schizotypy and mental imagery are indeed related to 
creativity, but that this may only be observed with exceptionally creative individuals, that 
is, those who are creative as part of their job.  This association supports both the evidence 
implicating mental imagery abilities and schizotypal thought in eminent creative 
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performance (see Chapter 2, section 2.5).  Those achieving high scores on the CAQ were 
successful in their field, which for the „creative‟ sample was obviously most likely the 
domain of „visual arts‟, but high scoring participants who were not visual artists would 
have reported significant achievements in one or more of the remaining nine domains of 
creativity which are tapped by the CAQ.  These results encourage the use of the ICRT in 
studies to investigate mental imagery abilities in many creative domains.  Unusual 
experiences scores were positively correlated with creative achievement scores and this 
was in line with predictions.  The finding that the CAQ was in fact the only creativity 
variable that correlated with positive schizotypy is especially noteworthy.  High scores on 
the CAQ reflect a considerable amount of creative success, and given the literature which 
has demonstrated an increased presence of positive schizotypy amongst visual artists, art 
students, and other individuals whose career would be described as „creative‟ (Nettle, 
2005; Rawings & Locarnini, 2008; Nettle & Clegg, 2005), this finding may even seem 
unsurprising.  This finding also gives weight to the conclusion of the previous study 
which suggested that the levels of unusual experiences may not have been high enough 
for stronger relationships to be revealed, and also supports the literature which reports 
evidence of high levels of positive schizotypy in visual artists (Nettle, 2006).   
 
„Creative strengths‟, as measured by Torrance‟s checklist, were also found to be 
positively associated with mental imagery control, but again, the association between the 
two variables was weak.  This checklist awards points to participants based on their 
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ability, for example, to tell stories with sets of unrelated figures, to use rich and colourful 
imagery and to show unusual perspectives in their drawings, and surprisingly it appears 
that the ability to control mental images was not especially related to skills of this nature. 
This may have been because there was no need to generate an initial mental image to 
work with, for the task stimuli were presented on the response sheet.  Initially it was 
intended that the scoring of the TTCT included all five indices as well as the Checklist of 
Creative Strengths, however, as was outlined in the results section (with further 
discussion at Appendix U), the decision was taken to eliminate some of the scores in light 
of the scoring instructions and issues encountered by judges.  Mental imagery control was 
positively related to all four indices of creativity and predicted variance in all of the 
regressions.   
 
In order to check for non-linear associations the scores belonging to the top and bottom 
quartiles on each of the independent variables were compared on each of the measures of 
creativity.  The comparisons of top and bottom ICRT imagery control, unusual 
experiences, introvertive anhedonia and impulsive nonconformity groups on the Torrance 
Creative Strengths (TTCT-CS) scores revealed no significant differences between any of 
the groups on this measure.  The ability to control mental imagery did not result in 
significantly enhanced creative strengths on this task.  It may be that this subscale alone 
does not tap creative ability as well it does when included with the other subscales of 
creative thought which are included in the TTCT (when up-to-date norms are available).  
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The scores reported by the top and bottom ICRT groups on the AUT were significantly 
different.  However, high and low groups on unusual experiences, introvertive anhedonia 
and impulsive nonconformity were not significantly different in terms of the alternative 
uses generated.  This reflects the possibility discussed earlier that participants were more 
successful on this task if they were able to manipulate and control mental imagery, the 
tentative conclusion being drawn that this is what they did with their mental image of the 
brick and the newspaper.  The subjectivity was removed from the scoring of this task, 
that is, the responses were not scored for elaboration, and it is argued that this 
modification improved the scoring of this measure of divergent thinking.  The regression 
to predict variance in AUT scores found that ICRT was the sole significant predictor. 
 
The scores of the top and bottom ICRT groups on the CET were significantly different, 
and this suggests that strong mental imagery control may have contributed to 
participants‟ ability to conceive of particularly unusual creatures prior to drawing them.  
Contrary to hypotheses however, the high and low on unusual experiences, introvertive 
anhedonia and impulsive nonconformity groups were not significantly different in their 
conceptual expansion.  The lack of relationship between this measure and unusual 
experiences is surprising because „fantasy proneness‟ and „magical ideation‟ certainly 
sounds as though they may influence the creation of alien creatures.  However, when the 
variables were entered into a regression to predict conceptual expansion, imagery control 
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was the strongest predictor, and unusual experiences scores were also found to be a 
significant predictor of scores in this variable.   
 
The comparisons of the top and bottom quartile groups‟ ICRT scores found that these 
differed significantly on the CAQ, and theoretically the inclusion of the visual artists in 
the sample may explain this finding.  The unusual experiences, introvertive anhedonia 
and impulsive nonconformity groups did not differ in their self-reported creative 
achievement.  The regression with CAQ as the criterion variable, however, found that 
unusual experiences scores and ICRT both predicted creative achievement, with imagery 
control exhibiting the most predictive power. 
 
The visual artists‟ scores were significantly higher than the non-artists‟ scores on the four 
measures of creativity.  This was somewhat expected due to the inclusion of artists which 
served as a type of „manipulation check‟ in the design of the study.  The inclusion of 
these individuals meant there was more variability in the responses provided, which mean 
that a more in-depth analysis could take place.  A marked difference was not found 
between unusual experiences scores for the visual artists compared to the non-artists, as 
had been hypothesised, while it was not possible to reliably investigate whether visual 
artists differed significantly on their levels of introvertive anhedonia as this scale was 
found to be unreliable.  With this in mind it may be worth noting that these participants 
reporting more of a tendency for these schizotypal traits, which concurs with previous 
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findings by Nettle (2006, see also Rawlings & Locarni, 2008), and unusual experiences 
did predict creative achievement. 
 
The discrininant function analysis was able to correctly classify a sizeable portion of the 
sample as either a visual artist or a „non-artist‟, and this was calculated on the basis of 
their creativity scores, their levels of positive schizotypy, and their ability to control their 
mental imagery.  This is an encouraging result as it indicates that, despite no especially 
large effects being revealed in this study, the materials and measures selected to provide 
indices on the variables of interest nonetheless accurately reflected the characteristics and 
patterns of responding of the participants in terms of their individual levels of creativity, 
mental imagery control and unusual experiences. 
 
In an early paper discussing the use of Torrance‟s creative thinking battery, Harrington 
(1975) notes that Torrance (1966) asked respondents to produce as many solutions as 
possible and to produce „interesting‟ and „clever‟ solutions  He states, “inadequately 
informative instructions fail to create conditions necessary for either the accurate 
assessment of divergent thinking abilities or for the meaningful evaluation of 
qualitatively-orientated scoring procedures” (p. 435), and this was certainly felt to be the 
case in the present study.  He discusses the effects of explicit instructions to „be creative‟ 
on the psychological meaning of divergent thinking test scores.  At the time Harrington‟s 
paper was published scant attention had been paid to investigate the influence of 
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instructions on task performance in measures of divergent thinking.  Explicitly instructing 
participants to „be creative‟ when completing these tasks appeared to influence their 
responding as they appeared to be threatened by this requirement, which additionally was 
found to be an “anxiety-arousing” component of the testing session (Harrington, 1975, p. 
451).   
 
Simonton states that “creativity is a very complex phenomenon with multiple 
determinants, some cognitive and others dispositional (Simonton, 2007, cited in Roberts, 
2007, p. 355)”.  He asserts “Because so many variables are involved in the makeup of the 
creative individual, the contribution of any single factor will be necessarily small” (p. 
355).  This was supported by the findings of Study 5, as is highlighted by the respective 
creativity tasks yielding differential associations with both imagery control and 
schizotypy.  Another potential confusing element to the domain-specificity debate in 
creativity research is the finding that cognitive and dispositional variables may actually 
interact, “rather than being the additive function of separate components, creative 
capacity may be a multiplicative function of them” (Roberts, 2007, p. 355).  Creativity, 
imagery, and schizotypy clearly interacted in different ways in Study 5, supporting the 
assertion that numerous separate components combine in creative exploration and 
thought. 
 
  372 
6.7.1 Limitations 
The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) proved to be only a marginally 
effective tool for assessing creative ability in the study, for a number of reasons.  Some 
participants commented that there was not enough room for them to elaborate on their 
drawings in the TTCT circles task, and there were problems with scoring the titles of the 
images that the participants produced.  The scorers were unable to agree on their initial 
originality ratings because the titles provided were often unique and in the form of a 
sentence, having followed the instruction to make the images „tell a story‟.  However 
what this meant was that the obvious originality that was clear to the scorers when 
looking at the images was lost due to the generic scoring procedure traditionally 
employed for this element of the TTCT.  Torrance has stated that he added the Checklist 
of Creative Strengths for this very reason, namely, the fact that the true essence and 
creativity of these images is lost when scoring with the conventional methods.  Despite 
this, none of the predictors were significantly related to TTCT-CS scores, a finding which 
supports the use of multiple creative thinking tasks in order to tap a range of creative 
abilities (Simonton, 2012; Armstrong, 2012). 
 
The participants completed the Alternative Uses Task online and this may have been a 
limitation of the study.  The webpages timed out after participants had spent two minutes 
providing alternative uses for each item, however, the lack of control here requires 
acknowledgement.  Though it is unlikely that respondents would have taken the 
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opportunity when completing this measure to cheat on this task in the absence of the 
experimenter, there is the possibility that they made have obtained help on their generated 
alternative uses from someone else who was with them (they were requested to complete 
the online tasks alone).  It was requested at the end of the experimental session and in the 
email containing the link to the online component that they concentrated and moved 
through the tasks as quickly as possible.  Inspection of the times taken to respond meant 
that any conspicuous responses may be studied and removed if necessary, and it was 
unlikely that participants did cheat on this task.  Participants also completed the 
schizotypy measure online, and it is recommended when completing psychometric 
questionnaires of this type that one goes with their instinct and resists deliberating on 
their responses too much.  Therefore the request to move quickly had two intentions; one, 
to reduce the likelihood that participants sought out external resources when responding 
to the AUT, and two, to ensure that they would not over-think their responses to the 
schizotypy measure.  One last limitation concerns the finding that the introvertive 
anhedonia subscale was unreliable.  This prevented an investigation of previous findings 
reported in the literature which suggest this trait may be negatively related to creative 
output.  This was revealed despite evidence which suggests that the short version of the 
O-LIFE is a valid and reliable tool for measuring the four schizotypy subscales, and so it 
is uncertain what lead to this result. 
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6.7.2 Further research 
The findings that visual artists differed when compared to non-artists in all of the 
creativity tools suggests that creative individuals are able to generate unique and original 
responses in a number of areas.  However, apart from the Alternative Uses Task, a verbal 
fluency task, these were primarily visual creativity tasks, as was intended due to the 
evidence suggesting that suitable measures should be employed when conducting 
research with different creative groups.  However, future research may want to consider 
how other creative groups, such as writers, scientists, mathematicians and computer 
programmers, perform in these differential tasks, and whether they demonstrate creative 
abilities in one or many areas.  Additionally, it may be that, as well as having different 
creative abilities, these individuals show marked differences in their mental imagery 
control skills.   
 
While statistical infrequency tells us something about the uniqueness of responses, this is 
contaminated by sample size.  As is noted by Silvia et al. (2008), research of this type is 
atypical in science because large sample sizes conflate the number of unique responses 
given.  As the responses are compared to the other participants in the sample, smaller 
samples are likely to have more original answers simply due to there being fewer 
participants.  Therefore people may be awarded points for „creativity‟ when actually their 
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response is an otherwise common one which, by chance, has not been generated by 
anyone else.  Similarly, it is pointed out that with large sample sizes, the likelihood that 
any response will be given increases as a function of the number of participants in the 
study. 
 
Overall the results of Study 5 suggest that associations between imagery, schizotypy and 
creativity vary according to the type of creativity that is being measured.  Imagery control 
appears useful for expanding conceptions about creatures from out-space, with 
schizotypy having little influence on this.  Control of imagery and a tendency towards 
impulsive nonconformity may engender high scores on measures of verbal fluency, while 
positive schizotypal traits, which may also represent uncontrolled imagery, may lead to 
greater creative achievement, with imagery control being implicated in this also. 
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CHAPTER 7 EXTENDED DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Main findings of the thesis 
Five studies were conducted and are reported within this thesis.  Table 7.1 summarises 
the key findings from each study.  Following this, each is discussed in turn and then 
contributions, conclusions, limitations and directions for future research are discussed. 
 
Table 7.1 
Summary of key findings from the thesis 
Chapter 
number 
Study number(s)  
and Title(s)  
Key findings 
3 Studies 1 and 2 
Pilot and development of 
the ICRT 
The ICRT effectively measures individual 
differences in levels of mental imagery control 
 
The psychometric properties of this tool should be 
explored to investigate whether memory or order 
were confounding variables 
 
New items need to be developed and existing ones 
refined 
 
4 Studies 3a, 3b and the 
construct validity and 
reliability of the ICRT  
 
The nameability study found that the intended-
images accurately depict what they intend to, 
resulting in greater confidence when using this 
tool to measure image recognition. 
 
The ability to rotate shapes in mental imagery 
appears to be an essential feature of mental 
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imagery control. 
 
The refined ICRT measures abilities in more than 
one area of mental imagery control, namely, 
image evocation, image manipulation, image 
recognition, and spatial and object imagery. 
 
5 Study 4 
Relationships between 
creativity, mental imagery 
and schizotypy 
Mental imagery control as measured by the ICRT 
was related to creative performance, however, 
self-reported mental imagery abilities were not.   
 
Self-reported mental imagery and objectively 
measured mental imagery scores were not related.  
Overall this supports the discriminant validity of 
the ICRT. 
 
No direct association was found between mental 
imagery control and levels of schizotypy, 
however, mental imagery control, unusual 
experiences, and cognitive disorganisation 
accounted for variance in scores on the creative 
visualisation task. 
 
 
6 Study 5 
Creativity, mental 
imagery and schizotypy in 
artists and non-artists 
Mental imagery control was found to be related to 
creative achievement, conceptual expansion, 
generating alternative uses for household objects, 
and creative strengths, findings which were 
supported when comparing strong image 
controllers to participants less able in imagery 
control.  Unusual experiences scores were related 
to high creative achievement.  Regression 
analyses showed that differential results emerged 
dependant on the creative measure, with ICRT 
predicting concept expansion and alternative uses, 
impulsive nonconformity also contributing to the 
latter index.  Neither imagery control or 
schizotypy variables predicted TTCT creative 
strengths, but the strongest predictor of creative 
achievement was found to be unusual experiences, 
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followed by imagery control skill. 
 
Visual artists were no different to the non-artists 
on levels of positive schizotypy though their 
imagery control skills differed significantly. 
 
The scores on creativity and mental imagery 
control accurately discriminated whether a 
participant was a visual artist or a non-artist for 
almost 84% of the sample, while the level of 
positive schizotypy was not found to be a 
discriminant predictor of group membership. 
 
 
7.1.1 Developing the ICRT 
The first studies were designed to pilot and test a new mental imagery control tool, the 
Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT).  Mental imagery control was shown to 
contain many facets which were individually measureable by the tool.  These involved 
the visualisation and rotation of objects, combining and restructuring of mental forms, 
and the ability to then see the image in a new, previously unanticipated way.  Not 
everyone who was tested was capable of all of these abilities, with some showing only 
moderate imagery control skills, while others were able to quickly move through the 
mental imagery tasks with ease and efficiency.  Others still were able to accurately 
complete all of the imagery manipulation tasks, but were unable to recognise a single 
image that they had created, while a small percentage of participants were able to easily 
recognise the pictures from their mental image, possibly demonstrating a mental shift 
from using spatial to object imagery.  This supports multidimensional theories of mental 
imagery and shows that, rather than being either a „spatial imager‟, or an „object imager‟ 
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(Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006), some show enhanced abilities in both types 
of mental imagery.  There also appears to be a threshold of difficulty beyond which only 
a few are able to go, that is, those who are strong in their mental imagery control can 
easily and successfully complete very long mental imagery tasks, involving 7, 8 and 9 
stages.  These studies provided acceptable support for the use of this tool in future 
investigations into mental imagery abilities. 
 
7.1.2 Construct validity and reliability of the ICRT 
The intended-images which materialise in mental imagery having correctly followed the 
ICRT instructions are unambiguous in what they depict, and so this tool has many 
potential applications in terms of methodologies of administration and what it is able to 
measure.  It was shown that the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) shared 
relationships with performance-based measures of mental imagery ability which provided 
construct validity for the tool.   
 
7.1.3 The relationships between creativity, schizotypy and mental imagery 
The results of study 3 were mixed in terms of the hypotheses that had been made.  The 
participants with high positive schizotypy scores did not perform better on the creative 
imagery task, though unusual experiences did share some of the predictive power with 
cognitive disorganisation and ICRT indices in explaining CVT scores.  This supports the 
contention that mental imagery control and creativity are inherently linked, and may 
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support the argument that an element of schizotypy, namely, unusual, uncontrolled 
perceptual and imaginal experiences, may also be associated with creative performance, 
and that the literature implicating schizotypy in creative performance may reflect this.  
However, the possibility remains that these results reflected a relationship between the 
cognitive processes that underlie both the imagery control tasks and creative 
visualisation, which were similar in nature.  A battery of varied creativity measures 
would have allowed this possibility to be explored, so this was planned for the final 
study. 
 
7.1.4 Creativity, schizotypy and mental imagery in artists and non-artists 
A number of interesting results were uncovered in Study 5.  The visual artists were 
shown to have distinct patterns of responding on some of the measures employed.  When 
compared to the non-artists, the visual artists were stronger in terms of performance on 
all of the creativity tasks, receiving significantly higher scores on all three performance 
measures, providing some evidence for domain-general creativity.  The schizotypy 
measure indicated that artists were more prone to flat affect (introvertive anhedonia) than 
the non-artists (this scale was, however, unreliable), though the two groups had similar 
unusual experiences (positive schizotypy) scores.  This could be due to the fact that one 
group were a student sample, and schizotypy scores are higher generally for this 
population (Nettle, 2001), and the other group were artists, also reportedly more likely to 
report frequent unusual experiences, magical ideation, and other strange, anomalous 
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perceptual occurrences.  Measuring creative performance has many nuances which need 
to be considered when designing research investigating the relationships between 
creativity and both schizotypy and mental imagery.  This is because different patterns of 
results are revealed depending on the way creativity is measured, that is, whether 
divergent thinking, conceptual expansion, thinking creatively with pictures, or self-report 
measures of creative achievement are used. 
 
The related studies which were conducted in the present thesis investigated three 
infamously convoluted constructs.  These investigations were designed to „iron-out‟ the 
hypothesised relationships inherent in these.  Initially an effective tool was developed in 
order that the construct be measured appropriately.  This was then scrutinised, the skills 
which it tapped were delineated and the tool refined.  The ICRT subsequently provided a 
useful tool to look at the relationships with creativity, imagery control and schizotypy. 
 
7.2 Contributions of the thesis 
A mental imagery tool which effectively differentiates levels of ability was lacking in the 
field.  The objective tools which exist certainly measure differing types of spatial ability, 
however, the ICRT offers mental imagery researchers the opportunity to study a number 
of imagery control aptitudes at once.  A secondary, equally pleasing but arguably less 
important aspect of the tool is that the majority of people who completed it during its 
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development (over 300) thoroughly enjoyed doing it.  An electronic version of the Image 
Control and Recognition Task (ICRT) for use on tablets, smartphones and PCs is in 
development, which will allow imagery researchers more flexibility and the ability to test 
mental imagery control and recognition remotely. 
 
The construct and convergent validity of the ICRT were scrutinised and its psychometric 
properties analysed.  Agreement on what the resultant-images of the ICRT represented 
was generally high which means that researchers who wish to investigate only the 
recognition element of the tool may do so without requiring participants to draw.  
Although ICRT Recognition was not included in some of the analyses in the thesis (due to 
issues of power and having the same pattern yet slightly smaller relationships with 
imagery and creativity), it deserves further analysis.  Visual artists recognised 
significantly more ICRT images than non-artists.  As well as being proficient in terms of 
their ability to generate, rotate, manipulate, and combine the shapes accurately, their 
ability to inspect and view these newly formed images „as a whole‟ was also enhanced.  
Though related, these are slightly different imagery abilities.   
 
Support for the role of positive schizotypy in creativity was found here and adds to the 
body of literature supporting the contention that the two are linked.  Two contributions of 
note are related to this.  Firstly, the amendment to the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of 
Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) allowed the levels of intrusion, distress, and 
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frequency of schizotypal experiences to be accounted for when considering relationships 
with creativity and imagery.   
 
Additionally, evidence for both domain-general and domain-specific creativity was 
found, with both artists and non-artists showing differential abilities in the varying types 
of creativity task employed. 
 
A new model of mental imagery is proposed, one which addresses different types of 
imagery ability (Figure 7.1).  There appears to be a difference between ‗imagery‘, as it is 
generally conceived, ‗image recognition‘, and ‗imagery control‘, which this thesis has 
suggested is comprised of a number of abilities.  The ICRT has allowed investigation into 
each of these aspects of mental imagery for there are a number of elements, or phases, to 
completing the tool.  Differences in the ability to generate, maintain, manipulate, and 
rotate mental images may be assessed, abilities which are collectively conceived of as 
‗imagery control‘.  However, an unexpected finding was that ‗image recognition‘ appears 
to be a separate ability, one that requires different skills to those necessary for success on 
imagery control tasks.  It seems to be an additional ability, one that is not possessed by 
everyone with skills in imagery control.  This model of imagery is depicted at Figure 7.1 
below. 
 
  384 
Figure 7.1 
New model of mental imagery 
 
 
 
7.3 Conclusions, limitations, future studies and directions 
The methods and collection of studies employed in this thesis were unique in their 
design.  Mental imagery and creativity researchers now have a new tool with which to 
investigate abilities in these areas.  Researchers interested in schizotypy and the 
dimensions underlying it may now also get an indication of whether individual 
differences in the levels of these traits are differentially related other to psychological 
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characteristics and constructs.  The adapted O-LIFE ratings and the scores revealed with 
these, which include the levels of distress, distraction and the frequency of schizotypal 
thought, represent an interesting avenue of research for investigators of the schizotypy-
creativity relationship, as well as in studies into the relation of schizotypal imagery to 
creativity.  What would be interesting would be to conduct investigations on these 
subscales individually to ascertain whether these have differential associations with 
creativity, or imagery control.  A detailed analysis of these individual indices was not 
conducted due to issues of power and sample size, though investigation of the 
incommodiousness of schizotypal traits and any relation this has to creativity may help to 
elucidate this convoluted relationship. 
 
There were some limitations in the studies in this thesis, mainly related to the creativity 
tasks employed.  The first task was problematic because it contained stimuli which were 
the same as those in the mental imagery task.  The second problem was that for the 
creativity tool employed in the study with the visual artists, conventional scoring lost all 
„flavour‟ of the creative responses on some tools.  The inclusion of a visual memory task 
would have been beneficial in Study 6.  A differentmemory measure may have 
highlighted differences in imaginal performance as a result of abilities in visual memory, 
the digit span tasks instead measuring other elements of working memory and, indirectly, 
executive function.  Additionally, any differences in visual memory between artists and 
non-artists may have been enlightening.  Recent evidence provided by fMRI imaging has 
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suggested that visual memory and visual mental imagery involve similar neural processes 
(Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2012), namely frontal-parietal control regions and 
occipital-temporal sensory regions, however, Slotnick et al. concluded that their findings 
“implicate differences in the specific degree to which particular process contributed to 
each task” (p. 19).  It has been argued that, to a certain degree, enhanced memory 
capacities are an implied but essential feature of mental imagery control, and this is 
supported by the finding that the two cognitive processes share neural connectivity.  A 
conclusion that may be drawn from this could be that the apparently effortless and 
exceptional imagery control exhibited by some during transformation tasks depends upon 
the efficacy of these interconnected brain regions.   
 
Future research could look at the differences between imagery control and image 
recognition as measured by the Image Control and Recognition Task.  This tool can be 
used to measure overall abilities in imagery control, but can also be utilised to obtain 
indications of the seemingly less common ability to recognise newly constructed mental 
images before drawing them.  The ability to do this would be useful for creative 
exploration and is akin to the process of „combinatory play‟ which is often cited in 
creative visualisation and discovery (Finke & Slayton, 1989). 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has contributed to the fields of imagery, creativity and 
schizotypy research through the development and adaptation of a number of tools, and 
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has provided evidence to support the supposition that both imagery control and elements 
of schizotypal thought are related to creative output.  These associations depend on the 
measure of imagery, levels of schizotypal thought, and the index of creativity which is 
considered, reflecting the multidimensional nature of these distinct yet subtly related 
constructs. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Study 1 information sheet 
Psychology Department 
Middlesex University 
Queensway, Enfield, Middlesex, EN3 4SA 
 
Nature of the study 
You are being invited to take part in the development and validation of a new psychological tool.  Prior to 
giving your consent, it is important that you understand what is being investigated.  Take as long as you 
need to read the following information and please ask should you have any queries relating to the study.  
If you no longer wish to take part once reading this information sheet you do not have to. 
 
Procedure 
You will be asked to complete a series of image transformation tasks whereby you will follow verbal 
instructions and imagine combining and manipulating the shapes in your head.  At the end of each stem 
you will be asked to draw the resultant image. 
 
At the end of this, you will be asked some questions and will have an opportunity to ask any questions of 
your own. 
 
Potential Risks/Discomfort 
The task poses no potential risk or discomfort whatsoever.   
 
Confidentiality 
All information and data collected in this study will remain confidential and will be destroyed after 
completion.   
 
Participation and Withdrawal 
Should you agree to participate in this study, you are free to withdraw at any time without further 
question.  
 
All proposals for research using human participants are reviewed by an Ethics Committee before they can 
proceed.  The Middlesex Psychology Department’s Ethics Committee has reviewed this proposal. 
 
Any Questions  
Should you have any questions relating to your participation in this study, please contact 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk and these will happily be answered. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet.   Please take time to decide if you would like to take part in 
the study and sign the consent form if so.  
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APPENDIX B  
Study 1 consent form 
School of Health and Social Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
 
Written Informed Consent 
 
I have understood the details of the research as explained to me by the researcher, and 
confirm that I have consented to act as a participant.   
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, the data collected during the 
research will not be identifiable, and I have the right to withdraw from the project at 
any time without any obligation to explain my reasons for doing so. 
 
I further understand that the data I provide may be used for analysis and subsequent 
publication, and provide my consent that this might occur. 
 
This sheet will be removed before data entry to ensure further confidentiality. 
 
 
Print name: _________________ Sign Name: 
____________________________ 
 
Date: ______________________ Student No: 
__________________________ 
 
Researcher: Lucy Irving  
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APPENDIX C 
Study 1. Debrief sheet  
Psychology Department 
Middlesex University 
Queensway, Enfield, Middlesex, EN3 4SA 
 
 
Debrief  
 
Thank you for participating.  The study you have just taken part in concerns the 
development of a new measure for assessing mental image controllability. 
 
The ability to control mental imagery has been implicated in certain creative pursuits.  
Famous people such as Albert Einstein and Salvador Dali utilised mental imagery when 
working on their creations, utilising thought experiments and dream-like images 
respectively. 
 
A tool which effectively measures the ability to control mental imagery is lacking in the 
psychological field, partly because of the subjective nature of mental imagery itself. 
 
The task you completed was a pilot of a new performance-based measure of image 
controllability.   
 
Please do not discuss the contents of your experimentation with any other student at 
Middlesex University. 
 
 
Further Reading: 
 
Kosslyn, S.M., Reiser, B.J., Farah, M.J., & Fliegal, S.L.  (1983).  Generating visual images:  
Units and Relations.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  General. Vol. 112, 278-303. 
 
Finke, R.A., Pinker, S., Farah, M.J.  (1989).  Reinterpreting Visual Patterns in Mental 
Imagery.  Cognitive Science.  Vol. 13, 51-78. 
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APPENDIX D 
Amended version of the Image Control and Recognition Task for Study 2 
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APPENDIX E 
Pool of all Image Control and Recognition Tasks  
9 items (marked with *) came from the previous version. 
Image Control and Recognition Task items 
1 Imagine a triangle pointing upwards 
2 Imagine another downward pointing triangle so that it is directly underneath 
and the horizontal lines overlap  
3 Remove the horizontal line  
 
1 Imagine a rectangle lying  sideways/horizontally 
2 Add a right pointing triangle to the right of the shape so it is touching 
3 Rotate the entire shape 90° left/anti-clockwise 
 
1 Imagine a right pointing triangle 
2 Add a sideways/horizontal oval to the right of the shape so it is touching it 
3 Add a dot inside the oval, towards the right 
 
1. Imagine a capital letter ‗D‘ 
2. Rotate it 90° to the left 
3. Add a capital ‗J‘ directly underneath it 
 
1. Imagine a letter ‗V‘ 
2. Rotate it 180° 
3. Add a circle to the bottom of each line of the upside-down ‗V‘ 
 
1. Imagine an oval lying sideways/horizontally 
2. Add a left pointing triangle to the right of the shape so it is touching 
3. Add a right pointing triangle to the left of the shape so it is touching 
 
1. Imagine a circle 
2. Add a tall triangle pointing upwards to the top of the circle so that it is 
touching 
3. Add a horizontal line to the top of the circle, underneath the triangle so the 
horizontal lines overlap 
 
1. Imagine two circles side-by-side so that they are touching 
2. Add a larger circle directly underneath so that it is touching 
3. Add an even larger circle than the one you just added directly underneath the 
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shape so it‘s touching it 
 
1. * Imagine a capital letter ‗B‘ 
2. Rotate it 90° to the left/anti-clockwise 
3. Add a triangle pointing downwards so it lines up with the bottom of the shape 
and is touching 
4. Remove the horizontal line in the middle  
 
1. Imagine an upside-down capital ‗U‘ 
2. Add a wide/sideways rectangle directly underneath so that it is touching 
3. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right/clockwise 
4. Add a short wavy line ‗coming out‘ of the top of the rectangle 
 
1. * Imagine a rectangle with the long edge at the bottom (horizontal) 
2. Outside the rectangle, at the bottom of the right hand edge, attach a short 
horizontal line 
3. Add a square inside the rectangle towards the right side but do not let it touch 
the sides 
4. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise  
 
1. * Imagine a tall thin rectangle so it is standing vertically 
2. Add a very short vertical line to the bottom of it so it looks like it‘s sticking 
out 
3. Rotate the entire shape 180°  
4. Attach a teardrop to the top of the shape so that it is touching it  
 
1. * Imagine a plus sign 
2. Add a circle to the bottom of the vertical line 
3. Add a capital ‗V‘ to the top of the vertical line 
4. Rotate the entire shape 180° 
 
1. Imagine a triangle pointing upwards 
2. Superimpose another triangle of the same size but pointing down on top of the 
first one 
3. Add a vertical line underneath so it touches the bottom of the shape 
4. Rotate the entire shape 180° 
 
1. Imagine a square 
2. Add a plus sign inside the square so all the lines reach the surrounding lines 
3. Add a ‗smaller than‘ sign (left facing arrow) to the right of the shape so that it 
is halfway down and touching 
4. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise  
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1. Imagine a downward pointing triangle 
2. Add two dots side-by-side above the triangle but do not let them touch it 
3. Enclose everything within a large circle 
4. ‗Fill in‘ or ‗colour in‘ the triangle 
 
1. * Imagine a capital letter ‗D‘ 
2. To the left of it, imagine a triangle pointing left with the vertical edge nearly 
touching the side of the ‗D‘, but not touching it 
3. Join the two shapes with a short horizontal line 
4. At the right of the ‗D‘, outside it, imagine a vertical wavy line touching the 
curve 
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right/clockwise  
 
1. * Imagine a capital letter ‗K‘ 
2. Enclose it within a circle but do not let the lines of the letter touch the circle 
3. Enclose this shape within a tall rectangle so the circle is towards the top 
4. Add a triangle to the top of the shape so that it points up 
5. Remove the bottom half of the capital letter ‗K‘ 
 
1. * Imagine a rectangle so that it is standing vertically 
2. Enclose the rectangle within a larger square lining up the bottom line of the 
rectangle with the bottom line of the square 
3. Add a small square just inside the top right corner of the large square, but 
ensure that it does not touch it 
4. Imagine a large triangle sitting on top of the outer square.  This should be the 
same width, pointing upwards, and touching 
5. Add a small circle just inside the top left corner of the large square, but it 
must not touch it 
 
1. Imagine a rectangle with the long edge at the bottom (horizontal) 
2. Add a capital ‗U‘ inside the rectangle, at the top right, so that the top of the 
letter touches the top of the rectangle 
3. Rotate the shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise  
4. Add a long and thin triangle outside the shape, to the right of it, pointing right  
5. Rotate entire shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise 
 
1. Imagine a capital letter ‗D‘ 
2. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anticlockwise  
3. Add a trapezoid, with the longer horizontal line at the top, underneath the 
shape so that the horizontal line of the trapezoid overlaps that of the rotated 
‗D‘ 
4. Add a small circle on top of the shape so it is touching 
5. ‗Fill in‘ or ‗colour in‘ the circle 
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1. Imagine a long thin triangle pointing left  
2. Add a plus sign to the right of the shape so that it is touching 
3. Move the vertical line of the plus sign right, to the end of the shape 
4. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right/clockwise 
5. Elongate the bottom horizontal line in both directions  
 
1. Imagine a capital letter‘ U‘ 
2. Rotate it 90° to the right/clockwise 
3. Add a square to the right of the shape so that it is touching 
4. Reduce/shrink the square so that it becomes an upright rectangle 
5. Rotate the whole shape 90° to the right/clockwise 
 
1. Imagine a long right-pointing triangle 
2. Rotate it 90° to the right/clockwise  
3. Add a horizontal line inside the triangle, about halfway down 
4. Add a short, upward pointing triangle underneath the shape so that it is 
touching 
5. Add a diagonal line, leaning right, so that it looks like it is sticking out of the 
top of the shape 
 
1. * Imagine two O‘s next to each other so that they are touching 
2. Make the O on the left bigger than the one on the right 
3. Add a question mark to the top of the big O but imagine that the dot is 
obscured – the line of the question mark should be touching the top of the big 
O 
4. Stretch the question mark upwards so that it is long and thin 
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise  
6. Add an upside down ‗W‘ to the highest point of the shape so it is touching it  
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1. * Imagine two circles that are next to each other, touching 
2. Stretch the circle on the left so that it becomes a wide oval 
3. Add a short vertical line just to the right of the circle so that it is touching it  
4. Add a small square to the right of the line you just added so that it is touching 
it  
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise  
6. In the centre of the shape which is at the bottom, add three spots in a vertical 
line  
 
1. Imagine a capital letter O 
2. Add a short line to the left of the O so that the O is at the top of the line, to the 
right of it 
3. Add another capital letter O so that it appears directly below the first O and is 
touching it 
4. Add a left pointing triangle to the left of the shape so that it joins the line to 
the left of the O‘s  
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anti-clockwise  
6. Add another O so that it sits on top of the O‘s you already have  
 
1. Imagine a capital ‗X‘ 
2. Add a vertical line to the right side of the letter so that it is the same height 
and touching 
3. Add a vertical line to the left side of the letter so that it is the same height and 
touching 
4. Add two horizontal lines, one across the top and one along the bottom of the 
shape so that they are the same width and touching 
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right/clockwise  
6. Remove the bottom half of the ‗X‘  
 
1. Imagine a capital ‗T‘ 
2. Add a horizontal line underneath the letter so that it is the same width, and 
touching 
3. Superimpose a diagonal line across the shape so that it joins the top right of 
the shape with the bottom left of it  
4. Superimpose a diagonal line across the shape so that it joins the top left of the 
shape with the bottom right of it  
5. Remove the vertical line  
6. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the right/clockwise  
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1. Imagine a vertically standing rectangle 
2. Stretch it upwards so that it is long and thin 
3. Rotate it 90° to the right/clockwise 
4. Add a square to the left of the rectangle so that it is the same height and 
touching it 
5. Add a right pointing triangle to the right of the shape so that it is the same 
height and touching it  
6. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anticlockwise  
 
1. Imagine a rectangle so that it is lying sideways (horizontally) 
2. Inside this rectangle, imagine a circle in the middle of it 
3. Imagine another circle to the right of the first one but do not let them touch 
4. Imagine another circle to the left of the first circle, but do not let them touch 
5. Rotate the entire shape 90° to the left/anticlockwise  
6. Add a vertical line directly underneath the shape so that it is sticking out 
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APPENDIX F 
Image Control and Recognition Task response booklet (1 page) 
Title: 
 
Title: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: 
 
Title: 
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APPENDIX G 
Study 2. Debrief sheet  
Psychology Department 
Middlesex University 
Queensway, Enfield, Middlesex, EN3 4SA 
 
 
Debrief  
 
Thank you for participating.  The study you have just taken part in concerns the 
development of a new measure for assessing mental image controllability. 
 
The ability to control mental imagery has been implicated in certain creative pursuits.  
Famous people such as Albert Einstein and Salvador Dali utilised mental imagery when 
working on their creations, utilising thought experiments and dream-like images 
respectively. 
 
A tool which effectively measures the ability to control mental imagery is lacking in the 
psychological field, partly because of the subjective nature of mental imagery itself. 
 
The tasks you completed were to pilot a new performance-based measure of image 
controllability.  The memory task was administered to ascertain whether memory or 
imagery were more crucial to the ability to solve the image transformation tasks. 
 
Please do not discuss the contents of your experimentation with any other student at 
Middlesex University. 
 
 
Further Reading: 
 
Kosslyn, S.M., Reiser, B.J., Farah, M.J., & Fliegal, S.L.  (1983).  Generating visual images:  
Units and Relations.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  General. Vol. 112, 278-303. 
 
Finke, R.A., Pinker, S., Farah, M.J.  (1989).  Reinterpreting Visual Patterns in Mental 
Imagery.  Cognitive Science.  Vol. 13, 51-78. 
  455 
APPENDIX H 
Study 3a. Information sheet   
HSSC, Department of Psychology 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher: Lucy Irving 
 
You are being invited to take part in a very short research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully.  Ask if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information.  Take your time to decide whether you 
wish to take part. 
 
This study is related to a piece of research being conducted into mental imagery.  Some 
imagery tasks have been developed, and your task is to look through the images and to 
give each one a name.  Please do not try to be creative, just write the name which you 
feel best suits the shape. 
 
All responses will be kept confidential and this booklet should take no longer than 15-20 
minutes to go through.  Participation is entirely voluntary.  You do not have to take part if 
you do not want to.  If you do decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a Written 
Informed Consent Form.  You may withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
The research data collected will be anonymous.  Your answers will be kept confidential 
during the research and after the study has been completed.  All information will only be 
seen by members of the research team and all proposals for research using human 
participants are reviewed by an Ethics Committee before they can proceed.  Middlesex 
University‟s Psychology Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved this study. 
 
If you have any concerns, questions or comments about this study please contact Lucy 
Irving.  Department of Psychology, Middlesex University, Hendon, room R109; email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk  
 
Thank you for reading this information.  Please feel free to keep this sheet. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Study 3a. Consent form  
School of Health and Social Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
 
Written Informed Consent 
 
I have understood the details of the research as explained to me by the researcher, and 
confirm that I have consented to act as a participant.   
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, the data collected during the 
research will not be identifiable, and I have the right to withdraw from the project at 
any time without any obligation to explain my reasons for doing so. 
 
I further understand that the data I provide may be used for analysis and subsequent 
publication, and provide my consent that this might occur. 
 
  
Date  Print name   Sign Name 
___________ ________________________ __________________ 
Student No.  
_________________ 
 
Researcher: Lucy Irving  
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APPENDIX J 
Study 3a. Debrief sheet  
 
 
Dear Student 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Your contribution assists in the validation of a 
new measure of imagery control, the Image Control and Recognition Task (ICRT).  
During this task, participants are asked to manipulate shapes using only their mental 
imagery, and then to try and name the resultant image before drawing it.  The ICRT is 
being developed for use primarily in the field of mental imagery and creativity research. 
 
The names you provided will enable further development of the tool, which is 
performance-based.  The nature of mental imagery means that it is difficult to effectively 
measure individual differences in imagery control, and the ICRT aims to be a more 
objective tool.  It is important that there is agreement about what the pictures dipict. 
 
If you have any questions relating to the study, or would like to know any further 
information please ask Lucy or email l.irving@mdx.ac.uk.   
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study.   
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APPENDIX K 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks, 1973)  
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Same questions for eyes closed version 
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APPENDIX L 
Study 3b. Information sheet   
 
Department of Psychology, HSSc 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Researcher: Lucy Irving 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully.  Ask if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. 
 
In this study, you will complete three imagery tasks and the session will take 45 minutes 
to an hour to complete.  One is a self-report questionnaire, and the other two are 
performance-based tasks.  Full instructions and practice trials will be provided. 
 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You may withdraw from the study at 
any time without giving a reason.  If you are happy to take part, please sign the 
Informed Consent section at the bottom of this sheet.   
 
The research data collected will be anonymous.  Your questionnaires will be kept strictly 
confidential during the research and after the study has been completed.  All 
information will only be seen by members of the research team and all proposals for 
research are reviewed by an Ethics Committee before they can proceed.  Middlesex 
University’s Psychology Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved this proposal. 
 
If you have any concerns, questions or comments about this study please contact Lucy 
Irving.  Department of Psychology, Middlesex University, Hendon, email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk  
 
Thank you for reading this information.  Please feel free to keep this sheet if you would 
like to. 
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APPENDIX M 
 
Study 3b. Consent form  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CONSENT FORM: 
This study has been explained to me to my satisfaction, and I agree to take part. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time. 
  
NAME: ...................................................................         DATE: ............................... 
MDX STUDENT NUMBER: ………………………………………….. 
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APPENDIX N 
Study 3b. Debrief sheet  
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Your contribution assists us in our understanding 
of the relationship between different types of mental imagery task. 
 
You completed three mental imagery tools: 
 
The Image Control & Recognition Task (ICRT, Irving, 2011) required you to follow 
instructions and combine shapes and letters, and then try to name and draw the resultant 
image.  This tool measures mental imagery control and this ability to manipulate mental 
images is something which many creative people say is utilised while engaging in 
creative pursuits. 
 
You also completed a mental rotation task, which is a well-known tool developed by 
Shepard and Metzler (1971).  The ways in which people manipulate mental images is of 
interest to those studying imagery and its use in creative domains.   
 
You also completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, (VVIQ, Marks, 
1973), which measures how vivid you rate your images to be when introspecting on 
certain scenes and scenarios brought to mind.   
 
These three tools will be analysed in relation to one another to ascertain whether the self-
report tools bear any relation to the more objective measures, as the literature often 
reports that they do not (Burton, 2003).   
 
If you have any questions relating to the study please ask Lucy or email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk.   
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study.   
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APPENDIX O 
Adapted Test of Visual Imagery Control, (TVIC, Gordon, 1950)  
 
THE GORDON TEST OF VISUAL IMAGERY CONTROL 
 
NAME:    AGE: 
 
MALE/FEMALE:   OCCUPATION/COURSE: 
 
Read each question then close your eyes while you try to visualise the scene.  Once you 
are happy with your image, please record how easily you are able to change and amend 
each image by circling one of the numbers below, with 1 being „no control, and 5 being 
„complete control‟. 
 
Your accurate and honest answer to these questions is most important for the validity of 
this study.  Please ensure that you answer all 12 questions. 
Please rate how easily you can control your internal image according to the following 
instructions. 
1. Visualise a car standing in the road in front of a house 1........2.........3.........4.........5 
2. Visualise it in colour   1........2.........3.........4.........5 
3. Visualise it in a different colour  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
4. Visualise the same car lying upside down 1........2.........3.........4.........5 
5. Visualise the same car back on its four wheels again 1........2.........3.........4.........5 
6. Visualise the same car running along the road 1........2.........3.........4.........5 
7. Visualise it climbing up a very steep hill  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
8. Visualise it climbing over the top  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
 
9. Visualise it getting out of control and  
10. crashing through a house  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
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11. Visualise the same car running along the road with  
a handsome couple inside  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
12. Visualise the car crossing a bridge and falling over  
the side into a stream below  1........2.........3.........4.........5 
13. Visualise the car old and dismantled in a car cemetery 1........2.........3.........4.........5 
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 APPENDIX P 
Study 4. Information sheet  
 
School of Health and Social Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Researcher: Lucy Irving 
Supervisor:  Dr Nicholas LeBoutillier 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully.  Ask us if there is anything that is 
not clear or if you would like more information.  Take your time to decide whether you 
wish to take part. 
 
In this study, the relationships between particular thinking styles and mental imagery 
abilities will be investigated.  You will be asked to complete a number of self-report 
questionnaires, relating to certain cognitive styles and traits, your imagery control and 
imagery vividness. 
 
The questionnaires should take no more than 1 hour to complete.   
 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You do not have to take part if you do 
not want to.  If you do decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a Written Informed 
Consent Form.  You may withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. 
 
The research data collected will be anonymous.  Your questionnaires will be kept strictly 
confidential during the research and after the study has been completed.  All 
information will only be seen by members of the research team and all proposals for 
research using human participants are reviewed by an Ethics Committee before they can 
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proceed.  Middlesex University’s Psychology Ethics Committee has reviewed and 
approved this proposal. 
 
If you have any concerns, questions or comments about this study please contact Lucy 
Irving.  Department of Psychology, Middlesex University, Hendon, room R109; email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk  
 
Thank you for reading this information. Please feel free to keep this sheet. 
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APPENDIX Q 
Study 4. Consent form  
 
School of Health and Social Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
 
Written Informed Consent 
 
I have understood the details of the research as explained to me by the researcher, and 
confirm that I have consented to act as a participant.   
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, the data collected during the 
research will not be identifiable, and I have the right to withdraw from the project at 
any time without any obligation to explain my reasons for doing so. 
 
I further understand that the data I provide may be used for analysis and subsequent 
publication, and provide my consent that this might occur. 
 
This sheet will be removed before data entry to ensure further confidentiality. 
 
 
Print name: _________________ Sign Name: ____________________________ 
Date: ______________________ Student No: __________________________ 
 
Researcher: Lucy Irving  
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APPENDIX R 
Study 4. Debrief sheet  
 
Dear Student 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Your contribution assists us in our understanding 
of the relationship between mental imagery and certain cognitive traits, or thinking styles. 
 
You completed two imagery questionnaires (Test for Visual Imagery Control, TVIC, 
Richardson, 1969) and the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, (VVIQ, Marks, 
1973), and a measure relating to your feelings and experiences called the Oxford-
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences, (O-LIFE, Mason et al., 1995).  In 
addition, you completed the Creative Visualisation Task, (CVT, Finke, 1990) and the 
Image Control and Task, (ICRT) which relates to both visual imagery and creativity.  
These measures are to be explored in relation to each other.   Further information about 
these measures can be found in the reference list provided.   
 
The traits which are measured by the questionnaire which asked about your thoughts and 
feelings are common.  It is thought that these traits and characteristics are present among 
the „normal‟ population, with all people falling somewhere on each scale.   
 
The subscales are: unusual experiences, cognitive disorganisation, impulsive 
noncomformity and introvertive anhedonia, yet the unusual experiences subscale 
(positive schizotypy) is of interest in the present study.  This scale is characterised by 
magical or sometimes bizarre thoughts and ideas, visual and/or auditory hallucinations, 
and an „over inclusive‟ thinking style, all of which are common among certain creative 
individuals.  The relationship between these scales will be looked at in relation to the 
creativity task you completed, and the image control and recognition task in which you 
manipulated shapes as instructed.   Imagery control has also been cited as being 
beneficial whilst engaging in creative activities. 
 
If you have any questions relating to the study please ask Lucy or email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk.   
 
References 
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APPENDIX S 
Study 4. Correlations between creativity, imagery and schizotypy variables with age 
partialled out 
 
Partial correlation results controlling for age: 
The relationship between CVT and ICRT controlling for age was pr = .52, p < .001.  This is a 
marginal increase from r = .50, p < .001. 
 
When age was taken into account, the significant negative relationship between CVT & CogDis 
was removed, pr = -.09, p = .414.  This coefficient represents a decrease from r = -.22, p < .05 
when controlling for age.   
 
The coefficient between CVT and VVIQ scores was pr = .19, p = .073, which is a decrease from r 
= .22, p < .05.  The significant relationship between creativity and vividness was not found when 
age was accounted for. 
 
There was no change in the relationships between TVIC and VVIQ (pr = .38, p < .001) and 
VVIQ and IntAn (pr = -.21, p = .045) when controlling for age, while the relationship between 
UnEx and ImpNon was pr = .33, p = .002, a marginal increase from r = .31, p < .001.  The 
relationship between CogDis and ImpNon was pr = .44, p < .001, a marginal decrease from r = 
.42, p < .001. 
  473 
APPENDIX T 
Flyer for recruiting artists for Study 5 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study 
Are you an artist? 
Are painting and drawing things you enjoy? 
Have you ever published any of your work? 
Are you creative? 
USE YOUR IMAGINATION 
… and be entered into a PRIZE-DRAW  for 
£150 Amazon vouchers 
As part of my PhD research I am investigating the relationships between mental imagery abilities, 
thinking styles, and the techniques individuals use when engaging in creative endeavours. 
If you take part you will undertake a range of short psychological questionnaires and tasks that 
measure your thinking styles and visual imagination. 
I will prepare a psychological profile for you that explains which of your aptitudes and cognitive 
characteristics may be related to your creativity, and of course your name will be entered into the 
draw for the vouchers.  The session will take no longer than 1.5 hours (less in most cases). 
I can see people one-to-one or in small groups (up to 7 people) and can travel to a location 
convenient to you. 
Please contact Lucy on l.irving@mdx.ac.uk or call 07958 455 590 
if you would like to take part or for more information. 
Please pass these details on to anyone you know who may be interested. 
~ Thank you ~ 
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APPENDIX U 
Complexities in scoring the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking and subsequent 
scoring decisions 
The following is an account of the challenges that arose during the coding and scoring of the 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT), along with an explanation of the steps which were 
taken in an attempt to overcome these challenges.  These obstacles are outlined along with 
illustrated examples. 
 
PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE CIRCLES AND THE INCOMPLETE FIGURES TTCT TASKS 
The titles which accompanied the incomplete figures and circles were problematic in terms of 
scoring.  Originally the scorers were requested to insert the titles for each shape into the dataset as 
they had been written by the participants verbatim, so that the statistical infrequency (originality) 
of these titles could be calculated.  However, once the data were returned for statistical analysis it 
was apparent that this was not straight-forward as most people had not provided a simple, one-
word title, so comparison of the actual titles as they were written was not possible.  The scoring 
was made more difficult because of a possible confound, namely, that the instructions explicitly 
requested participants to create stories with the stimulus images.  Despite the judges studying the 
complete set of titles which were provided with the drawings, scoring these for „abstractness‟ as a 
general quality was the titles did not lend always themselves to this type of scoring.  Examples in 
Figure T1 and T2 illustrate this point.  
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Figure T1  
Drawings and accompanying titles provided in the Incomplete Figures Task 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Figure T2 
Examples of abstract titles provided in the Incomplete Figures task  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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The problem of subjectivity was more pronounced for abstractness of titles than it was for 
the index of originality, which, owing to adoption of the Guilford scoring procedure, had 
a mathematical component to its calculation.  The problems encountered when scoring 
the images for elaboration and abstractness of titles meant in order to obtain agreement 
discussion between the raters would likely have to take place for every instance of a 
potentially abstract title in order to agree on how to best award the points.  This was 
problematic for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it appeared to be at odds with the objectives 
of psychometric testing in general, that is, the intention of creating technical norms and 
scoring procedures is surely to avoid the need for discussion of this nature.  Secondly, it 
seemed as though discussion about such a large set number responses would undermine 
the authenticity of subsequent calculations of inter-rater reliability.  Lastly – a similar 
problem to the first – the need for discussion of each title seemed counter to an 
overarching aim of the study itself, which was to employ tools to measure creativity 
which avoided the problem of subjectivity as far as possible. The inter-rater reliability 
between the judges for the elaboration scores was not reliable (r = .58).  The lack of 
agreement between raters may have been a result of the previously discussed issues.  
They could of course have resulted from raters‟ differing conceptualisations of the word 
„abstract‟ and what constitutes an abstract title.  That being said, these tasks were 
originally designed for use with children and so the abstractness of the responses, and 
indeed the overall level of detail provided may conceivably vary far less with younger 
participants, making it easier to award and agree upon ratings. 
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While this critique concerns the scoring of the TTCT, it is worth noting that scoring the 
other performance-based creativity tools in the battery was arguably less subjective and 
more numerical by comparison, indeed this was one of the reasons they were selected.  
The AUT scoring method included a correction for contamination of fluency and the 
responses were far easier to code due to the nature of the task instructions, while the 
scoring conventions for the CET were unambiguous and straightforward.  The CET and 
the elaboration index of the TTCT both require judges to count instances of some feature.  
However, how well defined these „point criteria‟ are varies depending on the tool.  In the 
case of the CET, the criteria for awarding points are far more explicit, for example, if the 
creature lacks sensory organs then it receives a point on the „lacks sensory organs‟ scale, 
while the TTCT criterion for elaboration is to award a point for each additional „idea‟ 
included, a far less concrete instruction.  Figure T3 below provides drawings which were 
provided by participants in the TTCT circles task.  
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(a) 
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(b) 
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Figure T3 
Examples generated by participants during the Circles task  
 
As the examples in Figure T5 indicate, for this activity there was no designated space 
provided for participants to record titles on the response sheet and the circles were close 
together.  A sizeable number of participants did not provide titles for the images they 
made for the circles, or only titled a selection of them, and it is suggested that the lack of 
space may be part of the reason for this.  Another probable reason may have resulted 
from the task instructions which explicitly specified that they tried to make the images 
tell a complete story, as was the case with the incomplete figures task.  The example in 
Figure T3 (a), which does not tell a story, includes a lot of detail around the circles, 
which in turn takes up space, and the participant does not provide titles for any of the 
images drawn.  However for the images in Figure T3 (b), although the response does not 
include a narrative, there is an apparent „space‟ theme, so this participant has clearly tried 
to follow both the instruction to provide titles but to also make the images „fit together‟ 
somehow, something seen in a number of participants‟ responses19. 
 
                                                 
19
 Some participants carried their theme through all of their images for all tasks.  It is conceivable that the 
„space theme‟ in Figure T5 (b) came about having completed the conceptual expansion task which 
required an imagined journey to a distant galaxy.  This tendency was shown by a small number of the 
participants and was highlighted by the substantial number of „nautical‟ themed drawings, possibly due 
to the similarity of the first TTCT incomplete figure to (half) a boat.  
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A complexity arose with the scoring the titles of the images generated by participants in 
the incomplete figures task.  As was outlined in the Procedure section, instructions 
explicitly requested that participants tried to make the images tell as complete and 
interesting a story as they could, so a number of them intuitively wrote their narrative in 
the space below each figure.  Not all of the participants provided what could be described 
as „titles‟ and many instead followed the instruction to make up a story with the images.  
Additionally, when „titling‟ their drawings, many assigned titles which did not lend 
themselves to the type of coding suggested by the originality scoring conventions.  Some 
examples are presented at Figure T4 (a & b) to illustrate these points. 
 
  485 
(a)  
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(b)  
Figure T4 
Examples of story-like titles generated in the Incomplete Figures task 
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Inspection of the responses provided for the incomplete figures task revealed that some 
common uses for the shapes frequently did emerge, so despite the lack of norms, this 
aspect of the scoring was attempted in order to ascertain originality scores.  The judges 
were asked to re-score all images generated in the incomplete figures tasks but they were 
also asked to provide an indication of what the participant made the main shape into 
rather than to record the actual title.  So, for example, it was apparent that the first 
incomplete figure was often made into a bowl or a mouth, so in these instances, despite 
the title provided possibly being something like „breakfast‟, or „yummy‟, the scorers were 
asked to provide a set of „generic‟ titles for the images.  They were asked to keep this as 
consistent as possible, so for example, for the drawings provided for incomplete figures 
number 1 in Figure T5, both images were entitled „boat‟20.  
 
                                                 
20
 Figures T4 and T5 also highlight the tendency for some participants to continue a theme throughout their 
responses. 
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(a)  
 
 
(b)  
  489 
Figure T5 
Examples of the same items being given different titles in the Incomplete Figures task  
 
Another example is provided in Figure T6 on the next page (drawing 1) which illustrates 
complexities that arose when the stimulus shape was made into something that others 
also thought of, but when the title provided did not reflect this and instead focussed on 
some other element of the picture. 
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Figure T6 
Example of a common response but an uncommon title in the Incomplete Figures task 
 
The example in Figure T6 shows that the image 1 was made into a type of bowl, which is 
a common response, however, the image is entitled „a blancmange‟.  Despite the steps 
taken to overcome these difficulties, it was found that an accurate analysis of the scorer 
assigned titles based on the descriptions provided in the space below each image was not 
possible.  This was due to the substantial amount of guess work involved in scoring this 
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way and it was found that when judges assigned their own titles and subsequent 
originality ratings were compared the reliability was low (r = .4).  The decision was 
therefore taken to discontinue the attempts to score for originality the titles accompanying 
the incomplete figures task drawings. 
 
Torrance‟s (1974) scoring guide for the 10 separate incomplete figures also included the 
associated norms for each one.  These provide examples for „zero‟ and „two‟ point 
common responses.  Inspection of these however reveals the same problem which was 
discussed previously, that is, that these are primarily children‟s responses and the points 
awarded for originality would arguably be questionable if used with an adult sample.  For 
example, „creative‟ responses for the incomplete figures task image 4 (two horizontal 
parallel lines) include „dog‟, „bridge‟ and „hammer‟.  According to the 1974 manual, 
these responses should each be awarded the maximum two points. 
 
The reliability coefficients reported in the manual between trained and untrained scorers 
are particularly high (fluency, r = .96; flexibility; r =.94, originality; r = .86 and 
elaboration, r = .91).  Despite the efforts of the scorers and a complete re-score of all 
responses as previously described, reliabilities obtained in this study were nowhere near 
those reported in Torrance (1974), (ranging from r = .27 for resistance to premature 
closure to r = .67 for abstractness of titles).  It is possible that the coding and scoring of 
the images in early samples upon which the norms were based was far simpler due to the 
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fact that children had generated them, however, even when streamlined and thorough 
categorical coding was undertaken using the manual as a guide for the categories, the 
subjective nature of these specific elements of scoring the TTCT remained problematic. 
 
SUBSEQUENT SCORING DECISIONS 
Further to the complexities encountered by judges when scoring the tasks according to 
the original (1974) scoring of the TTCT, it was decided to discontinue the attempts to 
streamline this procedure in order to obtain acceptable agreements.  The decision was 
taken to use only the Checklist of Creative Strengths scores as the creativity index for the 
TTCT (TTCT-CS).  This was for a number of reasons.  As has already been described, 
conventional scoring for originality was not possible for the drawings in either the 
incomplete figures task or the circles task for the reasons discussed above.  In addition to 
this, as was outlined in the Materials section, the creativity checklist has a clear scoring 
procedure which is designed in a way which appears to acknowledge at least some of the 
obstacles encountered when scoring for originality and abstractness of titles.  There is a 
maximum score of 26 using this checklist, with far simpler methods of point allocation.  
Should a participant exhibit more than three instances of the specified criteria across 
either of the creative thinking activities, they receive a maximum of two points.  
Although there remains some element of subjectivity, this appears to be an improvement 
to the early methods of scoring this tool.  Literature has been published which supports 
the addition of this element to the TTCT scoring (Kim, 2006), and it was therefore felt 
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that using this index alone would capture the creative characteristics exhibited by 
participants in the tasks.  Additionally, measures of fluency and originality were obtained 
for the Alternative Uses Task (AUT), and it was felt that none of the other measures 
employed in the present study captured the aspects of creativity that are tapped by the 
creative strengths checklist.  Factor analytic studies of the TTCT have suggested that 
Torrance‟s index of creative strengths may represent a separate factor to the other indices 
scored in the TTCT (Kim, 2006).  This subscale has stricter scoring criteria to the others 
and so it was decided that this would be the index of creativity for the TTCT drawings.   
 
Lastly, in case further justification should be sought in support of the decision to omit 
some of Torrance‟s indices, a final point concerns the scoring manual that was available 
(Torrance, 1974).  This edition did not contain the „re-normed‟ figures for the creative 
indices published in 2008, (Torrance, 2008, cited in Kim, 2011), and were in fact 
calculated on American college students and younger children whose maximum age only 
went up to nineteen.  It is argued that comparing the results from my sample of adult 
university students and visual artists to these figures would not be appropriate, regardless 
of the problems described afore.  Indeed, as was noted by Kim (2006) “Data that were 
collected from two elementary schools and a high school provide the major body of 
longitudinal research on the TTCT” (p. 6).  These norms were also produced during the 
1960s and 1970s, and it is conceivable that norms calculated from respondents 
completing the tasks during 2014 would differ substantially from these. 
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Torrance (1974) stated that “slight modifications will always have to be made in 
administration procedures depending upon the purposes and conditions of the testing” (p. 
6).  Due to the fact my sample was considerably different to Torrance‟s in terms of 
demographic composition, that is, my participants were well-educated adults, and it is 
likely that their responses and even the categories of their responses may be more 
sophisticated than those described in the TTCT scoring manual which was available to 
me.  To take one obvious example, the amount of elaboration provided by children is 
unlikely to be comparable to that of adults.  One last point is that the purposes and 
conditions of my investigation differed substantially from the more „traditional‟ 
administration protocols which can include categorising children in order to make 
decisions about whether they should join programmes for so-called „gifted and talented‟ 
pupils. 
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APPENDIX V 
Study 5. Information sheet and consent form  
 
 
 
Department of Psychology, HSSc 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Researcher: Lucy Irving 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study which will take around one hour.  
Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully.  
Ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
In this study, the relationships between thinking styles and mental imagery will be 
investigated.  You will be asked to complete some questionnaires relating to thinking 
styles and experiences, some divergent thinking tasks, and some measures relating to 
your mental imagery control.  Full instructions and practice trials will be provided. 
 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You may withdraw from the study at 
any time without giving a reason.  If you are happy to take part, please sign the 
Informed Consent section at the bottom of this sheet.   
 
The research data collected will be anonymous.  Your questionnaires will be kept strictly 
confidential during the research and after the study has been completed.  Responses 
will only be seen by the researcher and all proposals for research are reviewed by an 
Ethics Committee before they can proceed.  Middlesex University’s Psychology Ethics 
Committee has reviewed and approved this proposal. 
 
If you have any concerns, questions or comments about this study please contact Lucy 
Irving.  Department of Psychology, Middlesex University, Hendon, email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk  
 
Thank you for reading this information.  Please feel free to keep this sheet if you would 
like to. 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CONSENT FORM: 
This study has been explained to me to my satisfaction, and I agree to take part. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time. 
  
NAME: ...................................................................         DATE: ............................... 
JOB TITLE: ………………………………………….. 
 
(this slip will be removed from responses to maintain confidentiality) 
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APPENDIX W 
Study 5. Debrief sheet  
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Your contribution assists in our understanding of 
the relationships between mental imagery control, thinking styles and creativity. 
 
The Image Control & Recognition Task (ICRT, Irving, 2011) required you to follow 
instructions and manipulate shapes, and then try to name and draw the resultant image.  
This tool measures mental imagery control and is often cited that mental imagery is 
important to creative people in their work.  This is indeed reported by many famous 
creative individuals such as Albert Einstein, Salvador Dali and numerous others (Akiskal 
& Akiskal, 2007).  It is suggested that creative individuals are able to engage in 
„combinatory play‟ of mental images, often leading to solutions to problems or unique 
works of art. 
 
The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance, 1965) is a widely used 
measure which looks at „figural‟ creativity and was the task in which you made pictures 
from circles and random lines.  Ward‟s (1994) Alien Drawing Task is a conceptual 
expansion task and the Alternative Uses Task is a measure of divergent thinking and 
verbal fluency.  The responses you generated in these tasks will be rated for creativity by 
trained judges who are blind to the aims of the study. 
 
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences, (O-LIFE, Mason et al., 
1995) is a measure relating to your thoughts, feelings and experiences.  The traits which 
are measured by the questionnaire are common throughout the population.  The following 
subscales are measured: unusual experiences, cognitive disorganisation, impulsive 
noncomformity and introvertive anhedonia.   Many of these characteristics are reported 
amongst creative individuals (Nettle, 2005).  Particularly common are „unusual 
experiences‟, characterised by magical or sometimes bizarre thoughts and ideas, visual 
and/or auditory hallucinations, and an „over inclusive‟ thinking style which appears to 
lends itself to unique creative output.  The relationships between these subscales will be 
looked at in relation to the creativity tasks you completed, and the imagery control task 
(ICRT).    
 
If you have any questions relating to the study please ask Lucy or email 
l.irving@mdx.ac.uk.  You will receive your psychological profile as soon as possible
21
. 
 
                                                 
21
 This latter note was added to artists‟ debriefs only. 
  498 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study.   
 
Lucy Irving 
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APPENDIX X 
Study 5 partial correlations controlling for age  
Unusual experiences with creative expansion, pr = .219, p = .037 
Unusual experiences with cognitive disorganisation, pr = .407, p < .001  
Unusual experiences with impulsive nonconformity, pr = .250, p = .017 
Unusual expericnes with creative achievement, pr = .276, p = .008 
ICRT with TTCT-CS – no relationship  
ICRT with impulsive nonconformity, pr = .247, p = .018  
AUT with ICRT, pr = .356, p = .001  
Creative expansion with ICRT, pr = .203, p = .053  
Creative achievement with ICRT, pr = .224, p = .033 
 
 
  500 
Publication arising from the thesis 
Irving, L., Barry, R., LeBoutillier, N., & Westley, D.  (2011).  The Image Control and 
Recognition Task: A Performance-Based Measure of Imagery Control.  Journal of 
Mental Imagery, 35(3 & 4), 67-80. 
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